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Abstract 
 
Carbon emission markets, which are designed to reduce emissions of global greenhouse 
gases (GHGs), have experienced rapid ongoing development even during the recent recession 
and have attracted considerable attention from policy makers and investors. Therefore, it is 
important to understand the time series dynamics of carbon asset prices and the behaviour of 
trading activities in carbon emission markets. This thesis, using the second commitment 
period data of the European Union emission trading scheme (EU ETS), examines the 
underlying dynamics driving carbon emission markets, including the performance of state 
dependent hedge ratios, the impact of arbitrage opportunities on feedback trading activities, 
as well as the influence of carbon allowance submission deadlines on the relationship 
between carbon spot and futures markets. 
The research models the relationship between carbon spot and futures markets by 
incorporating state dependent characteristics into the return and volatility processes,  and 
finds that the class of regime switching hedging strategies, particularly the proposed new 
framework which combines regime switching behaviour and disequilibrium adjustment in the 
mean with state dependent dynamic volatility process, significantly outperform competing 
methods for all the measures considered, and for both in-sample and out-of-sample analysis. 
The results indicate that risk managers using Markov regime switching models to hedge the 
risk in carbon markets achieve greater variance reduction and better hedging performance. 
Secondly, this study extends Sentana and Wadhwani’s (1992) feedback trading model by 
allowing arbitrage opportunities to affect the demand of feedback traders in carbon markets. 
The results suggest that there is no evidence of feedback trading in the carbon market, where 
institutional investors dominate, although the effect persists in a few other energy markets. 
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This finding supports the view that institutional investors are not necessarily all feedback 
traders. Thirdly, when examining the influence of the carbon allowance submission deadline 
on the time series dynamics of carbon spot and futures markets, it is found that the 
equilibrium level, mean-reverting speed and no-arbitrage boundaries are affected by the 
submission deadline. However, the submission of allowances does not change the price 
discovery process of carbon emission markets, where this thesis finds that both the spot and 
futures markets Granger-cause each other. Furthermore, there is evidence that the volatility 
spillover process is different before and after the submission deadline, particularly from the 
spot market to the futures market. Therefore, in modelling the relationship between carbon 
spot and futures prices, the difference in the mean-reverting process of futures mispricing 
before and after the submission deadline should be accounted for. Overall, the thesis finds 
that the carbon emission markets yield different time series characteristics and trading 
behaviours from other financial markets. The findings of this thesis are of interest to risk 
managers, investors and arbitragers operating in the carbon emission market and could aid 
regulators in improving the mechanisms of the EU ETS in the next commitment period.     
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
 
1.1. Focus of the thesis  
      The international community has now reached a consensus that our world is experiencing 
serious environmental problems caused by the emission of carbon dioxide (CO2) and other 
greenhouse gases (GHGs). The level of greenhouse gases is expected to reach twice the level 
of pre-industrial times between 2030 and 2060 (Stern, 2007). This will increase the world 
average temperature by 2°C to 5°C by the end of the twenty-first century. Ice in Greenland 
and the Antarctic will melt dramatically, raising sea levels and disturbing the distribution of 
world ocean currents. More droughts and floods are likely, and more land will be under the 
threat of desertification, all of which will lead to significant detrimental economic and social 
consequences for humanity. 
In addressing these international environmental issues, the United Nations (UN) 
instigated the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, which aims to reduce GHG emissions through 
international cooperation. Under this treaty, the Kyoto Protocol requires industrialised 
countries and countries in transition to reduce their collective greenhouse gas emissions by 
5.2% of the level reached in 1990 before 2012 (UNFCCC, 1997). In order to improve the 
efficiency and reduce the costs of emissions abatement, the global GHG emission trading 
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markets, or the carbon emission markets, were launched under the framework of the Kyoto 
Protocol. 
Global carbon emission markets have experienced rapid ongoing development and have 
attracted increasing investment since their inception. The total value of the markets stood at 
more than $175 billion in 2011, which is over 20 times higher than in 2005 (World Bank, 
2012), and business activities in all sectors of the economy are influenced by carbon emission 
trading (Calel, 2013). Given the novel features and increasing importance of the carbon 
emission markets, there has been a growing body of literature studying the characteristics of 
carbon emission allowance prices and the financial markets for carbon assets.
1
 The most 
important carbon emission market is the European Union emission trading scheme (EU ETS), 
which is a “cap-and-trade” system requiring firms to surrender a certain amount of tradable 
permits corresponding to the firms’ GHG emissions by a specific deadline, otherwise they 
will incur a penalty. The EU ETS has three commitment periods (Phase I: 2005-2007; Phase 
II: 2008-2012; Phase III: 2012-2020), each with different characteristics. This thesis will 
focus on the issues associated with the second phase of the EU ETS.  
It has been shown that carbon allowance prices experience price jumps, spikes and high 
volatility, and are very sensitive to government policies (e.g. Daskalakis, Psychoyios and 
Markellos, 2009; Benz and Trück, 2009). These irregularities demonstrate the importance of 
understanding the time series properties of carbon allowance prices. In addition, the unique 
regulatory framework of carbon emission markets may lead to different behaviours within 
trading activities in carbon emission markets. Therefore, the focus of this thesis is to 
                                                          
1
 For example the determinants of carbon allowance prices (e.g. Alberola, Chevallier, and Chèze 2008; Creti, 
Jouvet and Mignon, 2012); the efficiency of carbon emission markets (e.g. Daskalakis and Markellos, 2008; 
Joyeux and Milunovich, 2010; Charles, Darné and Fouilloux, 2011); the comovement of carbon allowance 
prices and the prices of other financial assets (e.g. Chevallier, 2011a, b; Koch, 2011), etc. 
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investigate the time series dynamics of carbon allowance prices and trading behaviour in the 
carbon emission markets. 
 
1.2. Objectives of the thesis 
As it is important to understand the underlying dynamics driving the carbon emission 
markets, attention has been increasingly drawn to the econometric analysis of carbon 
allowance prices. For example, Paolella and Taschini (2008) analyse the time series 
properties of carbon allowance prices and examine the fitness of a series of GARCH models. 
It has been found that the GARCH model with generalised asymmetric t distribution 
performs best in the in-sample fitness; however, none of the models considered can provide 
accurate value of risk (VaR) forecasting. Other studies of time series analysis in carbon 
emission markets mainly focus on modelling the relationship between carbon spot and futures 
prices (e.g. Uhrig-Homburg and Wagner, 2009; Joyeux and Milunovich, 2010; Chevallier, 
2010; Rittler, 2012, among others). Apart from these studies, a very important issue is the 
impact of the regulations governing carbon emission markets on the time series 
characteristics of carbon allowance prices and the implications of these special properties for 
hedging, arbitrage and other trading activities in carbon emission markets. Therefore, it is 
useful to model the time series dynamics of carbon spot and futures markets by considering 
the special characteristics of carbon emission markets, and analyse how these models can be 
applied to trading activities.  
Previous research has shown that carbon allowance prices experience frequent jumps and 
spikes and that the volatility of carbon emission markets is high compared to other financial 
markets (Daskalakis, et al., 2009; Benz and Trück, 2009). Thus, managing the financial risk 
in carbon emission markets is important for market participants. However, few studies have 
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been conducted to estimate the hedge ratios and to evaluate the hedging performance in 
carbon emission markets. Only Pinho and Madaleno (2010) and Fan, Roca and Akimov 
(2013) examine the effectiveness of conventional hedging strategies in European carbon 
emission markets, including the naive hedge, constant OLS, VECM and GARCH approaches. 
These hedging strategies fail to consider the special characteristics of carbon emission 
markets and therefore cannot achieve a significant improvement on the simple naive hedge 
approach.  
Benz and Trück (2009) compare the usefulness of GARCH and regime switching 
approaches in modelling the dynamics of carbon allowance prices. The results show that the 
Markov regime switching model outperforms the GARCH model in both in-sample fit and 
out-of-sample forecasting. This is because the regime switching model can capture the 
economic and econometric characteristics of carbon allowance prices. From an economic 
perspective, the regime switching model can reflect the fluctuations in the demand and supply 
of carbon allowances based on different regulatory frameworks, production levels and 
weather conditions, by allowing a systematic switching between high variance (unstable) 
state and low variance (stable) state. In addition, the Markov regime switching models, in 
which the regimes are determined by an unobservable state variable, are more appropriate for 
carbon emission markets as several determinants of carbon allowance prices (e.g. the 
regulatory and sociological variables) are unquantifiable and unobservable. From an 
econometric perspective, the regime switching models which allow consecutive jumps and 
extreme values in asset prices can better capture the statistical characteristics of carbon 
allowance prices.  
The findings above imply that the regime switching models may produce better hedging 
performance than the GARCH approaches as they can capture the dynamics of carbon 
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emission markets more effectively. Therefore, in Chapter 3, this thesis models the 
relationship between carbon spot and futures markets by considering state dependent 
properties in the return and volatility processes, and evaluates the performance of Markov 
regime switching and alternative hedging strategies. In particular, this chapter introduces a 
new framework with which to model the carbon spot and futures relationship, which 
incorporates regime switching behaviour and the long run disequilibrium adjustment in the 
mean with the state dependent dynamic volatility process. In assessing the effectiveness of 
competing approaches, this chapter uses a variety of hedging performance measures, 
including the variance of hedged portfolio, hedger’s utility and value at risk exposure. In 
addition, this chapter also considers the downside risk measures, different hedging positions 
and tests the statistical significance of improvements by using state dependent hedge ratios. 
After evaluating the hedging performance of Markov regime switching models, the thesis 
turns its attention to attempting to understand the trading behaviour of investors in carbon 
emission markets, as they are governed by a different regulatory framework than other 
financial markets. The design and mechanisms of the EU ETS mean that the vast majority of 
investors in European carbon emission markets are institutional investors, which provides us 
with a unique and natural opportunity to investigate the institutional investors’ trading 
behaviour. In particular, feedback trading is an important trend chasing strategy which has 
attracted an increasing amount of attention in recent studies (e.g. Sentana and Wadhwani, 
1992; Antoniou, Koutmos and Pericli, 2005; Laopodis, 2005; Salm and Schuppli, 2010; Chau, 
Deesomsak and Lau, 2011, among others). However, no previous study has examined 
feedback trading in carbon emission markets, where institutional investors dominate. This 
provides a motivation for examining whether there is significant feedback trading in carbon 
emission markets, and comparing the results with other energy markets, which is the second 
aim of the thesis. 
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Conventional feedback trading models assume that the feedback traders’ demand for 
shares is only determined by the return in the last period. However, it has been argued that 
arbitrage opportunities can also affect the trading behaviour of feedback traders. Arbitrage, 
which is a form of rational speculation, is among the most important factors contributing to 
feedback trading (De Long, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann, 1990). In addition, it has been 
shown that arbitrage opportunities contain some predictive value for future price movements 
(e.g. Khoury and Yourougou, 1991; Knetsch, 2007; Gorton, Hayashi and Rouwenhorst, 
2013). For the reasons outlined above, the thesis argues that, in addition to the last period’s 
return, potential arbitrage opportunities can also determine the demand function of feedback 
traders. Therefore, Chapter 4 extends Sentana and Wadhwani’s (1992) feedback trading 
model by allowing arbitrage opportunities to affect the feedback traders’ demand function, 
and examines whether there is significant feedback trading in carbon emission and energy 
markets. In the augmented feedback trading model, the demand from feedback traders is 
influenced by arbitrage opportunities, which is measured by using the spot-futures basis and 
the convenience yield, in both an additive and a multiplicative way. The chapter also tests 
whether the effects of arbitrage opportunities on feedback trading are different across bull 
and bear market conditions. 
Beside the fact that carbon emission markets are dominated by institutional investors, 
there is another important characteristic of European carbon emission markets that needs to 
be addressed. Firms are required to submit a certain amount of their carbon allowances to the 
EU by a fixed deadline each year to comply with the EU ETS regulations; otherwise they will 
incur a heavy penalty. In order to avoid the fine, firms with insufficient carbon allowances 
need to purchase the rest of their allowances in the markets before the submission deadline. 
This causes trading to be more active before the submission deadline than after. After the 
submission, the total amount of carbon allowances in the markets is significantly lower than 
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before the submission deadline, which also means that investors’ trading activities differ 
before and after the submission deadline. Therefore, the time series dynamics driven by 
trading activities should have changed after the submission deadline. In order to observe the 
change intuitively, the author plots the time series of the difference between observed futures 
prices and theoretical futures prices derived from the cost of carry model. Persistent 
mispricing of carbon futures is observed before the submission deadline, which supports the 
previous argument. The reasons outlined above provide a strong motivation to examine the 
impact of the allowance submission deadline on the time series dynamics of carbon emission 
markets, which is the last objective of this thesis. In particular, in Chapter 5, this thesis 
examines the impact of the allowance submission deadline (30 April each year), set by the 
European Union emission trading scheme (EU ETS), on the relationship between carbon spot 
and futures markets. In particular, this chapter studies whether there is a shift in the mean-
reverting process of the carbon spot and futures relationship, the price discovery process and 
volatility spillovers of carbon spot and futures markets before and after the submission 
deadline. The effects described above are examined by using intraday data with different time 
frequencies. 
 
1.3. Contributions of the thesis 
By investigating the research objectives outlined above, the thesis makes unique 
contributions to the existing literature in the following respects. 
Firstly, in order to model the joint distribution of carbon spot and futures prices, this 
thesis formulates a new framework in Chapter 3 which incorporates the concepts of regime 
switching, disequilibrium adjustment and volatility clustering. In particular, this approach 
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allows Markov regime switching (MRS) behaviour and adjustment to the long run 
equilibrium (LR) in modelling the relationship between spot and futures returns, and state 
dependent characteristics in the dynamics volatility process, which is modelled by Engle’s 
(2002) dynamic conditional correlation (DCC) GARCH (referred as MRS-LR-DCC). This is 
important because, if there is a long run relationship between spot and futures prices, 
overlooking the cointegration relationship will cause misspecification of the models and 
consequently the performance of the hedging strategy could be unsatisfactory (e.g. Kroner 
and Sultan, 1993; Lien, 1996).  In addition, by allowing the conditional variance parameters 
to be state dependent, this thesis is the first to introduce the regime switching dynamic 
volatility process into the carbon emission markets. Previous studies only consider the state 
dependent characteristics in the return process of carbon allowances (e.g. Benz and Trück, 
2009; Chevellier, 2011a, b). However, Chevellier (2011c) shows that the conditional 
variances of carbon asset returns exhibit strong shifts and instability. Therefore, it is 
important to allow regime switching in carbon asset volatilities.  
The second contribution of the thesis is to demonstrate that the class of Markov regime 
switching approaches perform the best in hedging the financial risk in carbon emission 
markets. As Markov regime switching models can capture the economic and econometric 
properties of carbon allowance prices, the state dependent hedging strategies are expected to 
produce a superior performance. The class of Markov regime switching approaches 
outperform OLS and GARCH strategies in all the hedging performance measures considered, 
including variance reduction, hedgers’ utility and value at risk. White’s (2000) reality check 
is used to test the statistical significance of the improvement offered by the MRS-LR-DCC 
model over other approaches. The results show that the MRS-LR-DCC model significantly 
outstrips all the other strategies at conventional levels. Furthermore, the findings above are 
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still significant after considering the downside risk measures and the difference in long and 
short hedging positions.  
Thirdly, this thesis finds that there is no significant feedback trading in carbon emission 
markets. This is important because most of the investors in carbon markets are institutional 
investors. The unique features of carbon emission markets make the results obtained in this 
thesis significant in understanding the trading behaviour of institutional investors. 
Also, by examining the impact of arbitrage opportunities on feedback trading, this thesis 
contributes to a rising number of studies investigating how arbitrage opportunities affect 
investors’ trading behaviour. Arbitrage, which is regarded as a type of rational speculation, is 
suggested as one of the causes of feedback trading (De Long et al., 1990). In addition, 
arbitrage opportunities can be used to predict future price movements (e.g. Khoury and 
Martel, 1989; Khoury and Yourougou, 1991). Therefore, it is possible that feedback traders 
also consider the positional arbitrage opportunities as an indicator to trade. For this reason, 
this thesis extends Sentana and Wadhwani’s (1992) feedback trading model by allowing 
arbitrage opportunities to affect feedback traders’ demand for shares, in both an additive and 
a multiplicative way. The results show that the impact of arbitrage opportunities on feedback 
trading is significant in some energy markets. Furthermore, this thesis shows that the impact 
of arbitrage opportunities on the level of feedback trading is different across bull and bear 
market regimes. Finally, this thesis also differs from previous studies which only assume a 
particular specification of the conditional variance process, by conducting a comprehensive 
examination of specifications in order to select the most appropriate volatility model for each 
market. 
Last but not least, by examining the impact of the allowance submission deadline on the 
European carbon emission markets, this thesis finds in Chapter 5 that the time series 
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dynamics of the carbon emission markets change after the submission deadline. Due to the 
EU ETS regulations, investors’ trading activities in carbon emission markets may be 
different before and after the submission deadline, which can induce a change in the time 
series characteristics of carbon allowance prices. Therefore, the results obtained are 
significant in understanding the trading activities, especially arbitrage activities, in carbon 
emission markets. In particular, this thesis finds that the equilibrium level, mean-reverting 
speed and no-arbitrage boundaries of the carbon futures mispricing are affected by the 
submission deadline. However, the cointegration relationship between spot and futures 
prices is not affected. As previous studies show mixed results for the cost-of-carry 
relationship between carbon spot and futures prices, the results obtained show that 
submission of allowances is not the underlying reason for the mixed results. In addition, this 
study incorporates the impact of allowance submission into the examination of the causal 
relationship between spot and futures returns in the carbon emission markets. These results 
show that the price discovery process does not change after the allowance submission 
deadline. Furthermore, by using realised measures, this thesis finds that the submission of 
allowances has a significant impact on the volatility spillovers between carbon spot and 
futures markets, particularly from the spot market to the futures market.  
Overall, this thesis proposes a time series model (MRS-LR-DCC) for carbon emission 
markets that can explain the data generation process (DGP) accurately and also provide a 
superior hedging performance. Moreover, this thesis introduces a new feedback trading 
model in which arbitrage opportunities affect the demand from feedback traders. Finally, the 
thesis finds that carbon emission markets yield different time series characteristics from other 
financial markets, which is dependent on the submission deadline.  
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Chapter 2 
Overview of the Global Carbon Emissions Markets 
 
 
2.1. Global warming and the Kyoto protocol  
The observed average temperature of the Earth’s surface has shown a tendency to 
increase since the start of the twentieth century. The average surface temperature of the Earth 
rose by around 0.8°C over the past century, and about 0.6°C of this increase has occurred 
since 1980 (National Research Council, 2011). In addition, the projected world average 
temperature will increase by 2°C to 5°C by the end of the twenty-first century (Stern, 2007). 
Continuous global warming will have significant adverse economic and social consequences, 
such as more droughts, floods, and severe weather conditions, desertification of land and 
reductions in agricultural production.  
It has been shown that global warming is strongly associated with the emission of 
greenhouse gases (GHGs), and there is an increasing awareness that it is important to reduce 
GHG emissions. In order to address the climate change issue, the United Nations launched 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992 to reduce 
the worldwide emission of GHGs. 194 countries have acknowledged that the international 
community needs to control the accumulation of GHGs in the atmosphere, by keeping them 
under a certain level in order to avoid the hazardous impact of global warming on the climatic 
system (Newell, Pizer and Raimi, 2012). 
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The UNFCCC further proposed an agreement on how to achieve global emission 
reduction, known as the Kyoto Protocol, which was initially adopted in December 1997 in 
Kyoto, Japan. The treaty requires 37 industrialised countries or countries in transition (known 
as Annex I countries of the Kyoto Protocol) to reduce their collective GHG emissions by 
5.2% of the level reached in 1990 before 2012 (UNFCCC, 1997). The Kyoto Protocol also 
designed a “cap-and-trade” system to reduce the emissions more efficiently and economically. 
Under this system, central authorities set up a standard or “cap” on the total amount of 
greenhouse gases that each country or region can emit within a year or other fixed period. 
The authorities then allocate the allowance of emission units, which is the right to emit a 
certain amount of GHGs. Firms’ emissions should not exceed the allocated allowance 
represented by their in-hand credits; otherwise they must deliver the missing carbon credits in 
the next year and will also incur a heavy penalty. For example, the penalty in the EU is €40 
per ton of CO2 equivalent before 2008 and €100 per ton after 2008. The total amount of 
credits should not exceed the cap. As a consequence, the total amount of emissions can be 
controlled and kept under a target level. If a company needs to emit more than its allocated 
allowance, it can buy the carbon credits from another company with a remaining emission 
allowance. This is how the “cap-and-trade” system works. According to the Coase theorem 
(Coase, 1937, 1960), under the assumption of no transaction costs, and if the authorities 
allocate the credits and protect the rights of credit holders very effectively, the “cap-and-trade” 
system can completely solve the externality problem of market failure. By adopting the “cap-
and-trade” mechanism, many countries and regions implemented emission reduction 
programmes, and gradually created the global GHG emission markets, which are also known 
as the carbon emission markets as CO2 is the predominant gas in GHGs. The global carbon 
emission markets had reached a market value of $144 billion by the end of 2009, and had an 
annual growth rate of 6% even at the height of the economic recession (World Bank, 2010). 
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The value further increased to more than $175 billion in 2011, which is over 20 times higher 
than in 2005 (World Bank, 2012), while business activities in all sectors of the economy are 
influenced by carbon emission trading (Calel, 2013).
2
 
The Kyoto Protocol designed three “flexibility mechanisms” to be used by Annex I 
countries in order to meet their emission reduction obligations, which are: the International 
Emissions Trading (IET); the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM); and Joint 
Implementation (JI). The IET allows participating countries to trade their emission rights 
assigned by the UN, which are known as Assigned Amount Units (AAUs, or carbon emission 
allowances). The most important emission trading programme in the world is the European 
Union Emission trading scheme (EU ETS) organised by the European Union Commission. 
The CDM is designed to promote international environmental cooperation between 
industrialised counties and developing countries, by allowing Annex I parties to develop 
emission reduction projects in developing countries and generate Certified Emission 
Reduction units (CERs), which can be used to fulfil the emission reduction requirements or 
traded in the global carbon emission markets. Similarly, the JI is a mechanism which allows 
an Annex I country to invest in emission reduction projects in another Annex I country, in 
exchange for Emission Reduction Units (ERUs), which are also a form of carbon credits 
accepted by the UN. These flexibility mechanisms reduce the overall costs of emission 
reductions and boost the spillovers of clean energy technologies.  
 
2.2. The EU ETS  
                                                          
2
 The financial instruments traded in the carbon emission markets are called carbon credits. Because the carbon 
emission market is a futures-dominated market and always a sub-market of energy exchanges, carbon credits are 
commonly viewed as a special type of commodities (Button, 2008). Hence, some research methods intensively 
employed in commodity markets are adopted in this thesis. 
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The European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is a “cap-and-trade” system, 
operating under the Kyoto Protocol. Launched in 2005, the total value of European Union 
Allowance (EUA)
3
 transactions is 118.5 billion US dollars with an 18% growth rate, which is 
considerably faster than the growth of the global carbon emission market (World Bank, 2010). 
Accounting for 83% of the market value of global carbon emission markets, the EU ETS is 
the most influential and successful emission trading programme in the world. The firms 
covered by the EU ETS comprise approximately 12,000 installations which have a net 
generating capacity of more than 20 megawatts (MW), located in 28 countries in the EU and 
3 European countries outside of the EU (Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway). The sections 
included are: power stations; mineral or oil refineries; ferrous metal; glass production; coke 
ovens; ceramic production; cement manufacture; and finally the aviation industry which 
joined in 2012 (Ibikunle, 2012). 
After the “cap” or total amount of GHG emissions was decided, the EUAs were 
distributed to the participating nations and then the installations within them through National 
Allocation Plans (NAPs). The distribution approaches include free allocation, which is based 
on historic patterns of emissions in a specific sector (also known as grandfathering), 
auctioning, or a combination of both methods. As firms may receive windfall profits through 
free allocation, the EU gradually increases the proportion of auctioning in the EUA 
allocations. In any year, the government authorities have to issue the auctioned or freely 
allocated carbon emission allowances to the participating firms by 28 February. On 30 April 
of the following year, all firms covered by the EU ETS are required to surrender the specified 
quantity of EUAs or other accepted carbon financial instruments (including CERs and ERUs 
under some conditions) corresponding to the GHG emissions in the previous year. Those 
GHG emissions not covered by the surrendered carbon allowances are penalised at €40 per 
                                                          
3
 EUA is the carbon emission allowance traded under EU ETS. 
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ton of CO2 before 2008 and €100 per ton of CO2 after 2008. In addition, the uncovered 
carbon allowance should also be surrendered in the next compliance year. Therefore, in order 
to avoid the penalty, firms that do not have sufficient carbon allowances to surrender have to 
purchase the uncovered allowances in the spot market before the submission deadline, 
boosting trading activities in carbon emission allowances before 30 April each year. All the 
operators’ allowance holdings and carbon allowance trading are registered in the EU ETS 
Transaction Log. The data show that less than 6% of the total accounts are personal holding 
accounts (2,050 out of a total of 34,492 accounts) in November 2012, indicating that the vast 
majority of the participants in the European carbon emission markets are institutional 
investors. This is because individuals cannot claim carbon allowance from their personal 
emissions reduction, resulting in individuals being disadvantaged in terms of carbon emission 
trading compared to participating firms. The participants in the EU ETS include the 12,000 
installations covered by the scheme, firms investing in the CDM and JI projects, government 
carbon funds, international organisations, arbitragers, speculators and other environmental 
investors.  
The EU ETS has three commitment periods, each with different mechanisms. Phase I 
spans the period from January 2005 to the end of 2007, which is the trial period. All the 
carbon emission allowances were freely allocated through grandfathering. In addition, it did 
not permit banking and borrowing of carbon allowances between different phases. The 
penalty in this commitment period was €40 per CO2 ton not surrendered plus the submission 
of uncovered carbon allowances in the next year. The period from January 2008 to December 
2012 constitutes the second phase of the EU ETS; interphase banking restrictions were 
relaxed to some extent and more countries such as Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein joined 
the scheme. The aviation industry has also been included in the scheme since 2012. The 
financial penalty for default increased to €100 per CO2 ton of uncovered emissions. A small 
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fraction of carbon emission allowances (less than 10%) was distributed through auctioning. 
In the third commitment period of the EU ETS (2013–2020), a series of changes will be made 
by the European Union. For example, the proportion of carbon emission allowances allocated 
through auctioning will gradually increase from 20% in 2013 to 70% in 2020, and this 
allocation will not be done through NAPs but through EU-wide distributions. Interphase 
banking restrictions will be completely abolished. In addition, the European commission will 
restrict the use of carbon offsets outside of the EU as a substitute for the EUA. This makes 
the characteristics of carbon emission trading in EU ETS Phase III different from the first two 
commitment periods. Therefore, with increasing data availability, it will be of interest to 
investigate the new features of carbon emission markets in EU ETS Phase III. 
 
2.3. The European carbon emission trading markets 
The previous section has described the mechanisms and the primary markets (auction or 
free allocation) of the EU ETS. In this section, the thesis will focus on the secondary markets 
of the EU ETS, i.e. European carbon emission trading markets, which are the markets used 
for the empirical investigation carried out in this thesis.  
Spot and derivative carbon allowances are traded in a number of exchanges, including the 
European Climate Exchange (ECX) under the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE), BlueNext 
exchange,
4
 European Energy Exchange (EEX), Nordpool Exchange, Green Exchange, and 
the Climex. Futures contracts for the EUAs are the dominant financial instrument in 
European carbon emission markets (World Bank, 2008). More than 90% of carbon futures 
contracts are traded on the ICE ECX. The ICE ECX futures market opens from 07:00 to 
                                                          
4
 The BlueNext exchange was shut down in December 2012 as it failed to win a bid to run the EUA auctions 
from the start of the third commitment period of the EU ETS (2013-2020). European Energy Exchange won the 
bid so that will now be the leading spot market for the carbon allowances.  
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17:00 GMT Monday to Friday, and the futures contracts are listed on a quarterly expiry cycle, 
i.e. contracts expire in March, June, September and December each year. The expiry date is 
the last Monday of the contract month. The most liquid futures contract is the one which 
expires in December each year. The leading spot market for the EUA is the Bluenext 
exchange for the first and second commitment periods, and it will be the EEX for EU ETS 
Phase III. Trading on the BlueNext spot market occurs from 08:00 to 17:30 UTC+1, Monday 
to Friday. Therefore, this thesis uses the EUAs futures contracts data from the ICE ECX and 
spot contracts data from the BlueNext. 
[Insert Figure 2.1 here] 
The time series of the EUA futures prices in EU ETS Phase I and Phase II are presented 
in Figure 2.1. It can be observed that the carbon allowance prices are volatile and are 
characterised by frequent jumps and spikes, especially in the first commitment period of the 
EU ETS (2005-2007). The significant drop in the EUA prices during the last week of April 
2006 is because the installations’ emission data was disclosed and market participants 
realised that the EUAs were oversupplied. The over-allocation of the EUAs and windfall 
profits from the free allocation made the EUAs worthless and they gradually declined to zero 
(or almost zero) during the second half of 2007. Alberola et al. (2008) show that, in Phase I 
of the EU ETS, there are two structural changes in the carbon allowance prices and the price 
drivers are energy prices, weather conditions and unexpected policies. Given the high 
volatility of carbon allowance prices, there is a consensus that the European carbon emission 
markets are not efficient during EU ETS Phase I (e.g. Daskalakis and Markellos, 2008; 
Miclaus, Dumitrescu and Bobirca, 2008; Frunza and Guegan, 2009; Montagnoli and De Vries, 
2010; Joyeux and Milunovich, 2010; Charles, et al., 2011).  
18 
 
During Phase II of the EU ETS, the European Commission revised the National 
Allocation Plans (NAPs) to stabilise the carbon allowance prices. The significant decline in 
prices from August 2008 to April 2009 was because of the global financial crisis. After that, 
the carbon allowance prices became less volatile. During this commitment period, the 
interaction between carbon allowance prices and macroeconomic variables becomes stronger 
(e.g. Chevallier, 2011a, b), while the efficiency of the market has also been improved (e.g. 
Charles, et al., 2011; Charles, Darné, and Fouilloux, 2013). 
[Insert Figure 2.2 here] 
Figure 2.2 presents the annual market value of the European carbon emission market. 
Charles, et al. (2011) identify that the European carbon emission market was a thin trading 
market during EU ETS Phase I, although it is growing rapidly. It can be observed from the 
figure that the market value stood at only around $50 billion by the end of 2007 but jumped 
to $100 billion in 2008. The European carbon emission market was worth approximately 
$150 billion by 2011, which is 20 times higher than in 2005. It is now a sizable market and 
consequently is attracting an increasing amount of investment.  
Finally, it can be inferred from the design and regulations of the EU ETS, and the price-
volume analysis above, that the characteristics of European carbon markets have phase-
dependent issues. This thesis only considers the data in the second commitment period of the 
EU ETS, for the following reasons. Firstly, the second phase of the EU ETS is the most 
recent commitment period and has not been fully investigated. Secondly, the mechanisms of 
EU ETS Phase I and Phase II had been significantly changed; therefore, it would not be 
viable to examine the Phase I and Phase II data together. Thirdly, due to inter-phase banking 
restrictions, the spot prices were close to zero at the end of Phase I, i.e. the second half of 
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2007 (Chevellier, 2011a). Therefore, it is not appropriate to use the spot prices at that stage to 
study the time series dynamics of carbon emission markets. 
 From Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2 it can be observed that the European carbon market 
becomes less volatile and more liquid, although it is open to some criticisms, for example 
over-allocated allowances, the VAT fraud and the low prices at the end of the first phase. The 
European commission has made many changes in the mechanisms of Phase III designed to 
resolve these issues. The most important ones include auctioning the carbon allowances and 
reforming the National Allocation Plans (NAP). These actions will strongly support carbon 
prices and help the market to become mature. 
 
2.4. Other emission trading markets 
Prior to the EU ETS, the US SO2 market, which is also a “cap-and-trade” system, was 
created in 1995. Similar to the EU ETS, it consists of two phases with different targets. The 
price for SO2 was high in the first phase, and subsequently dropped to a very low level 
because technological advances reduced the cost of SO2 emission reduction. The market has 
been very successful as the SO2 emissions and acid rain levels dropped significantly after the 
programme was introduced. We can therefore expect the EU ETS, which has similar 
mechanisms to the US SO2 market, to be very successful in the future. 
Among the world’s carbon markets, the US voluntary carbon market is one of the most 
important. Currently there are no federal carbon regulations but only regional initiatives for 
carbon emission reductions in the United States, for example the Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative (RGGI) for the north-eastern states and emission trading in California. The US 
carbon emission market is a voluntary and pre-compliance carbon offset market, which can 
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be viewed as an experimental market for mandatory greenhouse gas “cap-and-trade” at 
federal level. The House of Representatives passed the Waxman-Markey Bill
5
 in June 2009 
and it is now waiting for Senate to vote on it. According to Point Carbon’s survey, 81% of 
participants expect the US to introduce an emission trading scheme in 2014 (Point Carbon, 
2010). Viswanathan (2010) proposes a hybrid approach to regulate the future U.S. carbon 
emission market, which involves a combination of exchange-traded centralised trading for 
large financial intermediates and over-the-counter (OTC) transactions for small contracts. If a 
U.S. emission trading programme was to be introduced, the trading volume of the global 
carbon market as a whole would be boosted, and it would probably surpass the EU ETS to 
become the largest carbon market within a few years.  
Other carbon emission markets include: New Zealand’s emission trading scheme (NZ 
ETS), launched in 2008; the emission trading programme in Quebec, Canada (launched in 
2013); and a number of provincial carbon emission markets in China (initiated from 2013 
onwards). Australia will implement an emission trading programme in 2015 and will link it to 
the EU ETS. Furthermore, Kazakhstan, Japan, South Korea, Brazil and Mexico have all 
passed legal procedures for introducing their own emission trading programmes.  
More than 15 years have passed since the signing of the Kyoto Protocol. Since then, 
global carbon emission markets have experienced ongoing development. Currently, carbon 
emission markets are sizeable and are continuing to expand rapidly. The regulatory 
framework for carbon emissions is not static; it incorporates the lessons learned from 
previous experience (Newell et al., 2012). Overall, carbon emission markets aid the efficient 
reduction of GHG emission and will attract an increasing amount of investment in the future 
(Newell, Pizer and Raimi, 2013).  
                                                          
5
 This is a mandatory emission reduction Act, which requires U.S. to reduce GHG emission by 20% below 2005 
emission levels before 2020, and introduced a series of long-term targets. 
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Figure 2.1: Time series of the EUA prices (€ per CO2 ton, continuous futures contracts) 
 
Note: This figure displays the time series of the EUA futures prices in the first and second commitment periods 
of the EU ETS (from 22 April, 2005 to 31 December, 2012). To construct a continuous series of futures prices, 
the futures contracts switch over on the first day of a new month’s trading, for all available trading months. 
 
Figure 2.2: Market value of European carbon emission market ($ billion) 
 
Note: This figure presents the annual market value of the European carbon emission market. The data is 
obtained from the World Bank (currently there is no data available for 2012). 
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Chapter 3 
Hedging carbon emission allowances using Markov regime 
switching approaches 
 
 
Abstract 
Using the second commitment period data for the European Union emission trading 
scheme (EU ETS), this chapter models the relationship between carbon spot and futures 
markets by incorporating state dependent characteristics in the return and volatility processes, 
and assesses the effectiveness of constant and dynamic hedge ratios. In particular, this 
chapter proposes a new framework for the carbon emission markets which combines regime 
switching behaviour and disequilibrium adjustment in the mean with a state dependent 
dynamic volatility process. It is found that the class of regime switching hedging strategies, 
especially the new approach proposed in this chapter, significantly outperform competing 
methods for all the measures considered, and for both in-sample and out-of-sample analysis. 
The results indicate that risk managers using state dependent hedge ratios to manage the 
financial risk in carbon emission markets can achieve greater variance reduction and better 
hedging performance. 
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3.1. Introduction 
Launched in 2005, the European Union emission trading scheme (EU ETS) is a “cap-
and-trade” system6 aimed at reducing emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse 
gases (GHGs) efficiently and economically. Since its inception, European carbon emission 
markets under the EU ETS have experienced rapid ongoing development and have attracted 
considerable attention from policy makers and investors. The total value of European Union 
allowances (EUAs)
7
 transactions had risen to 118.5 billion U.S. dollars with an 18% growth 
rate even during the recent global financial crisis (2008-2009), which is considerably faster 
than the growth rate in other financial markets (World Bank, 2010).  
Given the novel features and rapid growth of the carbon emission markets, an increasing 
number of studies have been conducted within this market. The existing literature mainly 
focuses on pricing carbon spot and derivatives assets (e.g. Benz and Trück, 2009; Daskalakis 
et al., 2009), or modelling the relationship between spot and futures prices (e.g. Uhrig-
Homburg and Wagner, 2009; Joyeux and Milunovich, 2010; Chevallier, 2010; Rittler, 2012; 
among others). However, little attention has been paid to risk management, especially 
hedging, in carbon emission markets. The risk associated with carbon markets involves the 
possibility of being fined for uncommitted allowances and the uncertainty of carbon 
                                                          
6
 Under this system, central authorities set up a standard or “cap” on the total amount of greenhouse gases that a 
country or region is allowed to emit within a year. The authorities then allocate the allowance of emission units, 
which is the right to emit a certain amount of greenhouse gases. Companies’ GHG emissions should not exceed 
the allocated allowance represented by their in-hand allowances; otherwise they must deliver the missing carbon 
allowances in the next year and also incur a heavy penalty. The GHG emissions not covered by the surrendered 
carbon allowances incur a fine of €40 per CO2 ton in Phase I and €100 per CO2 ton in Phase II. In addition, the 
uncovered carbon allowance should also be surrendered in the next compliance year. The total amount of 
allowances should not exceed the cap. As a consequence, the total amount of emissions can be controlled and 
kept under a target level. If a company needs to emit more than its allocated allowance, it can buy carbon 
allowances from another company which has some emission allowances remaining. According to the Coase 
theorem (Coase, 1937, 1960), under the assumption of zero transaction costs, and if the authorities allocate and 
protect the rights of allowance holders very effectively, the “cap-and-trade” system can completely solve the 
externalities problem of market failure. 
7
 The financial instruments traded in the carbon emission markets are known as carbon allowances. EUA is the 
carbon allowance traded under the EU ETS. 
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emission prices. Exceptions include Fan et al.’s (2013) study of hedging performance in the 
European carbon markets. The authors estimate the optimal hedge ratios in the first and 
second commitment periods of the EU ETS, which are obtained from the ordinary least 
squares (OLS) model, the two-stage error correction model (ECM), and the vector ECM 
(VECM) model, as well as the VECM model with bivariate generalised autoregressive 
conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH) errors. The results indicate that the static hedge 
ratio from the simple OLS model can provide the greatest variance reduction in most cases.  
However, Kroner and Sultan (1993) argue that if the asset prices follow time-varying 
distributions, time variation should also be taken into account for the optimal hedge ratio. 
Lien (2008) suggests that the OLS model tends to underperform dynamic hedging 
approaches in a number of empirical studies. The inferior performance of dynamic hedge 
ratios in Fan et al.’s (2013) study may be attributed to the fact that the VECM-GARCH 
model does not fit the data very well. Benz and Trück (2009) estimate the dynamics of 
carbon spot prices using various time series models. It is found that the Markov regime 
switching model outperforms the AR (1)-GARCH (1, 1) model in terms of in-sample fit and 
out-of-sample forecasting. Benz and Trück (2009) argue that the regime switching model is a 
promising approach for modelling the price dynamics of carbon emission allowances 
because it can capture the economic and econometric characteristics of carbon allowance 
prices. Firstly, the demand and supply of carbon allowances, which determine the carbon 
allowance prices, fluctuate according to the regulatory framework, production level, weather 
conditions and other factors. The regime switching model can reflect such fluctuations by 
allowing a systematic switching between a high variance (unstable) state and a low variance 
(stable) state. In particular, the Markov regime switching models, where the regimes are 
determined by an unobservable state variable, are more appropriate for carbon emission 
markets because the regulatory and sociological variables which could affect carbon 
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allowance prices are unquantifiable and unobservable. Secondly, the carbon allowance prices 
and returns exhibit price jumps, spikes and high volatility (Benz and Trück, 2009; 
Daskalakis et al., 2009). The regime switching model can capture these econometric 
properties by allowing for several successive price jumps and very high or low returns, 
which is important in risk management. In addition, Chevellier (2011a, b)  also showed the 
advantages of using the Markov regime switching (MRS) vector autoregressive (VAR) 
model over the single regime VAR model in examining the relationship between carbon 
allowance prices and macroeconomic variables. The evidence discussed above implies that 
the hedge ratios generated from regime switching models could outperform single regime 
hedging models in carbon emission markets. 
Motivated by the above results and arguments, this chapter aims to investigate the 
performance of state dependent hedge ratios in the European carbon emission markets. This 
thesis adopts the Markov regime switching model rather than another non-linear model (e.g. 
threshold models) because the hedging performance of threshold models is poor in the 
literature and the Markov regime switching model is shown to have good in-sample fit and 
out-of-sample forecasting for carbon markets. The Markov regime switching hedging 
strategies have been found to outperform the OLS and GARCH model in various financial 
markets (e.g. Alizadeh and Nomikos, 2004; Lee and Yoder, 2007a, b; Alizadeh, Nomikos 
and Pouliasis, 2008; Salvador and Arago, 2013). However, the Markov regime switching 
approaches to hedging have not been applied in the carbon emission markets. 
By examining the research question above, this chapter contributes to the literature in the 
following respects. Firstly, this chapter proposes a new framework with which to model the 
relationship between carbon spot and futures markets, which incorporates the concepts of 
regime switching, disequilibrium adjustment and volatility clustering. This method considers 
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Markov regime switching (MRS) behaviour and the long run relationship between spot and 
futures prices (LR) in the mean, and the state dependent dynamic volatility process which is 
modelled by Engle’s (2002) dynamic conditional correlation (DCC) GARCH (MRS-LR-
DCC). This approach differs from Lee and Yoder’s (2007b) MRS-TVC-GARCH model by 
allowing the disequilibrium adjustment coefficients to be state dependent.
8
 It has been shown 
that if spot and futures prices are cointegrated, overlooking the adjustment of the long run 
relationship between spot and futures prices will result in model misspecification and 
therefore inferior hedging performance (e.g. Kroner and Sultan, 1993; Lien, 1996). In 
addition, the author’s model differs from the MRS-BEKK method used by Alizadeh et al. 
(2008) because it allows the conditional correlations to be time-varying and state dependent. 
Secondly, this chapter first adopts the Markov regime switching approaches in order to 
hedge the financial risk in carbon emission markets. Given the economic and econometric 
properties of carbon prices, the state dependent hedge ratios are expected to provide higher 
variance reductions. Thirdly, although the first moment of carbon emission returns have been 
modelled using Markov regime switching approaches in both univariate (Benz and Trück, 
2009) and bivariate frameworks (Chevellier, 2011a, b), no previous research has allowed the 
conditional variance of carbon asset returns to be state dependent. Chevellier (2011c) 
demonstrates that there are strong shifts and significant instability in the conditional variance 
of carbon asset returns. For this reason, this chapter is the first to introduce the state 
dependent dynamic volatility process into the study of carbon emission markets.  
                                                          
8
 Another difference in the author’s model and the MRS-TVC-GARCH model is that this chapter uses Engle’s 
(2002) method to model the condition correlations while Lee and Yoder (2007b) employed Tse and Tsui’s 
(2002) approach. The only difference between the two methods is the way in which they standardise the 
residuals in the conditional correlation equation. 
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In this chapter, the optimal hedge ratios of different strategies are estimated using daily 
spot and futures prices in the second phase of the EU ETS.
9
 For completeness and 
comparison, in addition to the MRS-LR-DCC model, this chapter also considers the optimal 
hedge ratios obtained from the naïve hedge, the constant OLS method, the VECM model, the 
DCC-GARCH, MRS and MRS with a long run relationship (MRS-LR) approaches. In order 
to compare the in-sample and out-of-sample performance of these strategies, both symmetric 
and downside risk measures are employed. Symmetric measures include variance, utility and 
VaR, while asymmetric measures comprise semi-variance, semi-utility and asymmetric VaR. 
In addition, the difference between short and long hedgers’ positions is also examined in the 
downside risk analysis. 
The main findings of this chapter are summarised as follows. Firstly, it is found that the 
class of Markov regime switching approaches substantially outperform alternative strategies 
for all the measures considered, including portfolio variance reduction, utility maximisation 
and VaR exposure minimisation, for both in-sample and out-of-sample analysis. In 
particular, within the class of regime switching models, the MRS-LR-DCC model achieves 
the greatest and most significant variance improvement compared to competing strategies, 
indicated by the results of White’s (2000) reality check (RC). In addition, it is found that the 
MRS-LR model constantly outperforms the MRS model in both in-sample and out-of-
sample analysis, which supports the argument that the hedging performance can be improved 
by incorporating the long run relationship between spot and futures prices. Secondly, the 
results of in-sample and out-of-sample hedging effectiveness of different hedge positions 
                                                          
9
  The EU ETS has three phases, each with different mechanisms. Phase I spans the period from January 2005 to 
the end of 2007, and did not permit banking and borrowing of carbon allowances between different phases. The 
period from January 2008 to December 2012 constitutes the second phase of the EU ETS; interphase banking 
and borrowing restrictions were relaxed to some extent and more countries, such as Norway, Iceland, and 
Liechtenstein, were covered by the scheme. The aviation industry has also been included in the scheme since 
2012. In Phase III of the EU ETS (2013–2020), a series of changes will be made by the European Union. For 
example, a fraction of carbon allowances will be moved from free allocation to auctioning; more restrictions 
will be imposed on using carbon offsets outside of the EU as a substitute for EUAs, etc. 
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using downside risk measures are mostly in line with those using symmetric metrics, i.e. the 
class of Markov regime switching approaches underperforms alternative strategies. This 
implies that no matter what position market participants hold, they can benefit from using 
state dependent hedge ratios. 
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 summarises the 
previous literature about regime switching hedging strategies, presents the specifications of 
the Markov regime switching models and demonstrates the minimum-variance hedge ratio 
methodology. Section 3.3 presents the summary statistics and preliminary diagnostic tests 
for the data. In Section 3.4, the estimation results of the key models are provided and 
discussed. The hedging effectiveness of proposed strategies is evaluated and the data 
snooping basis is checked in Section 3.5. Section 3.6 further analyses the hedging 
performance by considering downside risk measures and short/long hedging positions. The 
findings are summarised and conclusions drawn in Section 3.7. 
 
3.2. Markov regime switching hedging strategies  
3.2.1. Previous studies on regime switching hedging 
Since introduced by Hamilton (1989, 1990), regime switching models have been widely 
applied within economic and finance studies, including dynamic hedging using futures. 
Sephton (1998) suggests that dynamic hedging using GARCH models is too unstable to 
provide hedging effectiveness and that the regime switching hedging strategy could be used 
as an alternative as it allows time-varying but not volatile hedge ratios.  
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The regime switching hedging strategies have been found to outperform the OLS and 
GARCH model in numerous financial markets.
10
 For example, Alizadeh and Nomikos 
(2004) find that the univariate MRS model improves the hedging effectiveness of the 
constant OLS and GARCH strategies in the U.K and U.S. stock index markets. Lee, Yoder, 
Mittelhammer and McCluskey (2006) allow the random coefficient autoregressive (RCAR) 
model to be state dependent and find that the hedge ratios generated from the model 
outperform competing strategies in Lead and Aluminium markets. This paper is the first to 
adopt White’s (2000) reality check in hedging performance analysis. In addition, Lee and 
Yoder (2007a) extend Gray’s (1996) univariate MRS-GARCH model to a bivariate 
framework and examine the hedging effectiveness of the MRS-GARCH model with Engle 
and Kroner’s (1995) BEKK form covariance matrix, in Corn and Nickel markets. The results 
indicate that the MRS-BEKK GARCH model has a greater but insignificant variance 
reduction than the OLS and single regime GARCH approaches. Lee and Yoder (2007b) 
further allow the conditional correlations of spot and futures returns to be time-varying and 
state dependent, and develop a MRS-GARCH model with time-varying conditional 
correlations (MRS-TVC-GARCH). The model is applied to Japanese and Hong Kong stock 
markets and yields better hedging performance than competing models. Furthermore, 
Alizadeh et al. (2008) incorporate the long run error correction into Lee and Yoder’s (2007b) 
MRS-BEKK GARCH model and find that the new model provides significant reductions in 
both symmetric and downside risk measures in oil markets.  
In addition, Lee (2009a) proposes a regime switching Gumbel-Clayton (RSGC) copula 
GARCH model for hedging agriculture commodities, which uses a copula function in the 
switching process instead of the normality assumption and also solves the path-dependency 
problem. The results show that the RSGC model can provide a superior out-of-sample 
                                                          
10
 For a comprehensive review of the hedging performance of regime switching models, please see Lien (2012). 
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hedging performance. Lee (2009b) allows jumps in Markov regime switching GARCH 
models and finds the model can achieve greater variance reduction and utility in the U.K. 
stock market. Moreover, Lee (2010) introduces an independent switching dynamic 
conditional correlation (IS-DCC) GARCH to hedging and allows the number of regimes 
considers being greater than two. The empirical results support the advantage of using the 
IS-DCC hedging model in commodity markets. Most recently, Salvador and Arago (2013) 
compare the hedging performance of different linear and nonlinear GARCH hedging models 
in the main European stock markets and find the GARCH model with state dependent 
characteristics performs the best.  However, the previous literature shows that the regime 
switching approaches to hedging have not been applied in the carbon emission markets.  
 
3.2.2. The Markov regime switching model (MRS-LR-DCC) 
The idea of a regime switching model is to divide the time series into several periods, 
which are known as regimes or states. For each state, the prices or returns are modelled in a 
separate and independent process. If the switches between regimes are driven by 
unobservable variables and are modelled by Markov chains, they become Markov regime 
switching models. The Markov regime switching approach to hedging is used to generate 
state dependent hedge ratios which can account for differences in the spot-futures 
relationship across various market states. This chapter first introduces the MRS-LR-DCC 
hedging model, in which both the conditional mean and conditional variance processes are 
dependent on the volatility of the regime (i.e. high/low variance state). In addition, similarly 
to Alizadeh et al. (2008), the long run relationship between spot and futures prices is 
incorporated into the return process and the coefficient of the long run relationship is 
allowed to be state dependent. Lien and Yang (2008) argue that the lagged basis can help to 
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determine the movement of spot and futures prices and facilitate the mean-reverting process, 
and therefore can serve as the proxy for the long run relationship. Kroner and Sultan (1993), 
and Lai and Sheu (2010), among others, also use the lagged basis for the long run 
relationship. Therefore, the lagged basis serves as the long run relationship in this chapter. 
The conditional means of spot and futures returns of the MRS-LR-DCC model are specified 
as:   
, 1 , ,t s st t s st tS z                                         (3.1) 
, 1 , ,t f st t f st tF z                              (3.2) 
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 
   
 
ε H         (3.3) 
where ΔSt and ΔFt  are spot and futures returns at time t, respectively; and zt is the spot-
futures basis at time t, which serves as the long run relationship. The basis is calculated as the 
logarithmic difference between spot and futures prices multiplied by 100. εst,t is a vector of 
the state dependent Gaussian white noise processes with a time-varying covariance matrix of 
Hst,t at time t. The parameters of the long run relationship and residuals in the MRS-LR-DCC 
model depend on the market regime at time t. The unobservable state variables st= {1, 2} are 
assumed to follow a first order, two-state Markov process with the following transition 
probability matrix:  
1 11 1 21 12 21
1 12 1 22 12 21
Pr( 1| 1) Pr( 1| 2) 1
Pr( 2 | 1) Pr( 2 | 2) 1
t t t t
t t t t
s s P s s P P P
s s P s s P P P

 
 
         
    
        
P               (3.4) 
where P11 provides the probability that state 1 will be followed by state 1; and P12 gives the 
probability that state 1 will be followed by state 2; and by analogy for the other notations. 
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The transition probabilities above are presumed to be constant between consecutive periods, 
and are assumed to follow a logistic distribution:  
12, 21,
1 2
1 1
;
1 exp( ) 1 exp( )
t tP P
 
 
 
                                                                                                                               
(3.5)  
where ϕ1 and ϕ2 are unstrained constant terms which are estimated along with other unknown 
parameters through Maximum likelihood estimation.  
The conditional variances of spot and futures returns are modelled as GARCH (1, 1) 
processes developed by Bollerslev (1986).
11
 The time-varying, state dependent and 
positively defined conditional covariance matrix, Hst,t, is specified as: 
2
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H                            (3.6) 
where ρst,t is the state dependent conditional correlation between spot and futures returns at 
time t in state st= {1, 2}; h
2
s,st,t and h
2
f,st,t are the state dependent conditional variances at time 
t in state st for spot and futures returns, respectively. Specifically, the conditional variances 
and conditional correlation in Engle’s (2002) dynamic conditional correlation (DCC) 
GARCH framework are shown as: 
2 2 2
, , , , , 1 , , 1s st t s st s st s t s st s th h               (3.7) 
2 2 2
, , , , , 1 , , 1f st t f st f st f t f st f th h                                  (3.8) 
, 1, 2, 1, -1 -1 2, , 1(1 )st t st st st t t st st t           
'η η        (3.9) 
                                                          
11
 In some cases in the out-of-sample analysis, convergence results cannot be generated by using standard 
GARCH (1, 1) specification. In order to get convergence results, Ding, Granger and Engle’s (1993) asymmetric 
power ARCH (APARCH) model is adopted in these cases. 
33 
 
where θ1,st and θ2,st are the DCC parameters, ρ is the initial value of the conditional 
correlation, and ηt is a matrix for the standardised residuals. At this stage, all the parameters 
in the system are state dependent.  
However, because both conditional variances and conditional correlations are based on 
all the past information recursively, the basic form of GARCH models with state dependent 
coefficients is intractable (e.g. Hamilton and Susmel, 1994; Cai, 1994). Gray (1996) solves 
the path-dependency problem in the univariate GARCH framework by formulating the 
conditional variance process as the conditional expectation of the variance. Following Gray 
(1996), Lee and Yoder (2007a) extend the collapsing method for conditional residuals, 
conditional variances and conditional covariance to the bivariate framework. For example, 
the conditional variance and conditional residuals of the spot returns are recombined as  
2 2 2 2 2 2
, 1, ,1, ,1, 1, ,2, ,2, 1, ,1, 1, ,2,( ) (1 )( ) [ (1 ) ]s t t s t s t t s t s t t s t t s th r h r h r r                        (3.10) 
, 1, ,1, 1, ,2,[ (1 ) ]s t t t s t t s tS r r                                  (3.11) 
where π1,t is the probability of being in state 1 at time t and then 1- π1,t is the probability of 
being in state 2 at time t; while rs,st,t is the state dependent conditional mean equation of the 
spot returns. Lee and Yoder (2007b) further recombine the conditional correlation as
12
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            (3.12)               
After the recombination procedures shown in Equation (3.10) to (3.12), the MRS-LR-DCC 
model becomes path-independent, as the variance-covariance matrix is not dependent on all 
the past information but only on the current regime. The model can then be estimated through 
                                                          
12
 For details of the collapsing methods for conditional residuals, conditional variances, conditional covariance 
and conditional correlations, please see Gray (1996) and Lee and Yoder (2007a, b). 
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Maximum likelihood estimation. The density function mixed with the probability distribution 
of the state variable is shown as:    
1, 1,1/2 -1 1/2 -1
1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2,
(1 )1 1
( ; ) | | exp( ) | | exp( )
2 2 2 2
t t
t t t t t t t t tf
 
 
 

   ' 'X θ H ε H ε H ε H ε          (3.13)       
where θ is the vector of unknown parameters and π1,t, Hst,t and εst,t are defined as previously 
described. The unknown parameter vector θ can be estimated by maximising the following 
log-likelihood function
 13
: 
1
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T
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
θ X θ                                                                                     (3.14) 
L(θ) is subject to the constraint that 0≤ π1,t ≤1 and is maximised using the Broyden–Fletcher–
Goldfarb–Shanno (BFGS) algorithm. The optimal hedge ratios are given by:     
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 
 
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                   (3.15) 
When π1,t =1, the MRS-LR-DCC model collapses into Engle’s (2002) DCC-GARCH model. 
The optimal hedge ratios of DCC-GARCH models are also given by Equation (3.15).
14
 When 
all the conditional variance parameters are set to zero, the MRS-LR-DCC model collapses 
into the Markov regime switching models in the mean equation. The minimum variance 
hedge ratios of the Markov regime switching model (MRS) can be calculated by estimating 
the following equation: 
0, 1, ,t st st t st tS F       ; 
2
, ,(0, )st t st tiid                                (3.16)                                                         
where ΔSt  and ΔFt  are defined as described above. The coefficients of futures returns in each 
state, γ1,1 and γ1,2, are the minimum variance hedge ratios, given the state of the market. The 
                                                          
13
 The MRS-LR-DCC model is estimated by using the Time Series Modelling (TSM) package version 4.39, 
developed by Professor James Davidson from the University of Exeter. I would like to thank Professor James 
Davidson for providing this package.  
14
 For simplicity, the DCC-GARCH model to hedge is not shown in this chapter.  
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transition probabilities of the MRS model are also presumed to follow a logistic distribution 
described in Equation (3.5). The optimal hedge ratio at any time t is then determined as the 
weighted average of the minimum variance hedge ratios in each state, according to the 
probability of being in each state, which is shown as: 
*
1, 1,1 1, 1,2(1 )t t t                         (3.17)  
In order to account for the information contained in the basis, the MRS model for 
hedging is extended by incorporating the lagged basis as an independent variable, which 
serves as the long run relationship. The MRS model with a long run relationship (MRS-LR) 
is specified as:  
0, 1, 2, 1 ,t st st t st t st tS F z         ;
2
, ,(0, )st t st tiid                 (3.18) 
where ΔSt, ΔFt, zt and the transition probabilities are defined as described above. The optimal 
hedge ratios of the MRS-LR model are also given by Equation (3.17). 
 
3.3. Data and preliminary diagnostics 
The dataset comprises daily closing (settlement) spot and futures prices of EUAs in the 
second phase of the EU ETS, i.e. from 3 March, 2008 to 30 November 2012. This chapter 
only considers the data from EU ETS Phase II for the following reasons. Firstly, the second 
phase of the EU ETS is the most recent commitment period, and has not been fully 
investigated. Secondly, the mechanisms of the EU ETS were significantly changed between 
Phases I and II; therefore, it is not reasonable to examine the Phase I and Phase II data 
together. Thirdly, due to inter-phase banking restrictions, the spot prices are close to zero at 
the end of Phase I, i.e. the second half of 2007 (Chevellier, 2011a). Therefore, it is not 
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appropriate to use the spot prices at that stage for developing hedge models. In this chapter, 
the author uses the spot carbon allowances traded on the BlueNext Exchange and carbon 
futures contracts listed on the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE).
15
 Data for the period from 3 
March, 2008 to 31 May, 2012 are used for in-sample analysis (1,109 observations), while the 
out-of-sample period runs from 1 June, 2012 to 30 November, 2012 (six months, 131 
observations). All the data are collected from DataStream. In order to construct a continuous 
series of futures prices, it is assumed that hedgers will switch over futures contracts from the 
nearest to maturity contract to the second nearest to maturity contract on the first business 
day after the expiry date of the nearest to maturity contract, for all available trading months.
16
 
[Insert Table 3.1 here] 
The spot prices and continuous futures prices are then converted into natural logarithms 
and daily spot and futures returns are calculated as the first differences of logarithmic spot 
and futures prices multiplied by 100. The summary statistics, unit root and cointegration tests 
of spot and futures price levels and returns series for both in-sample and out of-sample 
periods are shown in Table 3.1. It is found that the mean prices of spot and futures for the 
out-of-sample period are significantly lower than those for the in-sample period, while the 
mean returns of spot and futures for the out-of-sample period are higher and closer to zero 
than those for the in-sample period. The standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis for price 
levels and returns, and for spot and futures also show significant differences between the in-
sample and out-of-sample periods. This indicates that the distributions of prices and returns 
are different in the two periods, 
 
which may mean that the effectiveness of the out-of-sample 
                                                          
15
 Carbon futures were initially listed on the European Climate Exchange (ECX) from 2005. In 2010, the ICE 
acquired ECX as its emission markets. Therefore, the carbon futures are currently traded on the ICE. 
16
 The EUA futures contracts are listed in the ICE on a quarterly expiry cycle, i.e. contracts expire in March, 
June, September and December each year. The expiry day is the last Monday of the contact month. For instance, 
the June 2011 contract expires on 27 June, 2011, and then the contract is switched over to the September 2011 
contract on 28 June, 2011. 
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hedging based forecasting is not as effective as the in-sample forecasting.
17
 The Jarque and 
Bera (1980) statistics show that all the series considered significantly depart from a normal 
distribution. The results of Ljung and Box (LB)’s (1978) Q tests for the 12th lags of 
autocorrelation indicate that spot and futures prices are serially correlated, while there is no 
evidence of serial correlation in the spot and futures return series, for both in-sample and out-
of-sample periods. Furthermore, the LB tests on the squared series for Engle’s (1982) ARCH 
effect suggest the presence of volatility clustering in all series except for the out-of-sample 
spot returns. The results of Phillips and Perron’s (1988) unit root tests indicate that all the 
price series are non-stationary while all the return series are stationary. Finally, Johansen’s 
(1988) cointegration test shows that the spot and futures prices are cointegrated with one 
cointegration vector. The normalised cointegration vector is very close to (1 -1 0), indicating 
that the spot-futures basis can serve as the long run relationship. 
[Insert Figure 3.1 here] 
The time series of the spot-futures basis in percentage form is plotted in Figure 3.1. It is 
shown that the basis of carbon emission allowances is below zero in most of the cases, 
indicating that the carbon markets are normally in backwardation. Moreover, the basis 
generally lies in the range between -3% and 1%, which is less volatile than that for the WTI 
crude oil markets studied by Alizadeh et al. (2008).  
 
3.4. Estimation Results  
This section presents in-sample estimates of key hedging strategies, starting with the 
Markov regime switching models in the mean equation. All the Markov regime switching 
                                                          
17
 This may be because the out-of-sample period is approaching the end of the second phase of the EU ETS and 
some carbon emission allowances cannot be used in the next phase due to the interphase banking restrictions.  
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models in this chapter are assumed to have two regimes, i.e. the high variance state and the 
low variance state. Table 3.2 displays the estimation results of the MRS and MRS-LR 
models.  
[Insert Table 3.2 here] 
Several interesting points are revealed by Table 3.2. Firstly, it can be observed that the 
adjusted R
2
 in the MRS-LR model is higher than the MRS model for more than 2%, 
indicating that the MRS-LR model explains the dynamics of the spot-futures relationship 
more effectively than the MRS model, after considering the number of parameters. This 
supports the view that using the lagged basis as the long run relationship can provide 
additional information for modelling the relationship between spot and futures returns. 
Secondly, the minimum variance hedge ratio (γ1,st) of the MRS-LR model is higher than that 
of the MRS model in state 1, but lower in state 2. Alizadeh and Nomikos (2004) suggest that 
γ1,1 and γ1,2 can be considered as the upper and lower boundaries of the optimal hedge ratios. 
Therefore, the MRS-LR model provides a broader window of optimal hedge ratios than the 
MRS model, which has the potential to manage more sophisticated market conditions. 
Thirdly, the volatilities (σst) and inter-state transitional probabilities (P12 and P21) are lower in 
the MRS-LR model than the MRS model, suggesting that the MRS-LR is more stable. For 
the above reasons, it is expected that the hedging performance of the MRS-LR model will be 
better than the MRS model.  
[Insert Table Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3 here] 
From the volatilities in each state it can be observed that state 1 is the low variance state 
while state 2 is the high variance state. It can be observed from Table 3.2 that the minimum 
variance hedge ratio in the low variance state is higher and closer to the naïve hedge (γ=1) 
than in the high variance state. This may be because when variance is low, the spot-futures 
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relationship is more stable and closer to the long-run equilibrium of (1 -1 0), and therefore the 
hedge ratio is close to 1. The high variance state captures the price jumps so that the optimal 
hedge ratio deviates from 1. In addition, the transitional probability from the low variance 
state to the high variance state (P12) is lower than the probability in the opposite direction 
(P21), indicating that the low variance state is more stable and has a longer duration. For 
instance, the inter-state transition probabilities of the MRS model are P12=0.0517 and 
P21=0.1377, suggesting that the average expected durations (AED) of  being in state 1 and 
state 2 are approximately 19 (=1/0.0517) days and 7 (=1/0.1377) days, respectively.
18
 These 
findings are in line with the study by Alizadeh and Nomikos (2004) of the oil markets. To 
observe the probabilities of being in each state intuitively, the smooth regime probabilities of 
the MRS and MRS-LR models are presented in Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3, respectively.
19
 
Panel A and Panel B in Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3 show the probabilities in the high variance 
state and low variance state, respectively. It can be observed that the high variance state is 
short-lived for both models, confirming the results of the average expected durations. For the 
residual diagnostics of the models, it is shown that the residuals are not normally distributed 
and have significant autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity problems. Therefore, it may be 
more promising to use the Markov regime switching models with GARCH errors for hedging 
as they can solve these residual problems.  
[Insert Table 3.3 here] 
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 Hamilton (1989) shows that the average expected duration in the first state is calculated as: 
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19
 After estimating the unknown parameter vector θ from the data spanning the period from t to T, three regime 
probabilities: filtered probabilities; smooth probabilities; and predicted probabilities, can be obtained with 
respect to the unobservable state variable. The filtered regime probabilities for state i are the estimated 
probabilities for the unobservable state variable at time t=1 given the observations from 1 to t<T. The smooth 
regime probabilities for state i are the estimated probabilities for the unobservable state variable at time t=1 
given the whole sample of observations from 1 to T. The predicted regime probabilities for state i are the 
estimated probabilities for the unobservable state variable at time T+1=1 given the observations from 1 to T. For 
details of estimated regime probabilities, please see Hamilton (1994) 
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 The results of single state and Markov regime switching two state DCC-GARCH 
models are shown in Table 3.3.
20
 For the conditional mean equation, the parameters of the 
lagged basis, μs,st and μf,st, govern the adjustment speed of spot and futures prices to their 
long-run equilibrium. In the low variance state of the MRS-LR-DCC model, the speed of 
adjustment is negative and significant for the spot equation, while it is positive and 
insignificant for the futures equation. This implies that spot prices will converge towards a 
long-run equilibrium relationship. More specifically, if there is a positive deviation from the 
equilibrium at time t-1 (i.e. St-1 > Ft-1), the spot price at time t will decrease as a response to 
the deviation while the response of the futures price at time t will be insignificant. As a 
consequence, the long-run relationship between spot and futures price is restored. In the high 
variance state, the speed of adjustment is still negative and significant for the spot equation, 
and insignificant for the futures equation. However, the magnitude of the adjustment speed 
increases dramatically compared to the low variance state. This suggests that when there is a 
large deviation from the equilibrium (i.e. in the high variance state), the response of the spot 
price in the next period would be more significant in order to re-establish the long-run 
relationship. Compared with the results of the single regime DCC-GARCH model, the 
coefficients of the lagged basis for both spot and futures equations are negative and 
significant, which are qualitatively different from both the low and high state results of the 
MRS-LR-DCC model. The results imply that the dynamics of the relationship between spot 
and futures prices are different across various market states. More specifically, there are 
regime shifts in the mean-reverting process, while the responses to shocks deviating from the 
long-run equilibrium depend on the volatility of the states.  
The next focus of investigation is the conditional variance and conditional correlation 
equations. It can be observed from Table 3.3 that the variance constant, ARCH and GARCH 
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 The estimation results of the other models, such as constant OLS and VECM, are available upon request. 
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parameters in the low variance state are distinct from those in the high variance state. This 
suggests that the conditional variance process in the carbon emission markets is also state 
dependent, which has not been documented in the literature. Following Alizadeh et al. 
(2008), this chapter calculates the measure of the degree of volatility persistence, i.e. 
α2ii,st+β
2
ii,st, for st= {1, 2}. A positive relationship has been found between the degree of 
volatility persistence and the high/low volatility status of the state. That is, the high variance 
state is associated with higher volatility persistence compared to the corresponding low 
variance state. These results are in line with the studies by Alizadeh et al. (2008) and Fong 
and See (2002) of oil markets. When compared with the single regime DCC-GARCH model, 
it is found that the degrees of volatility persistence of both high and low variance states are 
higher than the single regime volatility model. In addition, the dynamic conditional 
correlation coefficients are significant, supporting the use of DCC-GARCH for the second 
moment of spot and futures returns. 
[Insert Figure 3.4 here] 
For the regime transition probabilities of the MRS-LR-DCC model, it is shown that the 
transitional probability from the low variance state to the high variance state (P12=0.0781) is 
significantly smaller than the probability in the opposite direction (P21=0.3888), showing that 
the low variance state is steadier and has a longer average expected duration 
(AED=1/0.0781≈13 days) than the high variance state (AED=1/0.3888≈3 days). In order to 
collapse the conditional residuals, conditional variances and conditional correlations to make 
them state dependent, the probabilities of being each state should be estimated. Smooth 
regime probabilities are used to recombine the variables in Equation (3.10) into Equation 
(3.12). Figure 3.4, Panel A, presents the smooth regime probabilities of the MRS-LR-DCC 
model in the high variance state, which indicates the likelihood of being in that state. It can 
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be observed from Figure 3.4 that the high variance state is generally short-lived while the low 
variance state prevails for longer. The high variance is mainly distributed in the first year of 
EU ETS Phase II, as a number of regulatory changes had been made from Phase I to Phase II. 
Finally, the residual diagnostic tests of the DCC and MRS-LR-DCC models are shown at the 
bottom of Table 3.3. The results of the LB (12) and LB
2 
(12) tests indicate that the residuals 
from the two models do not have significant autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity problems, 
which represents a dramatic improvement on the MRS and MRS-LR models.  
 
3.5. Optimal hedge ratios and hedging performance  
Following the estimation of the MRS-LR-DCC model, time-varying conditional 
variances and conditional correlations are generated. The optimal hedge ratios of the MRS-
LR-DCC model are then calculated by using Equation (3.15). For completeness and 
comparison, this chapter also considers the constant optimal hedge ratios obtained from the 
naïve hedge (i.e. hedge ratio is constantly equal to 1), the single regime OLS estimates of 
Equation (3.16), Engle and Granger’s (1987) vector error correction model (VCEM), as well 
as time-varying hedge ratios generated from the DCC-GARCH, MRS and MRS-LR models. 
Figure 3.5 compares the constant OLS, DCC-GARCH and MRS-LR-DCC GARCH hedge 
ratios for the in-sample period while the comparison of in-sample hedge ratios within the 
class of Markov regime switching models (the MRS, MRS-LR, MRS-LR-DCC models) are 
displayed in Figure 3.6. It can be observed that the MRS-LR-DCC hedge ratios are the most 
volatile of all the competing hedging strategies, implying that a hedged portfolio consisting of 
spot and futures contracts would have to be rebalanced frequently.  
[Insert Figure 3.5 and Figure 3.6 here] 
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The previous literature has shown a positive relationship between the magnitude of the 
basis and the volatility of the markets (e.g. Lee, 1994; Choudhry, 1997; Zhong, Darrat and 
Otero, 2004). That is, the market should be in the low variance state when the basis hovers 
around zero while the market is expected to be in the high variance state when the basis 
significantly deviates from zero. The relationship described above is confirmed in the case of 
carbon emission markets by regressing the smooth regime probability of being in the high 
variance state on the absolute value of the basis, where the slope coefficient is significantly 
positive. It can be observed from Equations (3.10) to (3.12) and Equation (3.15) that the 
optimal hedge ratio is also dependent on the probabilities of being in each state. This provides 
a motivation to investigate the relationship between the magnitude of the basis and the MRS-
LR-DCC hedge ratios. Following Alizadeh et al. (2008), the MRS-LR-DCC hedge ratio is 
regressed on the absolute value of the basis. The coefficient of the slope is negative and 
significant, suggesting that the hedge ratios are high and less volatile when the basis is close 
to zero (in the low variance state). The results are consistent with the findings of Alizadeh et 
al. (2008). 
[Insert Table 3.4 here] 
To evaluate the hedging performance of the MRS-LR-DCC and the competing strategies, 
the hedged portfolios are constructed every trading day and the returns (xt+1) are given by 
*
1 1 1 1t t t tx S F                          (3.19) 
where γ*t denotes the optimal hedge ratios from each model. A smaller variance for the 
hedged portfolio (Var(xt+1)) indicates a better hedging strategy. The in-sample hedging 
effectiveness of Markov regime switching approaches compared with alternative hedging 
strategies is displayed in Table 3.4, Panel A. It is shown that the hedged portfolio generated 
from the MRS-LR-DCC model has the lowest variance among all the hedging strategies, 
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followed by the MRS-LR and MRS models. This indicates that the class of Markov regime 
switching models outperforms the other constant and time-varying hedging models in terms 
of in-sample variance reduction. In particular, the MRS-LR-DCC provides an impressive 
level of improvement in terms of in-sample variance over other models, rising from 
approximately 14.7% to 22.9%. The results are significantly greater than the improvements 
for Markov regime switching hedging models in other markets; for example, the studies by 
Lee and Yoder (2007a) for the Corn and Nickel markets, Lee and Yoder (2007b) for Japanese 
and Hong Kong stock index markets, Alizadeh et al. (2008) for the Oil markets, as well as 
Salvador and Arago (2013) for the UK, European and German stock index markets. The 
above results strongly support the view expressed in this thesis that regime switching is 
important in carbon emission markets, particularly for the purpose of hedging. 
Hedgers are required to frequently rebalance their hedged portfolios when implementing 
dynamic hedging strategies. Therefore, transaction costs are not negligible in the hedging 
performance of different strategies. A study by Kroner and Sultan (1993), among others, 
employs the hedger’s utility as a measure of hedging performance, which takes into account 
the economic benefits of hedging. The utility function of a hedger is given by:  
1 1 1( ) ( ) ( )t t t t t xEU x E x kVar x                    (3.20) 
where xt is the hedged portfolio return at time t and k is the degree of risk aversion. Following 
Lee (2010), it is assumed that the expected hedged portfolio return is zero and the degree of 
risk aversion is 4.
21
 Take the MRS-LR-DCC model and the constant OLS as an example. It 
can be observed from Table 3.4, Panel A, that the average daily variance of a hedged 
portfolio is 0.5161 when the MRS-LR-DCC model is used and 0.6358 when the constant 
OLS model is adopted. A hedger using the MRS-LR-DCC approach can gain an average 
                                                          
21
 All the mean returns of the hedged portfolios using different hedging strategies in this study are less than 
0.00%; thus it is reasonable to assume the expected return is zero. 
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daily utility of U=-4*0.5161=-2.0644, while a hedger using the constant OLS approach gains 
only U=-4*0.6358=-2.5432 units of utility. Therefore, by using the MRS-LR-DCC model, 
hedgers in the carbon emission markets can benefit from an improvement in the daily average 
utility of about 0.4788-y units, over the constant OLS hedging strategy, where y stands for the 
reduced return incurred by the transaction costs of portfolio rebalancing. Mizrach and Otsubo 
(2013) estimated that the average transaction cost was 0.14% for the EUA contracts in 2009. 
The costs of rebalancing are even lower as only a fraction of the portfolio is rebalanced. 
Therefore, using the MRS-LR-DCC model to hedge can provide an increase in utility for 
hedgers after taking the relevant transaction costs into consideration. 
Another measure with which to assess hedging effectiveness is the value at risk (VaR) 
method used by Cotter and Hanley (2006). A better hedging strategy can provide a reduction 
in the VaR exposure. Assuming the hedged portfolio return follows a normal distribution, the 
VaR of the hedged portfolio at confidence level α is shown as: 
0 1 1[ ( ) ( )]t tVaR W E x Z Var x                     (3.21) 
where W0 denotes the initial wealth of the portfolio and Zα represents the quantile of the 
normal distribution. Assuming initial wealth of €1 million and a 95% confidence level, the 
daily average VaR for the MRS-LR-DCC model is VaR=€1m[-1.645*(0.5161)1/2]=-
€11,817.5, which represents a decrease of €1,299.5, compared to the VaR for the constant 
OLS model (VaR=€1m[-1.645*(0.6358)1/2]=-€13,117.0). The above results strongly support 
the use of the Markov regime switching models to hedge carbon emission allowances as they 
can provide economic benefits such as an increase in utility and a decrease in the amount of 
VaR exposure, after accounting for the costs of portfolio rebalancing.  
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Nevertheless, the superior performance of the MRS-LR-DCC model may be because of 
the data snooping bias. Sullivan, Timmermann and White (1999) and White (2000) suggest 
that the data snooping bias occurs when a specific dataset is used more than once for the 
purpose of inference and model selection, which is inevitable if only a single history of the 
dataset is available for time-series analysis. In other words, the probability of achieving 
satisfactory results may increase if the same dataset is used repeatedly for testing different 
models. The satisfactory results may only occur by chance or by using posterior information. 
White (2000) introduces a reality check (RC) for data snooping and the RC test can also be 
used to examine the statistical significance of relative hedging performance for different 
hedging strategies.
22
 The statistics of RC tests for hedging performance are defined as: 
2 2
, 1 , 11 1 1 1, 1
( ) ( )MRS DCC t k tt t t tk tf S F S F 
 
                                 (3.22)   
where k is the kth model which is used as a benchmark; ,k t


 represents the optimal hedge 
ratio at time t generated from the kth benchmark model; and ,MRS DCC t


 is the dynamic optimal 
hedge ratios from the MRS-LR-DCC model. The expression in parentheses is the loss 
function, which is the squared hedged portfolio returns and can be used as an unbiased 
estimator of the real conditional variance (e.g. Andersen and Bollerslev, 1998). The statistics 
should be positive if the MRS-LR-DCC model achieves greater variance reduction than the 
kth model. In order to test the statistical significance of the variance reduction, the null 
hypothesis is set, as the MRS-LR-DCC model is not superior to the kth model in terms of 
variance reduction, which can be expressed as: 
                                                          
22
 Thanks to Mr Arnout Tilgenkamp from Erasmus University in Rotterdam for sharing the MATLAB code for 
White’s (2000) reality check on the MATLAB Central website.  
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 0 : max ( ) 0k
k
H E f                     (3.23)  
Next, following White (2000), the null hypothesis is tested by computing the observed test 
statistics for the RC, which is shown as 1/2max( )RCn k
k
T n f

 , where ,1
1 n
k k tt
f f
n


  and n is 
the number of one step ahead forecasting periods. In order to construct the distribution of the 
test statistics, Politis and Romano’s (1994) stationary bootstrap method is adopted to 
reproduce the random paths of portfolio returns, while retaining the original series’ 
distributional characteristics. This method is used in order to resample the original data with 
different block lengths, assuming the block length follows a geometric distribution with a 
given mean (see Politis and Romano (1994) for details of the stationary bootstrap method). 
After obtaining the simulated portfolio returns, the loss function of Equation (3.22) is used to 
generate a distribution of test statistics for each hedging strategy. The p value of the RC test 
is computed by comparing the observed test statistics T
RC
n with the quantiles of the simulated 
distribution of test statistics T
RC*
n, which is given by: 
* 1/2 *max [ ( ) )]RCn k k
k
T n f b f
  
  
 
                 (3.24) 
where *( )kf b

 denotes the sample mean of relative hedging performance measures shown in 
Equation (22) computed from the bth simulated sample, for b=1, 2, …, L. This chapter 
employs White’s (2000) RC test with bootstrapping 1,000 times (i.e. L=1,000) to examine the 
null hypothesis that the variance improvement of the MRS-LR-DCC model is not 
significantly better than alternative models. The results of the RC tests in Table 4, Panel A, 
show that the MRS-LR-DCC model significantly outperforms other hedging strategies in the 
in-sample analysis, at conventional levels. 
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The in-sample results have already shown the advantages of using Markov regime 
switching models to hedge carbon emission allowances. However, risk managers are more 
concerned about how the models will perform in the future, i.e. the out-of-sample 
performance. In the out-of-sample analysis, all the models are estimated recursively with the 
data only up to a particular date. Specifically, the estimates of the MRS-LR-DCC model at 
time t are employed to perform the one step ahead forecast for the conditional variances and 
conditional correlation at time t+1.
23
 The optimal hedge ratio at time t+1 can then be 
calculated by Equation (3.15). On the next day (t+1) the MRS-LR-DCC model is re-
estimated with the new observation at t+1 included in the estimation dataset, to compute the 
optimal hedge ratio at time t+2. The exercise is repeated for every observation in the out-of-
sample period. For the VECM hedging strategy, the out-of-sample hedge ratios are generated 
by re-estimating the model every day. In the case of the DCC-GARCH model, the model is 
re-estimated for every new observation and the out-of-sample hedge ratios are obtained 
through the one step ahead forecast of the conditional variances and conditional correlation. 
With respect to the univariate Markov regime switching MRS and MRS-LR models, the 
chapter first forecasts the regime probability at time t+1 using the regime transition 
probability and smooth regime probabilities at time t. Subsequently, the optimal hedge ratio 
at time t+1 is computed as the average of optimal hedge ratios in each state at time t weighted 
by the forecasted regime probabilities.
24
  
The hedging performance of the Markov regime switching approaches compared to 
alternative hedging strategies in the out-of-sample period is presented in Table 3.4, Panel B. 
The results demonstrate a consistent picture, as for the in-sample analysis. That is, the MRS-
LR-DCC model provides the greatest variance reduction, followed by the MRS-LR and MRS 
                                                          
23
 See Alizadeh et al. (2008) for details of the forecasting procedure. 
24
 See Alizadeh and Nomikos (2004) for details of how to generate out-of-sample hedge ratios for the univariate 
Markov regime switching models. 
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models which rank second and third in terms of variance reduction, respectively, and lastly 
the non-Markov regime switching hedging strategies. The improvement in the MRS-LR-
DCC model for the out-of-sample period is not as great as that for the in-sample period, but is 
still encouraging. In addition, hedgers can gain an incremental average daily utility of 0.958 
if they use the MRS-LR-DCC hedge ratios compared to the constant OLS hedge ratios. They 
can also reduce the average daily VaR exposure by €1,193.3 by implementing the MRS-LR-
DCC hedging approach. Finally, the results of the RC tests indicate that the MRS-LR-DCC 
model can provide significant out-of-sample variance reduction compared to alternative 
models at the 5% level.  
To summarise, the above results show that the class of Markov regime switching models 
considerably outperform competing models in terms of portfolio variance reduction, utility 
maximization and reduction in VaR exposure, both for in-sample and out-of-sample periods. 
In particular, the MRS-LR-DCC model achieves the greatest variance reduction, and the RC 
test results demonstrate that the improvements in variance gained by using the MRS-LR-
DCC model over competing models are significant. The above findings illustrate the 
importance of using Markov regime switching models in hedging carbon emission 
allowances. 
 
3.6. Additional analysis 
The findings above suggest that Markov regime switching can reduce the overall risk in 
carbon emission markets; however, it has been shown that risk managers are generally more 
concerned about the downside risk (e.g. Adams and Montesi, 1995). Traditional measures of 
risk, such as variance, allocate equal weight to positive profits and negative losses, which is a 
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double-sided measure. Demirer and Lien (2003) suggest that it is more appropriate to use 
downside risk measures, such as lower partial moments (LPM), in the hedging effectiveness 
analysis. In addition, different hedging positions, i.e. short hedge or long hedge, should be 
considered separately. If spot and futures returns are both systemically distributed, the 
hedging effectiveness of short hedge and long hedge in terms of LPM are the same. 
Otherwise, using the same hedge ratios for short/long hedging positions should result in 
dissimilar performances (Demirer and Lien, 2003). Cotter and Hanley (2006) adopt the LPM 
measure to evaluate the effectiveness of various hedging strategies in short/long hedging 
positions, and find that the best strategies based on LPM are different from the traditional 
measure of variance. 
The nature and statistical properties of Markov regime switching models also provide a 
motivation for examining the difference in hedging performance between short and long 
hedging positions. The asymmetries of typical financial data, i.e. non-zero skewness and 
excess kurtosis, may affect short hedge and long hedge positions differently. Alizadeh et al. 
(2008) suggest that time-varying skewness and excess kurtosis are inherent in the Markov 
regime switching models, indicated by the dynamics of conditional means and conditional 
variances.
25
 Therefore, it is interesting to examine whether the Markov regime switching 
models can capture the possible asymmetries and then provide superior hedging performance.  
In this chapter, the author adopts the semi-variance metric used by Cotter and Hanley 
(2006) and Alizadeh et al. (2008) to assess the hedging performance of competing hedge 
models in long and short hedging positions. The (negative) semi-variance metric is a special 
case of the LPM, which can be shown as: 
                                                          
25
 Haas, Mittnik and Paolella (2004) show details of the higher moments (skewness and kurtosis) of a mixed 
normal distribution GARCH model and the related Markov regime switching GARCH model. 
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                    (3.25) 
where τ is the target return which is normally set to be zero, enabling positive and negative 
hedged portfolio returns xt+1 to be distinguished. The hedged portfolio return is different for 
long and short hedge positions. A short hedging strategy involves selling a number of futures 
contracts to hedge the purchase of the underlying spot assets; therefore the hedged portfolio 
return is calculated as *
1 1 1t t tS F     . Similarly, a long hedge is equivalent to buying 
futures contracts against the sale of the spot assets, and the hedged portfolio return is given 
by *
1 1 1t t tS F      , which is the opposite of short hedged portfolio returns. If a unified 
definition of a portfolio return, shown in Equation (19), is employed, a short hedger is mainly 
concerned with the negative returns of the portfolio while long hedgers focus on the positive 
returns. 
[Insert Table 3.5 here] 
Table 3.5 presents the in-sample and out-of-sample hedging effectiveness of Markov 
regime switching models compared with alternative hedging models in carbon emission 
markets, for long and short hedging positions. The short hedge results are shown in Panel A 
while the results of long hedge positions are displayed in Panel B. In addition to the semi-
variance metric, this study also considers other asymmetric measures of hedging performance, 
i.e. the semi-utility and the asymmetric VaR exposure. The semi-utility and asymmetric VaR 
are calculated from Equations (3.20) and (3.21), respectively, by substituting variance with 
semi-variance. The same quantiles of normal distribution are used to estimate the asymmetric 
VaR exposure, assuming positive and negative returns of the hedged portfolio follow half 
normal distribution. In the in-sample analysis, the hedging performance of short hedgers and 
long hedgers’ positions produces a consistent picture. The results show that the MRS-LR-
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DCC model provides the greatest semi-variance reduction, followed by the MRS-LR and 
MRS models, and then the non-Markov regime switching hedging strategies. In addition, 
according to White’s (2000) RC tests, the semi-variance improvements in the MRS-LR-DCC 
model are statistically significant compared to competing models for both short and long 
hedging positions. The MRS-LR-DCC model performs considerably better for a short hedge 
(with a semi-variance improvement of 23.7%-29.5%) than a long hedge (6.0%-14.5% 
improvement), implying that the MRS-LR-DCC model captures the asymmetries of negative 
returns better than positive returns. Furthermore, the MRS-LR-DCC model outperforms 
alternative models in terms of maximising semi-utility and minimising asymmetric VaR 
exposure.  
For the out-of-sample analysis, it is shown that the MRS-LR-DCC model still performs 
best for the short hedgers’ position in terms of semi-variance reduction, semi-utility 
maximization and asymmetric VaR minimization. The MRS-LR and MRS models are the 
second and third best. The semi-variance improvements offered by the MRS-LR-DCC model 
compared to other models are quite remarkable (64.1%-72.0% improvement) and strongly 
significant (all the p-values of RC=0.00). However, for the long hedgers’ position, the MRS-
LR-DCC model is the sixth best model, only outperforming the unhedged strategy and the 
DCC-GARCH model, in all asymmetric hedging performance measures. The MRS-LR and 
MRS model rank fourth and fifth best, respectively, also performing poorly. It is notable that 
the MRS-LR model outstrips the MRS model for both in-sample and out-of-sample analysis, 
and for both short and long hedging positions. This indicates that the basis serving as the long 
run relationship can provide additional information for hedging. The best hedging strategy is 
provided by the VECM model, which offers an improvement of more than 6% in semi-
variance compared to the MRS-LR-DCC model. The significant difference in hedging 
performance using the MRS-LR-DCC model and other Markov regime switching models 
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show that the Markov regime switching models can capture the asymmetries of negative 
returns well, but not of positive returns. The findings are in line with the in-sample analysis 
and imply that it is more appropriate to use Markov regime switching approaches for short 
hedging positions in carbon emission markets, i.e. when investors have some spot carbon 
emission allowances in-hand, and want to sell a number of carbon futures contracts to offset 
the potential losses incurred by the drop in spot carbon prices.  
 
3.7. Conclusion 
This chapter estimates the relationship between carbon spot and futures markets using 
Markov regime switching models and investigates the hedging effectiveness of state 
dependent hedge ratios in the European carbon emission markets. This is motivated by Benz 
and Trück (2009) who find that the carbon asset prices can be better characterised by regime 
switching models. Therefore, the relationship between carbon spot and futures prices may 
also be state dependent. This implies that the hedge ratios generated from regime switching 
models could provide a superior hedging performance to single regime hedging models. For 
this reason, this chapter proposes a new framework, i.e. Markov regime switching approaches, 
to hedge the financial risk in carbon emission markets. In particular, this chapter proposes a 
Markov regime switching model with a long run relationship and DCC-GARCH errors, to 
connect the idea of disequilibrium measured by a lagged basis with that of uncertainty 
modelled by DCC-GARCH, across different market regimes. This model differs from the 
MRS-BEKK model used by Alizadeh et al. (2008) in allowing the conditional correlation to 
be time-varying, and is distinct from Lee and Yoder’s (2007b) MRS-TVC-GARCH model 
because it incorporates the long run relationship into the return process. 
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Using daily spot and futures price data for EU ETS Phase II, the chapter finds that the 
class of Markov regime switching approaches considerably outperform competing hedging 
strategies for all the hedging performance measures considered, i.e. portfolio variance 
reduction, utility maximisation and VaR exposure minimisation, for both in-sample and out-
of-sample analysis. In particular, the MRS-LR-DCC strategy achieves the greatest variance 
reduction, and the results of White’s (2000) RC test demonstrate that the variance 
improvements offered by the MRS-LR-DCC model over competing approaches are 
statistically significant. Furthermore, it is found that the MRS-LR model consistently 
outperforms the MRS model in both in-sample and out-of-sample analysis, which supports 
the view that the lagged basis serving as the long run relationship can provide additional 
information for hedging. In addition to these symmetric hedging performance measures, this 
chapter further analyses the hedging effectiveness of the Markov regime switching 
approaches by considering downside risk and distinguishing the difference between short 
and long hedging positions. The in-sample results of downside risk metrics are consistent 
with those results produced using symmetric measures, for both short hedge and long hedge, 
where the MRS-LR-DCC, MRS-LR and MRS models are the top three hedging strategies. 
The only difference between short and long hedgers’ positions is that the semi-variance 
reduction of the MRS-LR-DCC model for a short hedge is considerably greater than for a 
long hedge. The difference becomes more significant in the out-of-sample analysis. The 
MRS-LR-DCC model is still the best and achieves a very impressive improvement in semi-
variance for short hedge positions; however, the class of Markov regime switching models 
underperforms some competing strategies for long hedge positions. These results suggest 
that the Markov regime switching models capture the asymmetries of negative returns better 
than they capture positive returns. Overall, market participants can benefit from using regime 
switching hedging strategies, no matter what position they hold. 
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To summarise, the above findings demonstrate the importance of using Markov regime 
switching approaches in hedging carbon emission allowances. Financial risk managers who 
adopt state dependent hedge ratios can achieve greater variance reduction and better hedging 
performance.  
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Figure 3.1: Spot-futures basis for carbon emission allowances 
 
Note: This figure displays the time series of spot-futures basis for carbon emissions from 3 March, 2008 to 31 
May, 2012 (in-sample period, 1,109 observations). Basis is defined as the logarithmic difference between spot 
and futures prices in percentage form. 
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Figure 3.2: Smooth regime probabilities of MRS model for carbon emissions
  
Panel A: The high variance state 
 
 
 
Panel B: The low variance state 
 
Note: This graph shows the smooth regime probabilities of the MRS model for carbon emissions from 3 March, 
2008 to 31 May, 2012 (in-sample period, 1,109 observations). The probabilities in the high variance state are 
presented in Panel A while those in the low variance state are shown in Panel B. 
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Figure 3.3: Smooth regime probabilities of MRS-LR model for carbon emissions
 
 
Panel A: The high variance state 
 
 
 
Panel B: The low variance state 
  
Note: This graph shows the smooth regime probabilities of the MRS model for carbon emissions from 3 March, 
2008 to 31 May, 2012 (in-sample period, 1,109 observations). The probabilities in the high variance state are 
presented in Panel A while those in the low variance state are shown in Panel B. 
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Figure 3.4: Smooth regime probabilities of MRS-LR-DCC models for carbon emissions
 
Panel A: The high variance state 
 
 
 
Panel B: The low variance state 
 
Note: This graph shows the smooth regime probabilities of the MRS-LR-DCC model for carbon emissions from 
3 March, 2008 to 31 May, 2012 (in-sample period, 1,109 observations). The probabilities in the high variance 
state are presented in Panel A while those in the low variance state are shown in Panel B. 
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Figure 3.5: Constant OLS, DCC-GARCH and MRS-LR-DCC hedge ratios for carbon 
emissions. 
 
Note: This figure shows the constant and dynamic hedge ratios of the constant OLS, DCC-GARCH model and 
MRS-LR-DCC models from 3 March, 2008 to 31 May, 2012 (in-sample period, 1,109 observations). 
 
 
Figure 3.6: MRS, MRS-LR and MRS-LR-DCC hedge ratios for carbon emissions. 
 
Note: This figure shows the dynamic hedge ratios of the MRS, MRS-LR and MRS-LR-DCC models from 3 
March, 2008 to 31 May, 2012 (in-sample period, 1,109 observations).  
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics, unit root and cointegration tests for spot and futures 
prices of carbon emissions
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics  
 In-sample  Out-of-sample 
 Log levels  % Returns  Log levels  % Returns 
 Spot  Futures Spot  Futures Spot  Futures Spot  Futures 
Mean 2.6261 2.6333 -0.1077 -0.1086 2.0068 2.0195 -0.0012 -0.0086 
S.D. 0.3364 0.3386 2.6375 2.6707 0.0874 0.0766 3.0608 2.7929 
Skewness -0.241 -0.238 0.103 0.104 -0.637 -0.521 1.053 -0.498 
Kurtosis 3.163 3.154 7.858 7.306 2.496 2.488 11.230 4.905 
J-B 11.960 
(0.00) 
11.589 
(0.00) 
1091.3 
(0.00) 
858.10 
(0.00) 
10.244 
(0.01) 
7.359 
(0.03) 
393.91 
(0.00) 
25.218 
(0.00) 
LB(12) 12388 
(0.00) 
12383 
(0.00) 
13.211 
(0.35) 
13.401 
(0.34) 
421.3 
(0.00) 
383.4 
(0.00) 
10.542 
(0.57) 
9.975 
(0.62) 
LB
2
(12) 12488 
(0.00) 
12484 
(0.00) 
221.75 
(0.00) 
290.90 
(0.00) 
417.10 
(0.00) 
381.50 
(0.00) 
8.327 
(0.76) 
21.388 
(0.05) 
PP test 
 
-0.525 
(0.88) 
-0.515 
(0.89) 
-32.308 
(0.00) 
-32.330 
(0.00) 
-2.217 
(0.20) 
-2.243 
(0.19) 
-8.967 
(0.00) 
-9.654 
(0.00) 
Panel B: Cointegration tests (in-sample only) 
 
Lag H0 λmax test λtrace test Normalised CV (1 β2 β0) 
2 k=0 75.595*** 75.344*** (1 -0.9941 -0.0082) 
 k≤1 0.251 0.251  
Note: The table provides summary statistics, unit root and cointegration tests for spot and futures prices of 
carbon emission allowances, for both in-sample and out-of-sample periods. The in-sample period runs from 3 
March, 2008 to 31 May, 2012 (1,109 observations) whereas the out-of-sample period runs from 1 June, 2012 to 
30 November, 2012 (six months, 131 observations). J-B stands for the Jarque and Bera (1980) test for Normality. 
LB(12) and LB
2(12) are Ljung and Box’s (1978) Q tests for 12th order autocorrelation in the level and squared 
series, respectively. The PP test is Phillips and Perron’s (1988) unit root test. Lag is the optimal lag length of the 
unrestricted VAR model in levels. Optimal lag length is selected based on Schwartz (1978) Information 
Criterion (SIC). The null hypochapter of λmax tests and λtrace tests is that the number of cointegration vectors is 
less than or equal to k, where k is 0 or 1. Normalised CV is the normalised cointegration vector of spot and 
futures prices. Figures in parentheses are P-values. ***, **, * indicate statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 
10%, respectively. 
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Table 3.2: Estimation results of Markov regime switching model and Markov regime 
switching model with long run relationship for carbon emissions
  
 MRS MRS-LR 
γ0,st=1 0.0014 (0.012) -0.1057 (0.018)*** 
γ1,st=1 0.9803 (0.009)*** 0.9820 (0.006)*** 
γ2,st=1   -0.2731 (0.037)*** 
σst=1 0.3080 (0.028)*** 0.2986 (0.017)*** 
γ0,st=2 -0.0149 (0.082) -0.7478 (0.136)*** 
γ1,st=2 0.8680 (0.055)*** 0.8646 (0.041)*** 
γ2,st=2   -0.4649 (0.071)*** 
σst=2 1.4188 (0.167)*** 1.2218 (0.100)*** 
ϕ1 2.9097 (0.262)*** 3.2463 (0.350)*** 
ϕ2 -1.8350 (0.329)*** -2.1818 (0.613)*** 
P12 0.0517 0.0375 
P21 0.1377 0.1014 
Log-L  -877.762 -779.28 
SIC -905.803 -814.331 
Adj. R
2 
0.912 0.936 
S.D. 0.783 0.667 
Skewness 0.007 0.054 
Kurtosis 3.600 3.327 
J-B 16.644*** 5.461* 
LB(12) 157.727*** 69.779*** 
LB
2
(12) 57.313*** 46.836*** 
Note: The table provides the estimation results of the Markov regime switching model (MRS) and Markov 
regime switching model with long run relationship (MRS-LR) for carbon emissions. The sample period runs 
from 3 March, 2008 to 31 May, 2012 (in-sample period, 1,109 observations). Figures in parentheses are 
standard errors. ***, **, * indicate statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. P12 gives the 
probability that state 1 will be followed by state 2 and P21 is the probability that state 2 will be followed by 
state 1. Log-L stands for log likelihood. SIC is the Schwartz (1978) Information Criterion. The standard 
deviation, skewness and kurtosis are for the residuals. J-B stands for the Jarque and Bera (1980) test for 
Normality of residuals. LB(12) and LB
2(12) are Ljung and Box’s (1978) Q tests for 12th order autocorrelation 
in the level and squared residuals, respectively. The models are specified as:                 
MRS: 
0, 1, ,t st st t st tS F       ; 
2
, ,(0, )st t st tiid                                                                             
MRS-LR: 
0, 1, 2, 1 ,t st st t st t st tS F z         ;
2
, ,(0, )st t st tiid               
Logistic function for transition probabilities: 12, 21,
1 2
1 1
;
1 exp( ) 1 exp( )
t tP P
 
 
   
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Table 3.3: Estimation results of DCC-GARCH and Markov regime switching DCC 
model with long run relationship for carbon emissions
 
 
 DCC-GARCH MRS-LR-DCC 
Conditional mean equation 
µs,st=1 
µf,st=1 
-0.1355 
-0.0696 
(0.041)*** 
(0.034)** 
-0.0935 
0.0317 
(0.042)** 
(0.035) 
µs,st=2 
µf,st=2 
  -0.2861 
-0.0472 
(0.113)** 
(0.121) 
Conditional variance equation 
γs,st=1 
γf,st=1 
1.1234 
1.1171 
(0.146)*** 
(0.137)*** 
0.7054 
0.7066 
(0.129)*** 
(0.129)*** 
αs,st=1 
αf,st=1 
0.1885 
0.1828 
(0.046)*** 
(0.042)*** 
0.0390 
0.0379 
(0.017)** 
(0.017)** 
βs,st=1 
βf,st=1 
0.7911 
0.7967 
(0.046)*** 
(0.042)*** 
0.9412 
0.9426 
(0.023)*** 
(0.024)*** 
θ1,st=1 
θ2,st=1 
ρ,st=1 
0.3304 
0.4679 
0.9651 
(0.080)*** 
(0.152)*** 
- 
0.0000 
0.0379 
0.9080 
(0.000) 
(0.017)** 
- 
γs,st=2 
γf,st=2 
  1.9076 
1.8927 
(0.734)*** 
(0.633)*** 
αs,st=2 
αf,st=2 
  0.1076 
0.1126 
(0.076) 
(0.073) 
βs,st=2 
βf,st=2 
  0.9373 
0.9351 
(0.036)*** 
(0.036)*** 
θ1,st=2 
θ2,st=2 
ρ,st=2 
  0.0000 
0.0379 
0.9080 
(0.000) 
(0.017)** 
- 
Transition parameters 
ϕ1   -2.4680 (0.277)*** 
ϕ2   0.4525 (0.475) 
P12   0.0781 - 
P21   0.3888 - 
Residual diagnostics 
Log-L -2431.66  -2255.51  
SIC -2498.24  -2335.62  
 Spot Futures Spot Futures 
S.D. 2.627 2.676 2.634 2.684 
Skewness -0.542 -0.392 -0.317 -0.216 
Kurtosis 4.638 4.349 3.074 2.932 
J-B 177.493*** 112.007*** 18.843*** 8.850** 
LB(12) 9.440 10.041 5.499 4.338 
LB
2
(12) 9.475 5.423 16.663 19.499* 
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Note: The table provides the maximum likelihood estimates of the DCC-GARCH model and Markov regime 
switching DCC model with long run relationship (MRS-LR-DCC) for carbon emission allowances. The sample 
period runs from 3 March, 2008 to 31 May, 2012 (in-sample period, 1,109 observations). Figures in parentheses 
are standard errors. ***, **, * indicate statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. P12 gives the 
probability that state 1 will be followed by state 2 and P21 provides the probability that state 2 will be followed 
by state 1. Log-L stands for log likelihood. SIC is the Schwartz (1978) Information Criterion. J-B stands for the 
Jarque and Bera (1980) test for Normality. LB (12) and LB
2 (12) are Ljung and Box’s (1978) Q tests for 12th 
order autocorrelation in the level and squared residuals, respectively. The models are specified as: 
, 1 , ,t s st t s st tS z    ;
 
 
, 1 , ,t f st t f st tF z    ;  
, ,
, 1 ,
, ,
(0, )
s st t
st t t st t
f st t
IN

 
 
   
 
ε H
2
, ,, , ,, , , ,
, 2
,, , , ,, , , ,
0 01
10 0
sf st ts st t st ts st t s st t
st t
st tf st t f st tsf st t f st t
hh h h
h hh h


    
             
H  
2 2 2
, , , , , 1 , , 1s st t s st s st s t s st s th h       ;  
2 2 2
, , , , , 1 , , 1f st t f st f st f t f st f th h      
, 1, 2, 1, -1 -1 2, , 1(1 )st t st st st t t st st t           
'η η ;  
, , , ,
, , , ,
/
/
s st t s st t
t
f st t f st t
h
h


 
  
 
 
η  
12, 21,
1 2
1 1
;
1 exp( ) 1 exp( )
t tP P
 
 
   
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Table 3.4: Effectiveness of Markov regime switching hedge ratios against alternative 
hedge ratios in carbon emission markets
a
 
 Variance
b 
Variance 
improvement of 
MRS-LR-DCC
c 
Utility
d 
VaR (5%)
e 
(€) 
Panel A: In-sample hedging effectiveness 
Unhedged  6.9562 92.58%*** -27.825 -43,386.2 
Naïve 0.6604 21.85%*** -2.641 -13,367.7 
Constant 0.6358 18.83%*** -2.543 -13,117.0 
VECM 0.6360 18.86%*** -2.544 -13,119.3 
DCC-GARCH 0.6464 20.16%*** -2.585 -13,225.3 
MRS 0.6100 15.40%*** -2.440 -12,848.3 
MRS-LR 0.6053 14.74%** -2.421 -12,798.2 
MRS-LR-DCC 0.5161 - -2.064 -11,817.5 
     
Panel B: Out-of-sample hedging effectiveness 
Unhedged  9.3685 72.12%*** -37.474 -50,350.1 
Naïve 2.9054 10.09%** -11.621 -28,039.5 
Constant 2.8516 8.39%** -11.407 -27,778.8 
VECM 2.8531 8.44%** -11.412 -27,786.0 
DCC-GARCH 3.6636 28.70%** -14.655 -31,486.3 
MRS 2.8135 7.15%** -11.254 -27,592.4 
MRS-LR 2.8019 6.77%** -11.208 -27,535.5 
MRS-LR-DCC 2.6123 - -10.449 -26,587.5 
Note: Asterisks (***, ** ,*) in the column entitled ‘‘Variance improvement of MRS-LR-DCC” indicate that the 
MRS-LR-DCC model outperforms the competing model at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively; the p-values are 
provided by White’s (2000) reality check using Politis and Romano’s (1994) stationary bootstrap method. 
a The in-sample period runs from 3 March, 2008 to 31 May, 2012 (1,109 observations) while the out-of-sample 
period runs from 1 June 2012 to 30 November 2012 (half a year, 131 observations). 
b Variance denotes the variance of the hedged portfolio. Note that the variance corresponds to logarithmic 
returns multiplied by 100. Figures in bold denote the best performing model for each criterion. 
c Variance improvement of MRS-LR-DCC measures the incremental variance reduction of the MRS-LR-DCC 
model versus the other models. This is estimated using the formula:[Var (Modeli)– Var (MRS-LR-DCC)]/Var 
(Modeli). 
d Utility is the average daily utility for an investor with a mean-variance utility function and a risk aversion 
coefficient of 4, using different hedging strategies. 
e VaR(5%) is the value-at-risk estimated  with Za equal to the normal distribution 5% quantile, i.e. -1.645.
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Table 3.5: Effectiveness of long/short hedging positions of Markov regime switching hedge ratios compared to alternative hedge ratios in 
carbon emission markets
a
 
 In-sample hedging effectiveness  Out-of-sample hedging effectiveness 
 Semi-
variance
b 
Semi-variance 
improvement of 
MRS-LR-DCC
c 
Semi-utility
d 
VaR (5%)
e 
(€) 
 Semi-
variance
b 
Semi-variance 
improvement of 
MRS-LR-DCC
c 
Semi-utility
d 
VaR (5%)
e 
(€) 
Panel A: Short hedgers positions    
Unhedged  3.7935 94.00%*** -15.174 -32039.5  4.1018 96.09%*** -16.407 -33,913.1 
Naïve 0.3229 29.50%*** -1.292 -9,347.6  0.5734 72.02%*** -2.293 -12,455.9 
Constant 0.3103 26.63%*** -1.241 -9,163.1  0.5202 69.17%*** -2.081 -11,864.6 
VECM 0.3104 26.66%*** -1.242 -9,164.9  0.5223 69.29%*** -2.089 -11,889.0 
DCC-GARCH 0.3059 25.58%*** -1.224 -9,098.1  0.5353 70.03%*** -2.141 -12,035.2 
MRS 0.2975 23.48%*** -1.190 -8,972.4  0.4660 65.58%*** -1.864 -11,229.3 
MRS-LR 0.2984 23.71%*** -1.194 -8,985.8  0.4468 64.10%*** -1.787 -10,995.5 
MRS-LR-DCC 0.2276 - -0.911 -7,848.5  0.1604 - -0.642 -6,588.1 
          
Panel B: Long hedgers positions   
Unhedged  3.1680 90.90%*** -12.672 -29,279.2  5.1951 52.83%*** -20.781 -37,494.2 
Naïve 0.3239 14.47%** -1.347 -9,547.6  2.3099 -6.10% -9.240 -25,001.5 
Constant 0.3250 11.34%** -1.300 -9,331.9  2.3097 -6.11% -9.239 -25,000.3 
VECM 0.3251 11.37%** -1.300 -9,379.3  2.3090 -6.14% -9.236 -24,996.6 
DCC-GARCH 0.3399 15.23%*** -1.360 -9,590.5  3.1120 21.25%** -12.448 -29,079.4 
MRS 0.3120 7.65%** -1.248 -9,188.4  2.3266 -5.33% -9.307 -25,091.7 
MRS-LR 0.3064 5.96%** -1.226 -9,105.3  2.3347 -4.97% -9.339 -25,135.2 
MRS-LR-DCC 0.2881 - -1.153 -8,830.0  2.4508 - -9.803 -25,752.3 
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Note: Asterisks (***, **, *) in the column entitled ‘‘Semi-variance improvement of MRS-LR-DCC” indicate that the MRS-LR-DCC model outperforms the competing 
model at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively; the p-values are provided by White’s (2000) reality check using Politis and Romano’s (1994) stationary bootstrap method. 
a The in-sample period runs from 3 March,  2008 to 31 May, 2012 (1,109 observations)  while the out-of-sample period runs from 1 June, 2012 to 30 November, 2012 (six 
months, 131 observations). 
b Semi-variance denotes the semi-variance of the hedged portfolio. Note that the semi-variance corresponds to logarithmic returns multiplied by 100. Figures in bold denote 
the best performing model for each criterion. 
c Semi-variance improvement of MRS-LR-DCC measures the incremental semi-variance reduction of the MRS-LR-DCC model versus the other models. This is estimated 
using the formula:[SVar (Modeli)– SVar (MRS-LR-DCC)]/SVar (Modeli). 
d Semi-utility is the average daily semi-utility for an investor with a mean-semivariance utility function and a risk aversion coefficient of 4, using different hedging strategies. 
e VaR(5%) is the value-at-risk estimated  with Za equal to the normal distribution 5% quantile i.e. -1.645 and σ equal to the semi-variance of the hedged portfolio. 
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Chapter 4 
Arbitrage Opportunities and Feedback Trading: Evidence 
from Emissions and Energy Markets 
 
 
Abstract 
This study extends Sentana and Wadhwani’s (1992) feedback trading model by allowing 
arbitrage opportunities to affect the demand of feedback traders. Using daily spot and futures 
data in five emissions and energy markets, the results show clear evidence of feedback 
trading in coal and electricity markets, but not in carbon markets where institutional investors 
dominate. This finding does not support the view that institutional investors are not 
necessarily all feedback traders. In addition, the results of the augmented feedback trading 
models suggest that arbitrage opportunities as proxied by a spot-futures basis and the 
convenience yield can significantly affect the demand of feedback traders. Furthermore, the 
effects of arbitrage opportunities on feedback trading are found to vary in different market 
regimes.
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4.1. Introduction 
Commodity markets have become more attractive to investors in recent years.  Global 
investment funds increased their commodities holdings from $13 billion in 2003 to $260 
billion in mid-2008, which is a twenty-fold rise (Cifarrelli and Paladino, 2010). Motivations 
for investing in commodity markets include the fact that commodities can offer 
diversification benefits and protect against inflation (Bodie and Rosansky, 1980). In addition, 
commodity futures can provide leverage and are not constrained by short-sale restrictions 
(Miffre and Rallis, 2007). Because of the increasing importance of commodities in global 
asset allocation, the trading behaviour of commodity markets investors has attracted growing 
attention in academic research, e.g. regarding momentum or contrarian strategies (Wang and 
Yu, 2004; Miffre and Rallis, 2007) and other technical trading rules (Marshall, Cahan and 
Cahan, 2008). However, another important trend chasing strategy, i.e. feedback trading, has 
not been fully examined in commodity markets.
26
  
The design and nature of commodity markets is particularly helpful to feedback trading. 
For instance, implementing feedback trading strategies requires frequent transactions. There 
are two types of feedback trading: positive and negative feedback trading. Positive (negative) 
feedback traders buy the asset after a price rise (drop), where the portfolio manager needs to 
frequently rebalance their portfolio. The low transaction costs and high liquidity of nearby 
commodity futures
27
 enables investors to pursue profits through feedback trading strategies.  
In addition, positive feedback traders may sell an asset short after a price drop. In commodity 
futures markets, short-selling is as easy as taking a long position. Therefore, implementing 
                                                          
26
 A recent paper by Cifarelli and Paladino (2010) examines feedback trading in crude oil markets. However, 
their results are based on weekly data, while the vast of majority feedback trading studies focus on daily prices 
or even intraday data. Koutmos (2012) argues that it is more appropriate to use higher frequency data because 
feedback traders tend to adopt short-run computerised strategies to capture very short-lived trends. The use of 
weekly data may fail to detect short-run feedback trading activity. 
27
 See Miffre and Rallis (2007) for details. 
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this kind of strategy in commodity markets is feasible, given that the market is not 
constrained by short-sale restrictions. Furthermore, Culter, Poterba and Summers (1990) 
argue that margin call-induced selling after a series of negative returns is one of the reasons 
for positive feedback trading. Therefore, it is likely to detect the margin call-caused feedback 
trading in commodity futures markets due to the intensive use of leverage.  
To this end, this chapter aims to empirically examine the question of whether there is 
feedback trading in commodity markets, using daily spot and futures prices in the carbon 
emission market, which was created in 2005 to reduce the emission of greenhouse gases. The 
market is built on a “cap-and-trade” system launched by the European Union. Only firms in 
several specified industries can receive a free allocation of carbon assets and individuals 
cannot claim carbon assets from their emissions reduction. Therefore, almost all the 
participants in carbon markets are institutional investors.
28
 This provides a unique and natural 
opportunity to investigate the relationship between institutional investors and feedback 
trading. For completeness and comparison, this chapter also includes four other major energy 
markets: carbon; coal; natural gas; electricity; and crude oil.  
Building on the work of Shiller (1984), Sentana and Wadhwani (1992, hereafter SW) 
develop a feedback trading model with heterogeneous investors (feedback traders and “smart 
money” investors) to identify the linkage between volatility and autocorrelation. It is found 
that, with the presence of significant feedback trading, asset returns exhibit positive 
autocorrelation in a low volatility period and negative autocorrelation in a high volatility 
period. The negative relation between autocorrelation and volatility is supported by a number 
                                                          
28
 The data from the European Union Emission Trading Scheme Transaction Log in November, 2012 shows 
that less than 6% of total accounts are personal holding accounts (2,050 out of a total of 34,492 accounts), 
suggesting that the vast majority of participants in the European carbon markets are institutional investors. 
Participants in the EU ETS include the 12,000 installations covered by the scheme, firms investing in the CDM 
and JI projects, government carbon funds, international organisations, arbitragers, speculators and other 
environmental investors. 
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of subsequent studies (e.g. Antoniou et al., 2005; Laopodis, 2005; Salm and Schuppli, 2010; 
Chau et al., 2011). In addition, recent literature has also focused on extending the original 
SW feedback trading model. For instance, Faff, Hillier and McKenzie (2005) extend the 
feedback trading model by including a cross-market feedback trader, whose demand function 
is sensitive to the price movement in foreign markets. Chau et al. (2011) consider the effect 
of investor sentiment on the feedback traders’ demand function, and further develop a 
feedback trading model with investor sentiment. Koutmos (2012) incorporates the role of 
fundamental traders in determining the stock return dynamics. 
Nevertheless, the aforementioned literature does not fully take into consideration the 
effects of arbitrage opportunities on feedback trading behaviour. De Long et al. (1990) argue 
that rational speculation and arbitrage are among the most important factors contributing to 
feedback trading. Arbitrage can be regarded as one form of rational speculation. Efficient 
arbitrage is the main force behind the linkage between spot and futures markets (MacKinlay 
and Ramaswamy, 1988) and also contributes significantly to price discovery (Garbade and 
Silber, 1983). One of the most commonly used arbitrage signals is the spot-futures basis 
(Kumar and Seppi, 1994). If the spot-futures basis moves above the arbitrage window, 
arbitragers can simultaneously buy futures contracts and sell the spot asset (Miller, 
Muthuswamy and Whale, 1994), pushing up futures prices. This in turn implies that arbitrage 
opportunities may contain some predictive value for future price movements (e.g. Khoury 
and Yourougou, 1991; Knetsch, 2007; Gorton et al., 2013). For this reason, this chapter 
argues that feedback traders not only trade based on past returns, but are also influenced by 
the level of arbitrage opportunities. However, no previous research has investigated the 
impact of arbitrage opportunities on feedback trading. To address this issue, another 
important objective of this chapter is to extend the SW feedback trading model by allowing 
the demand of feedback traders to be affected by the level of arbitrage opportunities. 
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This chapter adds to the existing literature in a number of aspects. Firstly, this study 
presents the first attempt to study the trading behaviour of investors in the new carbon 
emission markets. In particular, the baseline SW feedback trading model is adopted to 
examine the presence of feedback trading in these markets. As nearly all of the investors in 
carbon markets are institutional investors, the results obtained are significant in 
understanding the trading behaviour of institutional investors. 
Secondly, this work also contributes to a growing number of studies examining the role of 
arbitrage opportunities in trading behaviour.  Arbitrage is a kind of rational speculation, as it 
is based on rational analysis but speculates on prices adjusting to the equilibrium quickly, 
while rational speculation is cited as one of the factors contributing to feedback trading (De 
Long et al., 1990).  Arbitrage opportunities could be considered by feedback traders as a 
signal to trade. This study first extends the SW feedback trading model by allowing arbitrage 
opportunities to affect the demand of feedback traders, in both additive and multiplicative 
way. The results of this chapter are important in understanding trading behaviour in futures 
markets, where arbitrage and hedging are the main purposes of transactions. Thirdly, the 
augmented feedback trading model is re-estimated using data from different market regimes, 
i.e. bull and bear markets, to examine whether the level of feedback trading and the effects of 
arbitrage opportunities on feedback trading change across different market conditions. In 
addition, unlike previous studies which only assume a particular conditional variance 
specification, this chapter conducts a detailed specification test to identify the best volatility 
model for each market.  
Using daily spot and futures price data for carbon, coal, electricity, natural gas and crude 
oil markets, this chapter attempts to examine the following questions: 
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 Is there feedback trading in the commodity markets? In particular, do the investors in 
carbon emissions markets (mainly institutional investors) contribute to feedback trading 
activities or not?  
 How do the arbitrage opportunities affect the feedback trading activities? 
 Does the relationship between arbitrage opportunities and the level of feedback trading 
vary across bull/bear market regimes? 
The main findings of this chapter can be summarised as follows. First, the results of the 
feedback trading model show that feedback trading is significantly present in coal and 
electricity markets, but not in carbon, natural gas and crude oil markets. As the vast majority 
of investors in carbon emissions markets are institutions, the results do not support the view 
that institutional investors contribute to feedback trading, which differs from the traditional 
view (e.g. Nofsinger and Sias, 1999). Secondly, the results of the augmented SW feedback 
trading models show that arbitrage opportunities can affect demand from feedback traders’ in 
the electricity and natural gas markets, in both an additive and a multiplicative way. This 
supports the view that arbitrage opportunities have an impact on feedback trading. Thirdly, 
the responses of feedback traders to past returns or arbitrage opportunities vary significantly 
across bull and bear market regimes. Finally, all the above results are robust to different 
measures of arbitrage opportunities, including the spot-futures basis and the convenience 
yield. 
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 4.2 discusses empirical 
evidence of feedback trading in financial markets, and the relation between arbitrage 
opportunities and feedback trading. Section 4.3 describes the basic feedback model and the 
augmented feedback trading model with arbitrage opportunities. Section 4.4 explains the 
dataset employed in this study and provides some preliminary results. Section 4.5 analyses 
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the empirical results, while robustness checks are provided in Section 4.6. Conclusions about 
this research are stated in Section 4.7. 
 
4.2. Related literature: Arbitrage opportunities and feedback trading  
 Spot-futures arbitrage is a trading strategy that large investors pursue in order to profit 
from the difference between prices in the futures market and its underlying spot market 
(Chung, 1991). It is the main mechanism for maintaining the linkage between the two 
markets (MacKinlay and Ramaswamy, 1988) and also contributes significantly to price 
discovery (Garbade and Silber, 1983). One of the most commonly used arbitrage signals is 
the spot-futures basis (Kumar and Seppi, 1994). If the spot-futures basis is greater than a 
certain threshold, arbitragers can simultaneously buy futures contracts and sell the spot asset 
(Kumar and Seppi, 1994). To date, research has focused on examining the profitability of 
arbitrage opportunities (Chung, 1991) and on how limits to arbitrage affect arbitrage 
activities and spot-futures mispricing (McMillian and Philip, 2012). Intuitively, the presence 
of arbitrage opportunities is one of the motivations for investors to trade. However, the issue 
of whether arbitrage opportunities affect investors’ trading behaviour has received much less 
attention. In particular, there is little previous research connecting arbitrage opportunities 
with feedback trading.  
Since the seminal work of SW which develops a heterogeneous feedback trading model, 
feedback trading has been found in many markets, including the U.S. stock market (SW), 
other stock markets (Antoniou et al., 2005), foreign exchange markets (Laopodis, 2005), 
index futures markets (Salm and Schuppli, 2010), and exchange-traded fund (ETF) markets 
(Chau et al., 2011), as well as the crude oil market (Cifarrelli and Paladino, 2010). Beside the 
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above empirical work in different markets, the baseline feedback trading model has also been 
augmented in a number of directions. In the SW feedback trading model, there are two 
groups of investors, namely feedback traders and “smart money” investors. Feedback traders’ 
demand for shares is dependent on previous price changes while “smart money” investors 
trade based on risk-return analysis. Faff et al. (2005) extend the feedback trading model by 
including a cross-market feedback trader. Chau et al. (2011) incorporate the effect of investor 
sentiment into the feedback traders’ demand function, and develop a feedback trading model 
that takes into account the role of investor sentiment. A recent study by Koutmos (2012) 
shows that a feedback trading model with heterogeneous investors should have an additional 
investors group, consisting of fundamental traders.  
This chapter extends the baseline feedback trading model by considering the effects of 
arbitrage opportunities on feedback trading. Several papers have studied the relations 
between arbitrage opportunities (measured by the spot-futures basis or convenience yield) 
and hedging (Lien and Yang, 2008; Millios and Six, 2011), as well as the predictive power of 
the basis on futures prices and returns, both theoretically (Khoury and Martel, 1989) and 
empirically (Khoury and Yourougou, 1991). However, little research has been done on 
whether and how arbitrage opportunities can influence feedback traders’ investment decisions.  
Commodity assets have become increasingly important in investors’ asset allocation. The 
trading strategies used in commodity markets have also attracted increasing attention in 
academic research. Miffre and Rallis (2007) show that both momentum and contrarian 
strategies are profitable in commodity markets. Marshall et al. (2008) also suggest that 
certain groups of technical trading rules can generate abnormal returns in commodity markets. 
However, there are limited studies on feedback trading strategies in commodity markets. 
Cifarelli and Paladino (2010) study feedback trading in U.S. crude oil markets using weekly 
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data; however, the vast majority of feedback trading research has focused on daily prices or 
intraday data. The reason for using high frequency data is that feedback investors are likely to 
choose short-run computerised strategies to capture those trends which will vanish very 
quickly (Koutmos, 2012). The use of weekly data may fail to detect short-run feedback 
trading activity. Therefore, it is plausible to use daily data to examine feedback trading in 
commodity markets.
 29
 
Motivated by the aforementioned theories and empirical results, this chapter makes 
several extensions to the baseline SW feedback trading model, by allowing the potential 
arbitrage opportunities to affect feedback traders’ demand for shares. This study also uses 
daily data from emission and energy markets to fill the research gap in feedback trading in 
commodity markets. In the following sections, this chapter shows how the baseline and 
augmented feedback trading model with arbitrage opportunities can be developed. 
 
4.3. Feedback trading models 
4.3.1. The SW feedback trading model 
Since the discovery of the relationship between investors’ trading behaviour and stock 
return serial correlation, several forms of feedback trading models have been proposed to 
theoretically predict the patterns of return autocorrelation. The feedback trading models 
developed by Shiller (1984) and Cutler et al. (1990) predict a positive serial correlation of 
stock returns if there is feedback trading, as the feedback traders are able to help maintain the 
trend, i.e. produce a positive return autocorrelation. However, the SW feedback trading 
                                                          
29
 In addition to the literature summarised in this section,  this chapter provides a comprehensive review of 
previous literature related to arbitrate opportunities, arbitrage proxies, momentum and contrarian strategies in 
commodity markets, empirical tests and theoretical extensions of the SW feedback trading model, which is 
shown in Appendix 4A.  
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model which connects return autocorrelation and volatility, shows that positive feedback 
trading could lead to negative autocorrelation when volatility is high. This model identifies 
two distinct styles of investors in the stock market. “Smart money” investors constitute the 
first type of participants, who are assumed to be rational and make investment decisions 
based on fundamentals and risk-return trade-off. The second group of investors are known as 
feedback traders or trend followers, whose demand for stocks is made on the basis of 
previous stock returns. The SW model posits that the “smart money” investors are more 
cautious during high volatility periods, and therefore portfolio insurers and stop-loss investors 
have greater power to affect stock prices, which leads to a higher negative return 
autocorrelation. The heterogeneous trader model captures both the return autocorrelations and 
the impacts of volatility on stock returns caused by two different groups of investors. 
Following SW, by maximising utility in the mean-variance framework, the demand function 
for the rational “smart money” investors is formulated as: 
1( )t t
t
t
E R
S


 
           (4.1) 
where St is the fraction of shares that “smart money” investors hold, Et-1(Rt) is the expected 
return at time t based on the information available at time t-1, α is the return when the 
demand for shares from “smart money” investors is zero, which should be the risk-free rate, 
and μt is the risk premium when all the shares are held by this group of investors. As rational 
investors are risk averse, the risk premium is further modelled as: 
2( )t t               (4.2) 
where σt
2
 is the conditional variance of returns at time t and μ(x) is an increasing function. As 
the risk associated with returns increases, investors require a higher risk premium. It should 
be noted that, when all the shares are held by “smart money” investors and the market is in 
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equilibrium (i.e. St=1), Equation (1) becomes the classic Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM): 
2
1( ) ( )t t tE R                           (4.3) 
Feedback traders’ demand for shares fluctuates as stock prices change; therefore, their 
demand function is expressed as: 
1t tF R             (4.4) 
where Rt-1 is the ex-post stock return at time t-1 and γ is the marginal response of feedback 
traders to stock returns. The sign of γ can help to distinguish between the two types of trend 
followers in the stock market. A positive value for γ indicates that this group of investors 
(positive feedback traders) believe the trend will be persistent and consequently they will buy 
(sell) stocks after a rise (fall) in stock prices. On the contrary, negative feedback traders buy 
(sell) stocks during a period of falling (increasing) stock prices to reflect their opinion that the 
trend will reverse. In this case, the value of γ is expected to be less than zero. 
When the market is in equilibrium, all the shares are possessed by the two types of 
investors. Therefore: 
1t tS F             (4.5) 
Substituting Equations (4.1), (4.2) and (4.4) into Equation (4.5), produces the following: 
2 2
1 1( ) ( ) ( )t t tt tE R R                (4.6) 
Assuming that expected stock returns will be rational, i.e.  
1( )t t t tR E R             (4.7) 
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where εt is an independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) error term. Equation (4.6) can 
then be reformulated as:  
2 2
1( ) ( )t t tt tR R                 (4.8) 
However, Equation (4.8) does not consider the return autocorrelation caused by market 
inefficiency, non-synchronous trading and other market imperfections. Accounting for these 
possibilities and taking a linear form of risk premium, the empirical version of the SW 
feedback trading model is: 
2 2
0 1 - 1( )t t tt tR R                   (4.9)
 
where γ0 is the coefficient of first order autocorrelation induced by market imperfections and 
γ1=-γρ. Positive (negative) feedback trading indicates that γ1 should be negative (positive) 
and statistically significant. The model given by Equation (4.9) is referred to as baseline 
Model I. 
It is interesting to observe from the model that positive feedback trading (negative γ1) can 
result in negative return autocorrelations during a high volatility period and positive 
autocorrelations during low volatility times. The negative relation between autocorrelation 
and volatility is supported by SW’s empirical results using the U.S. data, and is also found in 
other stock markets (Antoniou et al., 2005), foreign exchange markets (Laopodis, 2005), and 
index futures markets (Salm and Schuppli, 2010), as well as exchange-traded fund (ETF) 
markets (Chau et al., 2011). 
 
4.3.2. Feedback trading models with arbitrage opportunities 
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In the baseline SW feedback trading model, the demand function of feedback traders 
depends only on past realised returns. However, an increasing amount of literature supports 
the idea that there is strong link between the presence of arbitrage opportunities and trading 
behaviour in futures markets. As shown in Section 4.2, the arbitrage opportunities can be 
measured by the futures basis or convenience yield. Kumar and Seppi (1994) and Miller et al. 
(1994) indicate that the dynamics of the basis acts as a signal for some arbitragers. If the basis 
is wide enough or above a certain threshold, arbitragers will exploit the arbitrage opportunity 
by trading in futures markets. In addition, Lien and Yang (2008) show the importance of 
incorporating the changes of basis into hedging decisions. The basis affects the minimum 
variance hedge ratio estimation not only in terms of the mean level but also in terms of the 
volatility level. Mellios and Six (2011) also demonstrate that the hedging demand is uniquely 
associated with the convenience yield.  
Motivated by the aforementioned literature, this chapter extends the SW feedback trading 
model by allowing arbitrage opportunities to affect feedback trading in futures markets. 
Similarly to SW, these feedback traders still do not take risk into consideration; however, 
they not only respond to the past period returns, but also observe what happens in the spot 
market and react to the arbitrage opportunities between the spot and futures markets. 
Following SW, two distinct types of investors, i.e. “smart money” investors and feedback 
traders, are assumed to participate in futures markets. The demand function for “smart money” 
investors remains unchanged. However, the demand function for feedback investors is 
modified to reflect the important role of arbitrage opportunities. As a substantial amount of 
literature shows that arbitrage opportunity proxies directly affect futures trading, including 
both arbitrage and hedging, the first extension of the feedback trading model in this chapter 
involves allowing the demand function of feedback traders to rely on current arbitrage 
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opportunities, in an additive way. One of the most commonly used arbitrage signals is the 
spot-futures basis (Kumar and Seppi, 1994). If the spot-futures basis is wider than the 
threshold, arbitragers can simultaneously buy futures contracts and sell the spot asset (Miller 
et al., 1994). For this reason, the lagged basis is adopted as a proxy for the arbitrage 
opportunities. The basis is the logarithm difference between the spot and futures prices
,=ln ( / )t t t TBasis S F , where T is the maturity time of the futures contract, St is the spot price at 
time t and Ft,T is the futures price at time t which matures at time T. Therefore, the demand 
function for feedback traders is:  
1 1+t t tF R Basis                      (4.10) 
where Basist-1 is the spot-futures basis and δ is the response of feedback traders to arbitrage 
opportunities (measured by a lagged basis). 
Substituting Equations (4.10), (4.2) and (4.4) into Equation (4.5), the first augmented 
feedback trading model is formulated as follows:  
2 2
1 1 -1( ) ( ) ( ) -t t tt t tE R R Basis                         (4.11)
 
Following the empirical approximations of SW, and taking γ2=-δ, the empirical version of 
the first augmented feedback trading model is:
 
2 2 2
0 1 - 1 2 1( )t t tt t t tR R Basis                            (4.12) 
and the model described in Equation (4.12) is referred to as Model II. 
It is also noteworthy that the literature has documented that the basis is associated with 
futures prices and returns, theoretically (Khoury and Martel, 1989) and empirically (Khoury 
and Yourougou, 1991). In addition, when modelling futures returns, the basis usually acts as 
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the error correction term in the mean equation (Lien and Yang, 2008). Based on the above 
argument, feedback traders might believe the arbitrage opportunity signal is an indicator of 
future price movement. They think that the presence of arbitrage opportunities can partly 
determine the profitability of the feedback trading strategy. Consequently, their reaction to 
past returns (i.e. the degree of feedback trading) also depends on the arbitrage proxies. The 
above additive model cannot capture the relation between arbitrage opportunities and the 
degree of feedback trading; therefore, an alternative model is proposed in which feedback 
traders’ demand for shares is affected by arbitrage proxies in a multiplicative way, as follows: 
1 -1+ )t t tF Basis R  （                   (4.13)  
where Basist-1 is defined as previously described. δ here represents the effects of arbitrage 
opportunities on the degree of feedback trading.  
Substituting Equations (4.13), (4.2) and (4.4) into Equation (4.5), the second augmented 
feedback trading model is formulated as follows:  
2 2
1 -1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( )t t t t t tE R Basis R                          (4.14) 
Following the empirical approximations of SW, and taking γ2=-δ, the empirical version of the 
second augmented feedback trading model, or Model III, is:
 
2 2 2
0 1 - 12 1( )t t tt t t tR Basis R                            (4.15) 
 
4.3.3. Conditional volatility specifications 
An important issue within the empirical work on feedback trading involves estimating the 
conditional variance σt
2
, which is primarily modelled by generalised autoregressive 
conditional heteroskedastic (GARCH) processes in the financial literature. SW adopt the 
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exponential GARCH (EGARCH) in their work, but an increasing number of researchers 
(Antoniou et al., 2005; Chau et al., 2011) have started to use the GJR-GARCH, introduced by 
Glosten, Jagannathan and Runkle (1993). Both the EGARCH and GJR-GARCH models can 
capture asymmetric effects in the conditional variance while the standard GARCH model 
cannot. The standard GARCH model is:  
2 2 2
0 1 1 1t t t                          (4.16)
 
and the EGARCH is specified as:  
0 1
2 2
1 1ln t t tG       ; 
1 1
1
1 1
2
| |t tt
t t
G
 

  
 

 
                   (4.17) 
while the GJR-GARCH is modelled as: 
2 2 2 2
0 1 11 1 1tt t t tI                             (4.18)
 
where 2t denotes the conditional variance at time t,  εt is the error term from Equations (4.9) 
(4.12) and (4.15), and It-1 is a dummy variable which takes the value of one if the error term 
is negative at time t-1 and takes the value of zero otherwise.  
Cappiello, Engle and Sheppard (2006) show that if the GARCH model is not well 
specified, the estimation results of the mean model will no longer be consistent. In order to 
select the most appropriate volatility model for each market, this study includes the following 
models in the specification tests: standard GARCH; EGARCH; and GJR-GARCH. An AR 
(1)-GARCH (1, 1) model with the three GARCH specifications is estimated for each market. 
The most appropriate model is selected based on several criteria, including the value of log-
likelihood function (Log L), heteroskedasticity-adjusted mean squared error (HMSE) and 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC).  
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As most of the standard residuals from GARCH models which are assumed to be 
normally distributed appear to be leptokurtic, the standard t-test will be unreliable (Antoniou 
et al., 2005). In this chapter, the error terms are assumed to follow the Generalised Error 
Distribution (GED) which allows for fat tails. Its density function is:  
1/2 3/2 /2( , , ) [ (3 / )] [ (1/ )] (1/ )exp( [ (3 / ) / (1/ )] | | )
2
t t t t tf
                          (4.19) 
where ν is the scale parameter estimated endogenously. When ν=2, GED yields normal 
distribution, and ν=1 for the Laplace distribution.  
 
4.4. Data and model selection 
The dataset used in this study includes daily spot and futures prices of carbon emission 
allowances and four main energy commodities within the European market, which are coal, 
electricity, natural gas and crude oil. In order to examine these commodity markets, the 
following futures contracts listed on the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) and their reference 
spot prices are used: EU Emission Allowance (EUA) futures (carbon emission); Rotterdam 
coal futures (coal); UK base time electricity futures (electricity); UK natural gas futures 
(natural gas); Brent crude oil futures (crude oil). These contracts are studied in the previous 
literature as proxies for each commodity.
30
 The starting dates for each commodity vary 
because of data availability, and are as follows: 03/03/2008 (carbon); 17/07/2006 (coal); 
27/12/2006 (electricity); 06/02//2003 (natural gas); and 08/09/2003 (crude oil). The end date 
for all the markets is 30/09/2012. To construct a continuous series of futures prices, the 
futures contracts switch over on the first day of a new trading month, for all available trading 
                                                          
30
 For example, see Daskalakis et al. (2009) for the carbon emission market, Borger, Cartea, Kiesel and 
Schindlmayr (2009) for the coal market, Bunn and Gianfreda (2010) for the electricity market, Hochradl and 
Rammerstorfer (2012) for the natural gas market, and Ellen and Zwinkels (2010) for the crude oil market. 
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months. In currency terms, the coal and crude oil prices are denominated in U.S dollars 
(USD); the carbon emission price is denominated in Euros; while electricity and natural gas 
prices are denominated in Great British Pounds (GBP). For the estimation of implied 
convenience yields, following Heaney (2002), the 3-month mid-rate of the Euro-currency 
(London) USD, Euro and GBP are adopted as the risk-free interest rates for each commodity. 
The data in this chapter was obtained from DataStream. 
[Insert Table 4.1 here] 
Daily futures returns are calculated as the logarithmic first differences of futures prices in 
percentage form. The descriptive statistics of the futures returns are presented in Panel A of 
Table 4.1. It is shown that coal and crude oil returns are negatively skewed, while carbon, 
electricity and natural gas returns are positively skewed. All the series exhibit highly 
leptokurtic and significant deviations from normality (see results of the Jarque-Bera test). 
Ljung-Box statistics provide clear evidence of serial correlation in all return data except 
carbon, and in all squared return data except natural gas. A significant ARCH effect is also 
found in carbon, coal, electricity and crude oil, but not for natural gas. The results of Engle 
and Ng’s (1993) JOINT test designed to test the asymmetries in conditional volatility, 
indicate that significant asymmetries appear in all futures conditional variances, providing the 
rationale for using asymmetric GARCH models. It can be observed from Panel B of Table 
4.1 that all five markets are significantly correlated.  
Panel C in Table 4.1 provides a preliminary idea of the degree of feedback trading in 
these markets. It shows the estimation results of an autoregressive model of order, AR (5), for 
futures returns. Consistent with the Ljung-Box Q-test results, all the futures returns except 
carbon exhibit autocorrelation to some extent. However, the simple autoregressive model 
cannot capture the interaction between feedback traders and “smart money” investors, as 
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feedback trading can cause a negative relation between autocorrelation and volatility. 
Therefore, it is useful to further investigate the effect of feedback trading through the SW 
feedback trading model and its augmented models.  
[Insert Table 4.2 here] 
The summary statistics for the spot-futures basis and convenience yield is shown in Table 
4.2. The means of all futures bases are around zero; however the absolute values of the means 
of convenience yields are much larger. It is also indicated in the table that the convenience 
yields of these commodities are more volatile than their basis. All the bases and convenience 
yields display some degree of skewness and are highly leptokurtic.  
[Insert Table 4.3 here] 
As described in Section 4.3.3, the conditional variance is modelled by a standard GARCH, 
EGARCH or GJR-GARCH. A simple AR (1)-GARCH (1, 1) model is estimated to test the 
fitness of the data to the three GARCH model specifications. Table 4.3 displays the results of 
the specification tests for the GARCH models. The most appropriate model is selected based 
on several criteria, including the value of log likelihood function (Log L), heteroskedasticity-
adjusted mean squared error (HMSE) and Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). The final 
GARCH specifications selected for each market are presented in the last column, which are 
as follows: EGARCH for carbon, electricity, and natural gas; GJR-GARCH for coal and 
crude oil. It is noteworthy that all the models selected are asymmetric GARCH models, 
which is consistent with the JOINT test results indicating that there are asymmetries in the 
conditional variance of all the futures returns.  
 
4.5. Empirical results  
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4.5.1. Feedback trading evidence in emissions and energy markets 
To detect possible feedback trading in the emissions and energy markets, this study first 
estimates the baseline SW feedback trading model (Model I, Equation 4.9) with the 
conditional variance specifications stated in Table 4.3. The maximum likelihood estimation 
results of the baseline model are presented in Table 4.4. From the conditional variance 
equation, it can be observed that the coefficients α0, α1, and β are all statistically significant at 
the 5% level, indicating that the current conditional variance is dependent on past squared 
errors and past conditional volatility. δ, which is the asymmetric parameter in the GJR-
GARCH and the leverage parameter in the EGARCH, is significant in all cases except the 
coal market. The results confirm the model selection in Table 4.3. The estimated scale 
parameter ν in the GED function is significant and less than 2 in all cases,31 showing that all 
the error terms are not normally distributed and are leptokurtic, which confirms the use of 
GED distribution. The results also confirm that the temporal first and second moment 
dependencies of returns cannot fully explain why returns are not normally distributed.  
[Insert Table 4.4 here] 
The most interesting parameters in the baseline model are the autocorrelation parameters 
γ0 and γ1, which test the existence of feedback trading. The constant term of the return 
autocorrelation, γ0, is positive and significant for coal and electricity at the 5% level, and for 
natural gas at the 10% level, showing a positive return autocorrelation in these markets. The 
results are generally consistent with the finding in Panel C of Table 4.1. SW argue that this 
kind of return autocorrelation is caused by non-synchronous trading and other market 
frictions or inefficiencies. The effects of feedback investors’ trading behaviour on return 
autocorrelation are captured by γ1. It is shown in Table 4.4 that the feedback trading 
                                                          
31
 When ν=2, GED reduces to the standard normal distribution.  
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parameter γ1 is insignificant for carbon and natural gas, implying that there is no feedback 
trading in these markets and investors do not trade based on past returns. As the vast majority 
of investors in the carbon market are institutions, these results do not support the view that 
institutional investors contribute to feedback trading, which differs from Nofsinger and Sias’s 
(1999) findings. γ1 is negative and significant in the coal market at the 5% level, suggesting 
that positive feedback trading is present in the coal market and its impacts on returns become 
greater in high volatility periods. Some investors are more inclined to hold a coal futures long 
position when coal futures prices go up, consistent with the momentum strategy found in 
commodity markets (Miffre and Rallis, 2007). The presence of positive feedback trading has 
also been widely discovered in stock markets (Antoniou et al., 2005), foreign exchange 
markets (Laopodis, 2005), and index futures markets (Salm and Schuppli, 2010), as well as 
exchange-traded fund (ETF) markets (Chau et al., 2011). Moreover, although not marked in 
Table 4.4, γ1 for crude oil is negative and significant at the 10% level (t-statistics is -1.713), 
showing very weak positive feedback trading in the crude oil market. Cifarrelli and Paladino 
(2010) document strong positive evidence of feedback in the U.S. crude oil market from 1992 
to 2008. However, it is observed that the feedback trading parameter is positive in the 
electricity market, showing that there is negative feedback trading in that market. Feedback 
investors in the electricity market sell electricity futures contracts after a rise in the futures 
price, similarly to the contrarian strategy detected in commodity markets (Wang and Yu, 
2004). There is not much evidence of negative feedback trading in the literature. Laopodis 
(2005) studies the global foreign exchange market using the SW model, and finds that 
negative feedback trading occurred in the British Pounds market, the South Korean Won 
market before the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis, and the Italian Lira market before the 
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) crisis in 1992-1993. For the diagnostics tests presented in 
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Panel C of Table 4.4, all the statistics are improved compared to the raw return results and 
show no evidence of serious model misspecification of the baseline model.  
 
4.5.2. The effects of arbitrage opportunities on feedback trading 
This section investigates whether arbitrage proxies have an impact on feedback trading. 
The influence of arbitrage opportunities on the feedback traders’ demand function is 
modelled in an additive way (Model II) or a multiplicative way (Model III). As the spot-
futures basis is a direct signal of arbitrage opportunities (Kumar and Seppi, 1994), this study 
adopts the basis as the proxy for arbitrage opportunities in the main tests and uses the 
convenience yield as an alternative measure of arbitrage opportunities for robustness checks. 
[Insert Table 4.5 here] 
In Model II (Equation 4.12) with a basis, feedback investors not only trade based on the 
returns from the last period, but also based on the last period’s spot-futures basis, which can 
be an indicator of arbitrage opportunities (Sofianos, 1993) or a factor affecting hedging 
decisions (Lien and Yang, 2008). The demand function of feedback traders is their additive 
response to the previous period’s return and basis. In this model, a positive γ2 suggests that 
feedback traders will sell the asset when the spot price is greater than the futures price on the 
last trading day while a negative γ2 implies that feedback investors are more inclined to buy a 
futures long position when the last period’s basis is positive. The estimation results from 
Model II with a basis are shown in Table 4.5.  It can be observed that the directions and 
significances of the γ1 parameters are identical to the results in Model I. The magnitude and 
significance of the parameters in the conditional variance equation are not uncommon. The 
most interesting parameter in Model II is γ2, the one governing the additive effect of the basis 
on feedback trading. The results in Table 4.5 demonstrate that γ2 is insignificant in the carbon, 
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coal and crude oil markets, showing that feedback traders in these markets do not directly 
respond to the spot-futures basis. In contrast, γ2 is negative and significant in the electricity 
and natural gas markets, indicating that feedback investors hold more long positions of 
futures contracts when the last period’s spot price is higher than the last period’s futures 
prices. Feedback traders in the electricity and natural gas markets believe that futures prices 
will rise to draw level with the spot prices and therefore they are more likely to buy futures 
long positions. This trading behaviour can inflate futures prices and reduce the spot-futures 
basis, which confirms the use of the basis as an arbitrage signal. Miller et al. (1994) argue 
that when the spot price is too high relative to the futures price and the basis is higher than its 
theoretical level, arbitragers can simultaneously short-sell the spot asset and buy futures 
contracts to exploit the arbitrage profit. The results confirm the above arguments and support 
the linkage between arbitrage opportunities and feedback trading. It is also noteworthy that 
the diagnostic tests for the electricity and natural gas markets improved significantly from 
Model I to Model II with a basis, especially for the degree of autocorrelation in the residuals, 
showing that the significant basis effects in the feedback trading model increase the 
effectiveness of model specification.  
  [Insert Table 4.6 here]  
Besides predicting arbitrage opportunities, the basis is also claimed to be an indicator of 
the futures price movement trend (Khoury and Martel, 1989; Khoury and Yourougou, 1991). 
Therefore the basis can affect the profitability of a feedback trading strategy and thus 
determine the level of feedback trading. Based on this, Model III (Equation 4.15) is 
developed, in which the feedback traders’ demand function depends on the past basis in a 
multiplicative way. The results of Model III with a basis are displayed in Table 4.6.  In this 
model, feedback investors do not directly respond to the basis; however, the basis affects 
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their feedback trading in terms of sensitivity to past returns. A positive γ2 suggests that 
feedback traders buy short futures contracts when past futures returns are positive and the 
past basis is positive and a negative γ2 suggests they buy more long-futures when both past 
returns and the past basis are negative. However, explaining the results in terms of feedback 
trading is more complex. In Model III with a basis, -γ1-γ2*Basist-1 is the function parameter of 
past returns and the basis affects feedback trading in a multiplicative way. A positive γ2 can 
only suggest that the degree of negative feedback trading increases or the degree of positive 
feedback trading decreases, and vice versa. However, we cannot determine the direction of 
feedback trading. Therefore, it is reasonable to observe γ1 and γ2 together. For the carbon 
emission and crude oil markets, both γ1 and γ2 are insignificant, implying that there is no 
feedback trading in these markets. For the remaining three markets, both parameters are 
significant.  In the coal market, γ1=-0.0132 and γ2=0.0913. The results indicate that there is 
positive feedback trading when the spot price is equal to the futures price, but the degree of 
positive feedback trading decreases as the basis becomes larger. When the basis is greater 
than 0.1446, it turns into negative feedback trading. Similarly for γ1=-0.0001 and γ2=0.0005 
in the natural gas market. When the basis is zero in the natural gas market, feedback investors 
buy more long position futures when futures prices rise, but the degree of positive feedback 
trading diminishes and becomes zero when the basis approaches 0.2000. For the electricity 
market, there is negative feedback trading when the basis is zero (γ1=0.0009) and the degree 
of negative feedback trading increases as the basis becomes greater (γ2=0.0595). However, 
when the basis decreases to -0.0151 (i.e. the spot price is lower than the futures price by 
1.52%), it will become positive feedback trading. It is also very interesting that the γ2 
parameters in all five markets are positive (although some of them are insignificant). The 
results show that the degree of negative feedback trading increases or the degree of positive 
feedback trading decreases as the lagged basis becomes larger. The spot-futures basis in the 
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last period provides the threshold point for positive and negative feedback trading, and it can 
also be viewed as a signal of channel breakouts in technical analysis. When the basis is 
within certain thresholds, feedback traders believe that the current trend for futures prices will 
persist; therefore they adopt a positive feedback trading strategy. However, if the basis is 
wide enough, the current channel will be broken out by arbitragers; consequently, negative 
feedback trading becomes profitable for investors. The above results are consistent with 
Marshall et al. (2008), who find some channel breakout trading rules are profitable in the U.S. 
commodity markets; they are also consistent with the use of a basis as arbitrage signals.  
 
4.6. Robustness checks 
4.6.1. Alternative  measure of arbitrage opportunities 
The difference between spot and futures prices, the basis, is a naïve and widely used 
signal and measure of arbitrage opportunities. However, the spot-futures basis does not 
consider the explicit and implicit costs of arbitrage, including borrowing costs and 
opportunity costs. The convenience yield, which can be derived from the non-arbitrage cost-
of-carry model, reflects these costs in addition to the basis. From the equations to calculate 
the basis and convenience yield (Equations 4.20 and 4.21 below), it can be ascertained that 
the convenience yield is estimated based on a basis but also considers the effects of dynamic 
risk-free rates and time-to-maturity. Economically, the convenience yield is the benefit of 
holding spot inventory rather than buying futures. It shows the economic relationship 
between spot and futures prices. Therefore, the convenience yield can also be an indicator of 
future price movements in futures. Bertus, Godbey and Hilliard (2009) and Mellios and Six 
(2011) also find that the convenience yield can affect the hedging demand and optimal hedge 
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ratio.  In this section, the sensitivity of the above results above to an alternative measure of 
arbitrage opportunities, the convenience yield, is examined.  
The convenience yield is estimated from the cost-of-carry model. As suggested by 
Brennan (1958), the futures price is determined by the spot price, risk-free rate, convenience 
yield and the time to maturity, which can be expressed as: 
( )( )
,
Rft CYt T t
t T tF S e
 
                     (4.20) 
where Rft is the continuously compounded risk-free rate in the market at time t, T is the 
maturity time of the futures contract, St is spot price at time t, Ft,T is the futures price at time t 
which matures at time T, and CYt is the convenience yield at time t. Rearranging Equation 
(4.20), the convenience yield can be modelled as: 
,1 1
ln( )
t T
t t t t
t
F
CY Rf Rf Basis
T t S T t
   
 
                     (4.21) 
From Equation (4.21) it can be observed that the convenience yield moves with the basis but 
also takes into account the effects of the risk-free rate and time-to-maturity. The estimation 
methods of the convenience yield stated above are extensively used in the literature, for 
example by Milonas and Henker (2001). 
Substituting the basis in the feedback trading models with the convenience yield, and then 
the feedback trading models II and III with the convenience yield are specified as: 
Model II:  2 2 20 1 - 1 2 1( )t t tt t t tR R CY                           (4.22) 
Model III: 2 2 20 1 - 12 1( )t t tt t t tR CY R                                      (4.23) 
[Insert Table 4.7 here] 
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The results of Model II with the convenience yield are presented in Table 4.7. Except for 
natural gas, the results of γ1 are consistent with Model I and Model II with a basis. γ1 is 
negative and significant for the natural gas market in Model II with the convenience yield, 
but insignificant in Model I and Model II with a basis. The γ2 for the natural gas market is 
also negative and significant. This shows that feedback traders respond positively to the last 
period’s futures return and convenience yield, i.e. they hold more long futures positions when 
futures returns and the convenience yield is positive in the previous period. Feedback 
investors buy more long-futures when the convenience yield is positive because they believe 
that the benefits of holding a spot asset will diminish and futures prices will rise. Similarly to 
natural gas, the γ2 of the electricity market in Model II with the convenience yield is negative 
and significant. For the remaining three markets, carbon, coal and crude oil, the convenience 
yield parameter is insignificant, indicating that the investors in these markets do not respond 
to the past convenience yield. 
[Insert Table 4.8 here] 
Table 4.8 shows the estimation results of Model III with the convenience yield. For the 
carbon and crude oil markets, both γ1 and γ2 are insignificant, implying that there is no 
feedback trading in these markets. For the remaining three markets, both parameters are 
significant. In the coal market, γ1=-0.0127 and γ2=0.0083. The results indicate that there is 
positive feedback trading when the convenience yield is zero, but the degree of positive 
feedback trading decreases as the convenience yield becomes larger. When the convenience 
yield is greater than 1.5301, it becomes negative feedback trading. Similarly, γ1=-0.0003 and 
γ2=0.00004 in the natural gas market. When the convenience yield is zero in the natural gas 
market, feedback investors buy more futures long positions when futures prices rise, but the 
degree of positive feedback trading diminishes and becomes zero when the convenience yield 
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approaches 7.5000. Negative feedback trading occurs in the electricity market when the 
convenience yield is zero (γ1=0.0008) and the degree of negative feedback trading increases 
as the convenience yield becomes greater (γ2=0.0052). However, when the convenience yield 
decreases to -0.1538, it becomes positive feedback trading. It is also of interest that the γ2 
parameters in all five markets are positive (although some of them are insignificant). The 
results show that the degree of negative feedback trading increases or the degree of positive 
feedback trading decreases as the past convenience yield becomes larger. The results of 
Model III with the convenience yield and Model III with a basis are strongly consistent. The 
convenience yield also provides the threshold point for positive and negative feedback 
trading. 
 
4.6.2. The effects of arbitrage opportunities on feedback trading across different 
market regimes 
The above results thus provide evidence of feedback trading in some of the energy 
markets, and spot-futures dynamics have a significant impact on feedback trading. The results 
are consistent with the argument that the basis and convenience yield are related to arbitrage, 
hedging and other trading activities. However, the sample in this chapter contains both bull 
and bear market regimes for energy markets. Therefore, following Chau et al. (2011) , it is 
plausible to examine whether the relation between spot-futures dynamics and feedback 
trading changes across different market regimes. As shown in the International Monetary 
Fund and World Bank energy index, energy prices reached a historic peak in July 2008 and 
have declined since then.
32
 For this reason, July 2008 was selected as the cut-off point for 
                                                          
32
 It is not surprising that commodity prices continued to rise after the current financial crisis occurred and stock 
markets collapsed. Generally speaking, commodities tend to perform well in periods of late expansion and early 
recessions, because interest rates are cut to boost economic activities when the economy is slowing down, and 
this could help to increase commodity prices (see Bodie and Rosansky, 1980).    
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bull and bear markets: the bull market occurred before July 2008 and the bear market 
happened after July 2008.  
[Insert Table 4.9 and Table 4.10 here]  
Model III with a basis and Model III with the convenience yield are re-estimated for bull 
and bear markets, following the same estimation procedure. The results of the robustness 
checks are summarised in Table 4.9 and Table 4.10. The robust results with a basis and 
convenience yield are consistent, i.e. the significance and direction of key parameters are 
identical. Compared with the main tests, the results for carbon and crude oil are consistent 
with the full sample results, in which both γ1 and γ2 are insignificant. For the coal market, the 
results of the bear market are consistent with the main tests, where γ1 is negative and 
significant while γ2 is positive and significant. The γ1 of the bull market analysis is still 
negative and significant but γ2 becomes insignificant. For the electricity market, the results of 
the bear market are consistent with the main tests, in which both γ1 and γ2 are positive and 
significant. The γ1 of the bull market becomes negative and significant but γ2 remains positive 
and significant. For the natural gas market, the results of the bull market are consistent with 
the main tests, in which γ1 is negative and significant while γ2 is positive and significant. The 
γ1 of the bull market positive and significant but γ2 is still positive and significant. In addition, 
two likelihood ratio tests are employed to examine the equality of the parameters in each 
market regime. LR1 is used to test the equality of γ1 in each regime and LR2 is used to 
examine whether γ2 is the same in a bear market as in a bull market. The Wald-test results 
show that the feedback trading parameters γ1, γ2 are different in each market regime in most 
of the cases. The different results in bull and bear markets are due to the potential regime 
switching in these markets. 
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4.7. Conclusion 
Conventional feedback trading models assume that feedback investors trade based on past 
asset returns. Positive feedback traders purchase more assets after an increase in prices while 
negative feedback traders sell the asset following a price rise. Commodity markets, however, 
have long established futures markets along with spot markets. Many empirical studies show 
that the spot and futures markets are cointegrated and cross-market arbitrage is the main force 
maintaining the linkage between the two markets (MacKinlay and Ramaswamy, 1988). 
Arbitrage activity could push futures prices up and down and therefore arbitrage 
opportunities have some forecasting power for future price movements. For this reason, it is 
reasonable that some feedback traders not only trade based on past returns, but also pay 
attention to potential arbitrage opportunities, which can affect the profitability of a feedback 
trading strategy. 
In order to understand how feedback traders respond to arbitrage opportunities, this 
chapter has developed and estimated several feedback trading models in which the feedback 
investors’ demand for shares is not only depends on previous asset returns, but also on the 
potential arbitrage opportunities within the spot and futures markets. In particular, arbitrage 
opportunities can either affect feedback traders’ demand in an additive way or in a 
multiplicative way. 
Using recent daily spot and futures data for five emissions and energy markets and the 
spot-futures basis or convenience yield as the proxy for arbitrage opportunities, this study 
firstly finds that there is evidence of feedback trading in the coal and electricity markets, but 
not in the carbon, natural gas and crude oil markets. As most of the investors in the carbon 
market are institutions, these findings do not support the view that institutional investors 
contribute to feedback trading, which is not consistent with the common belief, expressed in 
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Nofsinger and Sias’s (1999) study on the U.S. stock market, among others. Secondly, by 
adopting the spot-futures basis and convenience yield as proxies of arbitrage opportunities, 
the results show that arbitrage opportunities can affect feedback traders’ demand in an 
additive way, in the electricity and natural gas markets. Thirdly, the results also suggest that 
arbitrage opportunities can indirectly influence the demand from feedback traders in the coal, 
electricity and natural gas markets, in a multiplicative way. Finally, this chapter also re-
estimates the augmented feedback trading model using data from bull and bear markets, 
separately. The results show that the degrees of feedback trading to past returns and the 
effects of arbitrage opportunities on feedback trading are different across bull and bear 
market regimes.
33
 
Overall, the above findings strongly support the claim that feedback traders also take 
potential arbitrage opportunities into consideration when they make investment decisions. 
The results in this chapter are important in understanding investors’ trading behaviour and 
trading strategies in commodity markets, particularly the new carbon emission market, where 
there is no evidence of feedback trading and arbitrage opportunities cannot affect feedback 
trading. As almost all of the participants in the carbon emission markets are institutional 
investors, the results also contribute to the debate about whether or not institutional investors 
contribute to feedback trading. 
  
                                                          
33
 A summary of key results is presented in Appendix 4B. 
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Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics of emission and energy futures returns 
 Carbon Coal Electricity Natural gas Crude oil 
Panel A: summary statistics 
Mean -0.081 0.020 0.016 0.051 0.060 
Std. Dev. 2.661 1.719 2.297 4.146 2.176 
Skewness 0.075 -0.737 1.370 2.955 -0.114 
Kurtosis 7.097 9.331 16.641 27.952 6.067 
Jarque-Bera 836.370*** 2850.619*** 12114.920*** 68303.070*** 931.706*** 
LB(12) 15.939 74.068*** 57.885*** 30.621*** 35.812*** 
LB
2
(12) 292.580*** 1241.600*** 56.654*** 4.598 1446.9*** 
ARCH(12) 122.439*** 381.844*** 35.883*** 4.344 514.070*** 
JOINT 47.291*** 108.047*** 32.303*** 8.432** 61.930*** 
 
Panel B : correlation coefficients(common period)  
Carbon 1     
Coal 0.295 1    
Electricity 0.256 0.381 1   
Natural gas 0.167 0.267 0.520 1  
Crude oil 0.264 0.360 0.137 0.105 1 
 
Panel C: autocorrelation 
b0 -0.084 0.015 0.018 0.050 0.064 
b1 0.033 0.193*** 0.083*** 0.036* -0.064** 
b2 -0.062** 0.005 0.002 -0.062*** -0.007 
b3 0.036 0.019 -0.054** -0.038* 0.017 
b4 0.003 0.034 0.028 -0.050** 0.046** 
b5 -0.004 -0.015 0.064** -0.001 -0.048** 
F-test 1.412 13.375*** 4.431*** 4.579*** 4.436**** 
Notes: The table provides descriptive statistics of the emission and energy futures return series. LB(n) and 
LB
2
(n) are the Ljung-Box Q test of autocorrelation for the level and squared emission and energy futures returns; 
the test statistics follow Chi-squared distribution with n (number of lags) degrees of freedom.  ARCH (n) is the 
Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test for the ARCH effect. The JOINT test is Engle and Ng’s (1993) test for the 
potential asymmetries in conditional variance. The test is an F-test with the null hypothesis of b1=b2=b3 for the 
regression below: 
2 - - +
1 2 -1 2 -1= +b +b +b +t t t t t t tZ a S S S v   
where Zt
2
 is the square of standardised residuals; St
-
 is a dummy variable which equals 1 when εt-1 <0 and 0 
otherwise;  St
+ 
 is a dummy variable which equals 1 when εt-1 >0 and 0 otherwise. In Panel C, the autocorrelation 
parameters (b0 to b5) are estimated from the following regression: 
 
5
0 -
=1
= + +t i t i t
i
R b b R u   
***, ** and * denote statistically significant at 1 %, 5 % and 10 % respectively. 
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 Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics of emission and energy basis and convenience yield  
Notes: The table provides descriptive statistics of the emission and energy spot-futures basis and convenience 
yield. The basis is estimated as:  
,=ln ( / )t t t TBasis S F  
The convenience yield is modelled as: 
,1
ln( )
t T
t t
t
F
CY Rf
T t S
 

        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 Carbon Coal Electricity Natural gas Crude oil 
Panel A: basis statistics 
 Mean -0.008 0.003 -0.001 -0.047 -0.000 
 Std. Dev. 0.014 0.031 0.060 0.174 0.025 
 Skewness -5.798 2.176 -4.027 -1.784 0.033 
 Kurtosis 58.151 18.252 45.775 18.195 6.589 
Panel B: convenience yield statistics 
 Mean -0.001 0.044 0.017 -0.376 0.181 
 Std. Dev. 0.045 0.327 0.639 0.156 0.223 
 Skewness -8.029 2.577 -7.357 -1.540 -0.047 
 Kurtosis 90.678 23.952 112.541 15.833 7.127 
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Table 4.3: Results of specification tests for various GARCH models 
 
 
GARCH EGARCH GJR-GARCH Model 
Selected 
Log L HMSE AIC Log L HMSE AIC Log L HMSE AIC 
Carbon -2697 3.570 4.530 -2686 3.417 4.513 -2690 3.389 4.520 EGARCH 
Coal -2732 4.472 3.383 -2741 4.669 3.396 -2727 4.112 3.378 GJR-GARCH 
Electricity -3193 12.904 4.262 -3174 12.529 4.238 -3193 12.855 4.263 EGARCH 
Natural gas -6931 36.709 5.567 -6860 28.460 5.511 -6892 30.504 5.536 EGARCH 
Crude oil -4945 2.874 4.193 - - - -4939 2.770 4.186 GJR-GARCH 
Notes: The table shows the results of specification tests for a selection of GARCH models, including standard 
GARCH, EGARCH and GJR-GARCH. These models are specified as: 
GARCH: 2 2 20 1 1 1t t t         
GJR-GARCH: 2 2 2 20 1 11 1 1tt t t tI               
EGARCH: 
0 1
2 2
1 1ln t t tG       ; 
1 1
1
1 1
2
| |t tt
t t
G
 

  
 

 
    
The most appropriate model is selected based on several criteria, including the value of the log likelihood 
function (Log L), heteroskedasticity-adjusted mean squared error (HMSE) and Akaike Information Criterion 
(AIC). For each criterion, the best model is highlighted in bold. The final GARCH specifications for each 
market are presented in the last column.  “-” indicates that is not possible to get convergence results based on 
that model. 
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Table 4.4: Maximum likelihood estimates of the SW feedback trading model I 
Parameters 
Carbon 
(EGARCH) 
Coal 
(GJR-GARCH)  
Electricity 
(EGARCH) 
Natural gas 
(EGARCH) 
Crude oil 
(GJR-GARCH) 
Panel A: conditional mean equation 
α 
-0.0006 
(-0.092) 
0.0370* 
(1.703) 
0.0498*** 
(51.765) 
0.0337 
(1.576) 
0.1295 
(1.610) 
ρ 
-0.0001 
(-0.019) 
-0.0003 
(-0.019) 
-0.0200*** 
(-44.540) 
-0.0082*** 
(-4.839) 
-0.009 
(-0.451) 
γ0 
0.0063 
(0.998) 
0.2387*** 
(8.372) 
0.0035*** 
(18.768) 
0.0107* 
(1.954) 
-0.0233 
(-0.819) 
γ1 
-0.0033 
(-0.971) 
-0.0093** 
(-2.020) 
0.0009*** 
(28.966) 
-0.0002 
(-1.336) 
-0.0054* 
(-1.713) 
 
Panel B: conditional variance equation 
α0 
0.0555** 
(2.551) 
0.0285*** 
(5.231) 
0.0627*** 
(17.217) 
0.0892*** 
(24.228) 
0.0602*** 
(2.846) 
α1 
0.2415*** 
(3.385) 
0.1372*** 
(8.990) 
0.2255*** 
(33.042) 
0.2023*** 
(15.072) 
0.0205** 
(2.439) 
β 
0.9726*** 
(92.511) 
0.8699*** 
(196.031) 
0.9723*** 
(529.183) 
0.9761*** 
(629.888) 
0.9414*** 
(73.544) 
δ 
-0.2820** 
(-2.565) 
-0.0252 
(-1.097) 
-0.0375*** 
(-7.391) 
-0.2806*** 
(-4.899) 
0.0452*** 
(3.575) 
ν 
1.3183*** 
(16.714) 
1.2342*** 
(23.880) 
0.8667*** 
(31.443) 
0.7401*** 
(44.265) 
1.5482*** 
(22.885) 
Panel C: diagnostic tests 
E(Zt) -0.031 0.005 0.059 0.054 -0.012 
E(Z
2
t) 0.997 1.002 1.097 1.370 0.999 
LB(12) 11.599 15.594* 21.477** 22.229*** 6.546 
LB
2
(12) 5.097 11.283 3.526 3.130 8.200 
ARCH(12) 4.933 11.507 3.617 3.377 8.049 
JOINT 2.403 2.889 6.151 1.150 25.626*** 
Notes: The table shows maximum likelihood estimates of the baseline feedback trading model I (i.e. the original 
SW model) for the emission and energy futures markets. The conditional mean is specified as: 
2 2
0 1 - 1( )t t tt tR R           (Equation 4.9) 
The conditional variance equations are:   
GJR-GARCH: 2 2 2 20 1 11 1 1tt t t tI              or EGARCH: 0 1
2 2
1 1ln t t tG       ; 
1 1
1
1 1
2
| |t tt
t t
G
 

  
 

 
  
 
The error terms are presumed to follow the Generalised Error Distribution (GED) with a scale parameter of ν. 
The values of the t-statistics for each parameter (presented in parentheses) are robust to autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity by adopting Bollerslev and Woodridge’s (1992) robust standard errors. ***, ** and * denote 
statistically significant at 1 %, 5 % and 10 % respectively.  
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Table 4.5: Maximum likelihood estimates of feedback trading model II with basis  
Parameters 
Carbon 
(EGARCH) 
Coal 
(GJR-GARCH)  
Electricity 
(EGARCH) 
Natural gas 
(EGARCH) 
Crude oil 
(GJR-GARCH) 
Panel A: conditional mean equation 
α 
0.0048** 
(2.107) 
0.0475** 
(2.022) 
0.0248 
(0.737) 
0.0476*** 
(64.410) 
0.1295*** 
(2.901) 
ρ 
0.0004 
(0.106) 
-0.0091 
(-0.745) 
-0.0095*** 
(-4.299) 
-0.0098*** 
(-17.143) 
-0.0090  
(-0.822) 
γ0 
0.0048 
(0.754) 
0.2415*** 
(10.598) 
0.0008 
(0.150) 
0.0010 
(1.260) 
-0.0234 
(-0.903) 
γ1 
-0.0032 
(-1.174) 
-0.0078** 
(-2.078) 
0.0005*** 
(9.889) 
-0.0000 
(-0.874) 
-0.0050 
(-0.977) 
γ2 
0.2175 
(0.246) 
0.3558* 
(1.854) 
-0.1558*** 
(-5.110) 
-0.0023*** 
(-149.491) 
0.0365 
(0.075) 
 
Panel B: conditional variance equation 
α0 
0.0554** 
(2.251) 
0.0284*** 
(5.054) 
0.0550* 
(1.740) 
0.0869*** 
(7.193) 
0.0605** 
(2.359) 
α1 
0.2430*** 
(3.183) 
0.1364*** 
(20.656) 
0.2047*** 
(10.331) 
0.2008*** 
(67.117) 
0.0204** 
(2.203) 
β 
0.9727*** 
(81.106) 
0.8708*** 
(181.365) 
0.9761*** 
(39.372) 
0.9770*** 
(483.135) 
0.9414*** 
(64.231) 
δ 
-0.2818** 
(-2.550) 
-0.0257** 
(-2.222) 
0.0248 
(0.121) 
-0.2660*** 
(-25.459) 
0.0452*** 
(3.111) 
ν 
1.3195*** 
(14.855) 
1.2306*** 
(24.599) 
0.8590*** 
(14.357) 
0.7385*** 
(24.633) 
1.548*** 
(19.639) 
Panel C: diagnostic tests 
E(Zt) -0.030 0.004 0.052 0.055 -0.012 
E(Z
2
t) 0.997 1.002 1.096 1.368 0.999 
LB(12) 11.931 17.645** 19.429** 22.506** 6.548 
LB
2
(12) 5.197 11.057 3.470 3.128 8.816 
ARCH(12) 5.043 0.501 3.549 3.374 8.035 
JOINT 3.458 2.493 7.244 1.334 25.611*** 
Notes: The table shows maximum likelihood estimates of the augmented SW feedback trading model II with a 
basis for the emission and energy futures markets. The conditional mean is specified as:
2 2 2
0 1 - 1 2 1( )t t tt t t tR R Basis              (Equation 4.12) 
The conditional variance equations are:  
GJR-GARCH: 2 2 2 20 1 11 1 1tt t t tI              or EGARCH: 0 1
2 2
1 1ln t t tG       ; 
1 1
1
1 1
2
| |t tt
t t
G
 

  
 

 
    
The error terms are presumed to follow the Generalised Error Distribution (GED) with a scale parameter of ν. 
The values of the t-statistics for each parameter (presented in parentheses) are robust to autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity by adopting Bollerslev and Woodridge’s (1992) robust standard errors. ***, ** and * denote 
statistically significant at 1 %, 5 % and 10 % respectively.  
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Table 4.6: Maximum likelihood estimates of feedback trading model III with basis  
Parameters 
Carbon 
(EGARCH) 
Coal 
(GJR-GARCH)  
Electricity 
(EGARCH) 
Natural gas 
(EGARCH) 
Crude oil 
(GJR-GARCH) 
Panel A: conditional mean equation 
α 
-0.0007 
(-0.101) 
0.0327 
(1.393) 
0.0447*** 
(22.044) 
0.0461*** 
(70.101) 
0.1078 
(1.212) 
ρ 
-0.0001 
(-0.017) 
0.0052 
(0.422) 
-0.0170*** 
(-28.631) 
-0.0087*** 
(-46.919) 
-0.0016 
(-0.067) 
γ0 
0.0063 
(0.892) 
0.2452*** 
(10.689) 
0.0019*** 
(6.879) 
0.0075*** 
(2029.944) 
-0.0245 
(-0.782) 
γ1 
-0.0033 
(-0.751) 
-0.0132*** 
(-3.274) 
0.0009*** 
(19.289) 
-0.0001*** 
(-25.101) 
-0.0050 
(-1.279) 
γ2 
0.0034 
(0.010) 
0.0913** 
(2.515) 
0.0595*** 
(26.703) 
0.0005*** 
(72.152) 
0.0262 
(0.569) 
 
Panel B: conditional variance equation 
α0 
0.0555** 
(2.547) 
0.0296*** 
(8.105) 
0.0619*** 
(13.729) 
0.0850*** 
(35.112) 
0.0601** 
(2.488) 
α1 
0.2415*** 
(3.309) 
0.1381*** 
(40.428) 
0.2242*** 
(37.780) 
0.1969*** 
(109.364) 
0.0202** 
(2.433) 
β 
0.9726*** 
(92.340) 
0.8678*** 
(468.580) 
0.9731*** 
(476.477) 
0.9775*** 
(5730.473) 
0.9417*** 
(71.040) 
δ 
-0.2820*** 
(-2.617) 
-0.0236*** 
(-3.957) 
-0.0403 
(-1.344) 
-0.2806*** 
(-217.348) 
0.0449*** 
(3.106) 
ν 
1.3182*** 
(16.490) 
1.2274*** 
(23.609) 
0.8641*** 
(33.688) 
0.7389*** 
(50.511) 
1.5501*** 
(25.364) 
Panel C: diagnostic tests 
E(Zt) -0.031 0.005 0.064 0.052 -0.013 
E(Z
2
t) 0.997 1.002 1.095 1.366 0.999 
LB(12) 11.611 14.611 21.110** 22.865*** 6.512 
LB
2
(12) 5.098 11.986 3.591 3.072 8.286 
ARCH(12) 4.934 12.131 3.669 3.308 8.134 
JOINT 2.464 2.783 6.394 1.267 23.048*** 
Notes: The table shows Maximum likelihood estimates of the augmented SW feedback trading model III with a 
basis for emission and energy futures markets. The conditional mean is specified as: 
2 2 2
0 1 - 12 1( )t t tt t t tR Basis R              (Equation 4.15) 
The conditional variance equations are:  
GJR-GARCH: 2 2 2 20 1 11 1 1tt t t tI              or EGARCH: 0 1
2 2
1 1ln t t tG       ; 
1 1
1
1 1
2
| |t tt
t t
G
 

  
 

 
    
The error terms are presumed to follow the Generalised Error Distribution (GED) with a scale parameter of ν. 
The values of the t-statistics for each parameter (presented in parentheses) are robust to autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity by adopting Bollerslev and Woodridge’s (1992) robust standard errors. ***, ** and * denote 
statistically significant at 1 %, 5 % and 10 % respectively.
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Table 4.7: Maximum likelihood estimates of feedback trading model II with 
convenience yield  
Parameters 
Carbon 
(EGARCH) 
Coal 
(GJR-GARCH)  
Electricity 
(EGARCH) 
Natural gas 
(EGARCH) 
Crude oil 
(GJR-GARCH) 
Panel A: conditional mean equation 
α 
-0.0002 
(-0.017) 
0.0470** 
(2.001) 
0.0577*** 
(14.789) 
0.0316*** 
(29.115) 
0.1269 
(1.574) 
ρ 
-0.0003 
(-0.057) 
-0.0094 
(-0.765) 
-0.0226*** 
(-9.730) 
-0.0081*** 
(-20.204) 
-0.0092 
(-0.451) 
γ0 
0.0060 
(0.264) 
0.2413*** 
(10.597) 
0.0023 
(1.061) 
0.0062*** 
(22.884) 
-0.0235 
(-0.899) 
γ1 
-0.0033 
(-0.900) 
-0.0081** 
(-2.179) 
0.0012*** 
(6.869) 
-0.0004*** 
(-20.640) 
-0.0022 
(-0.3145) 
γ2 
0.0452 
(0.306) 
0.0349* 
(1.952) 
-0.0099*** 
(-237.698) 
-0.0010*** 
(-34.507) 
0.0361 
(0.711) 
 
Panel B: conditional variance equation 
α0 
0.0558** 
(2.390) 
0.0283*** 
(5.039) 
0.0599*** 
(4.229) 
0.0938*** 
(17.675) 
0.0601** 
(2.275) 
α1 
0.2424*** 
(3.146) 
0.1363*** 
(20.687) 
0.2203*** 
(7.116) 
0.2083*** 
(48.231) 
0.0203* 
(1.708) 
β 
0.9725*** 
(83.699) 
0.8712*** 
(181.706) 
0.9738*** 
(179.547) 
0.9746*** 
(3084.200) 
0.9415*** 
(61.787) 
δ 
-0.2814*** 
(-2.761) 
-0.260** 
(-2.265) 
-0.0303 
(-0.907) 
-0.2695*** 
(-15.948) 
0.0454** 
(2.509) 
ν 
1.3189*** 
(14.428) 
1.2294*** 
(24.583) 
0.8686*** 
(23.006) 
0.7367*** 
(30.144) 
1.5492*** 
(21.305) 
Panel C: diagnostic tests 
E(Zt) -0.030 0.004 0.062 0.052 -0.012 
E(Z
2
t) 0.997 1.002 1.100 1.361 0.999 
LB(12) 11.658 18.023** 19.632** 22.770*** 6.658 
LB
2
(12) 5.117 10.917 3.483 3.201 8.179 
ARCH(12) 4.956 11.193 3.568 3.461 8.019 
JOINT 3.072 2.421 6.437 1.196 24.578*** 
Notes: The table shows maximum likelihood estimates of the augmented SW feedback trading model II with the 
convenience yield for emission and energy futures markets. The conditional mean is specified as: 
2 2 2
0 1 - 1 2 1( )t t tt t t tR R CY              (Equation 4.22) 
The conditional variance equations are:  
GJR-GARCH: 2 2 2 20 1 11 1 1tt t t tI               or EGARCH: 0 1
2 2
1 1ln t t tG       ; 
1 1
1
1 1
2
| |t tt
t t
G
 

  
 

 
    
The error terms are presumed to follow the Generalised Error Distribution (GED) with a scale parameter of ν. 
The values of the t-statistics for each parameter (presented in parentheses) are robust to autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity by adopting Bollerslev and Woodridge’s (1992) robust standard errors. ***, ** and * denote 
statistically significant at 1 %, 5 % and 10 % respectively.  
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Table 4.8: Maximum likelihood estimates of feedback trading model III with 
convenience yield 
Parameters 
Carbon 
(EGARCH) 
Coal 
(GJR-GARCH)  
Electricity 
(EGARCH) 
Natural gas 
(EGARCH) 
Crude oil 
(GJR-GARCH) 
Panel A: conditional mean equation 
α 
-0.0007 
(-0.075) 
0.0343 
(1.458) 
0.0448*** 
(7.663) 
0.0216*** 
(13.548) 
0.1294 
(1.395) 
ρ 
-0.0000 
(-0.001) 
0.0036 
(0.292) 
-0.0171*** 
(-7.055) 
-0.0040*** 
(-56.161) 
-0.0090 
(-0.364) 
γ0 
0.0057 
(0.484) 
0.2451*** 
(10.742) 
0.0018 
(0.564) 
0.0100*** 
(70.465) 
-0.0233 
(-0.780) 
γ1 
-0.0032 
(-0.856) 
-0.0127*** 
(-3.371) 
0.0008*** 
(5.846) 
-0.0003*** 
(-82.057) 
-0.0054 
(-1.390) 
γ2 
0.0188 
(0.480) 
0.0083*** 
(2.925) 
0.0052*** 
(50.597) 
0.00004*** 
(188.229) 
0.0000 
(0.004) 
 
Panel B: conditional variance equation 
α0 
0.0553** 
(2.229) 
0.0293*** 
(5.105) 
0.0600*** 
(15.415) 
0.0875*** 
(6.588) 
0.0602** 
(2.439) 
α1 
0.2411*** 
(3.198) 
0.1377*** 
(20.384) 
0.2223*** 
(13.489) 
0.1988*** 
(341.708) 
0.0204 
(1.871) 
β 
0.9728*** 
(78.799) 
0.8684*** 
(177.265) 
0.9740*** 
(331.295) 
0.9765*** 
(273.398) 
0.9414*** 
(64.553) 
δ 
-0.2830*** 
(-2.913) 
-0.0239** 
(-1.991) 
-0.0376 
(-0.560) 
-0.2707*** 
(-85.447) 
0.0452*** 
(2.968) 
ν 
1.3177*** 
(13.421) 
1.228*** 
(24.692) 
0.8653*** 
(31.474) 
0.7321*** 
(28.612) 
1.5482*** 
(20.480) 
Panel C: diagnostic tests 
E(Zt) -0.030 0.005 0.062 0.043 -0.012 
E(Z
2
t) 0.997 1.002 1.098 1.359 0.999 
LB(12) 11.520 14.593 20.968** 22.799*** 6.546 
LB
2
(12) 5.125 12.214 3.577 3.076 8.200 
ARCH(12) 4.959 12.357 3.656 3.316 8.049 
JOINT 2.571 2.739 6.456 1.310 25.625*** 
Notes: The table shows maximum likelihood estimates of the augmented SW feedback trading model III with 
the convenience yield for emission and energy futures markets. The conditional mean is specified as: 
2 2 2
0 1 - 12 1( )t t tt t t tR CY R             (Equation 4.23) 
The conditional variance equations are:  
GJR-GARCH: 2 2 2 20 1 11 1 1tt t t tI               Or EGARCH: 0 1
2 2
1 1ln t t tG       ; 
1 1
1
1 1
2
| |t tt
t t
G
 

  
 

 
    
The error terms are presumed to follow the Generalised Error Distribution (GED) with a scale parameter of ν. 
The values of the t-statistics for each parameter (presented in parentheses) are robust to autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity by adopting Bollerslev and Woodridge’s (1992) robust standard errors. ***, ** and * denote 
statistically significant at 1 %, 5 % and 10 % respectively.  
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Table 4.9: Robustness checks results of model III with basis  
Parameters 
Bull Market Bear Market 
Carbon 
(EGARCH) 
Coal 
(GJR-
GARCH)  
Electricity 
(EGARCH) 
Natural gas 
(EGARCH) 
Crude oil 
(GJR-
GARCH) 
 
Carbon 
(EGARCH) 
Coal 
(GJR-
GARCH)  
Electricity 
(EGARCH) 
Natural gas 
(EGARCH) 
Crude oil 
(GJR-
GARCH) 
Panel A: conditional mean equation 
α 
0.4776*** 
(5.937) 
0.0751* 
(1.690) 
0.0867*** 
(18.251) 
0.0467*** 
(83.348) 
0.1669 
(0.235) 
-0.0043 
(-0.191) 
0.0069 
(0.196) 
0.0874*** 
(8.310) 
-0.0346*** 
(-7.517) 
0.0789 
(0.862) 
ρ 
-0.0831*** 
(-72.253) 
0.0287*** 
(6.720) 
-0.0130*** 
(-36.058) 
-0.0110*** 
(-446.346) 
0.0017 
(0.008) 
-0.0001 
(-0.011) 
-0.0043 
(-0.230) 
-0.0469*** 
(-11.793) 
-0.0067*** 
(-8.637) 
-0.0084 
(-0.349) 
γ0 
0.0056 
(0.074) 
0.2570*** 
(12.356) 
0.0321*** 
(95.805) 
0.0985*** 
(196.299) 
0.0332 
(0.292) 
0.0079 
(0.989) 
0.2403*** 
(6.769) 
-0.0409* 
(-1.934) 
-0.0482*** 
(-78.476) 
0.0265 
(0.684) 
γ1 
-0.0092 
(-1.475) 
-0.0203*** 
(-4.224) 
-0.0002*** 
(-12.319) 
-0.0009*** 
(-187.517) 
-0.0287 
(-0.925) 
-0.0037* 
(-1.809) 
-0.0115*** 
(-2.784) 
0.0162*** 
(35.415) 
0.0031*** 
(9.336) 
-0.0063 
(-1.620) 
γ2 
-0.0522 
(-1.199) 
-0.0316 
(-1.534) 
0.0264*** 
(220.960) 
0.0002*** 
(363.464) 
0.2788 
(1.259) 
0.0542 
(0.211) 
0.0852** 
(2.496) 
0.1363*** 
(2.615) 
0.0064*** 
(7.130) 
0.0019 
(0.047) 
 
Panel B: conditional variance equation 
α0 
0.2961* 
(1.674) 
0.0676** 
(2.136) 
0.1344*** 
(190.588) 
0.2779*** 
(912.242) 
0.1462 
(0.715) 
0.0514** 
(2.464) 
0.0249** 
(2.545) 
0.0338 
(1.556) 
0.0369** 
(2.150) 
0.0466 
(0.114) 
α1 
0.4009*** 
(5.777) 
0.2204*** 
(5.347) 
0.3097*** 
(31.075) 
0.3670*** 
(222.132) 
0.0201 
(1.895)* 
0.2375*** 
(3.464) 
0.1161*** 
(11.377) 
0.1485*** 
(5.153) 
0.1706*** 
(7.545) 
0.0103 
(0.655) 
β 
0.7795*** 
(6.097) 
0.8047*** 
(18.742) 
0.9566*** 
(819.173) 
0.9222*** 
(1302.311) 
0.9252*** 
(12.581) 
0.9756*** 
(100.669) 
0.8771*** 
(112.780) 
0.9813*** 
(50.177) 
0.9896*** 
(203.004) 
0.9411*** 
(32.815) 
δ 
-0.3510* 
(-1.743) 
-0.0706*** 
(-3.408) 
-0.2263*** 
(-52.147) 
-0.3881*** 
(-143.684) 
0.0286 
(0.863) 
-0.2927*** 
(-2.639) 
-0.0004 
(-0.014) 
0.1718 
(0.369) 
-0.2689** 
(-2.541) 
0.0732*** 
(2.661) 
ν 
1.6130*** 
(5.053) 
1.1537*** 
(12.448) 
0.7838*** 
(31.110) 
0.6576*** 
(46.885) 
1.7200*** 
(14.503) 
1.2943*** 
(15.759) 
1.250*** 
(18.014) 
0.9073*** 
(22.795) 
0.9741*** 
(16.197) 
1.3754*** 
(14.457) 
Panel C: likelihood ratio tests      
LR1 - - - - - 7.475*** 8.349*** 1285.321*** 144.494*** 33.133*** 
LR2 - - - - - 0.171 10.820*** 4.447** 47.727*** 48.807*** 
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Table 4.9 (Continued) 
Parameters 
Bull Market Bear Market 
Carbon 
(EGARCH) 
Coal 
(GJR-
GARCH)  
Electricity 
(EGARCH) 
Natural gas 
(EGARCH) 
Crude oil 
(GJR-
GARCH) 
 
Carbon 
(EGARCH) 
Coal 
(GJR-
GARCH)  
Electricity 
(EGARCH) 
Natural gas 
(EGARCH) 
Crude oil 
(GJR-
GARCH) 
Panel D: diagnostic tests 
E(Zt) -0.036 0.031 0.099 0.067 -0.006 -0.036 -0.006 0.057 0.049 -0.020 
E(Z
2
t) 0.982 1.000 1.013 1.453 0.998 0.996 1.007 1.107 1.115 1.001 
LB(12) 22.042*** 6.636 17.970** 9.812 4.864 11.213 11.824 13.064 27.274*** 8.233 
LB
2
(12) 6.803 3.204 2.112 3.665 16.864 5.074 12.968 2.890 3.198 14.930 
ARCH(12) 7.031 2.872 2.156 4.208 17.500 4.776 13.638 2.929 3.159 14.361 
JOINT 2.706 3.019 2.106    0.314 17.819*** 2.150 2.428 8.945** 4.113 15.990*** 
Notes: The table shows maximum likelihood estimates of the augmented SW feedback trading model III with a basis for emission and energy futures markets, across 
different market regimes. The turning point from bull market to bear market is July, 2008. The bull market is defined as the market before 31 July 2008 and bear market is the 
market after July 2008. The conditional mean is specified as: 
2 2 2
0 1 - 12 1( )t t tt t t tR Basis R              (Equation 4.15) 
The conditional variance equations are:  
GJR-GARCH: 2 2 2 20 1 11 1 1tt t t tI                or EGARCH: 0 1
2 2
1 1ln t t tG       ; 
1 1
1
1 1
2
| |t tt
t t
G
 

  
 

 
  
 
The error terms are presumed to follow the Generalised Error Distribution (GED) with a scale parameter of ν. The values of the t-statistics for each parameter (presented in 
parentheses) are robust to autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity by adopting Bollerslev and Woodridge’s (1992) robust standard errors. LR1 is the likelihood ratio test for the 
equality of γ1 in each market regime and LR2 is the test for the equality of γ2 in bull and bear markets. ***, ** and * denote statistically significant at 1 %, 5 % and 10 % 
respectively.
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Table 4.10: Robustness checks results model III with convenience yield  
Parameters 
Bull Market Bear Market 
Carbon 
(EGARCH) 
Coal 
(GJR-
GARCH)  
Electricity 
(EGARCH) 
Natural gas 
(EGARCH) 
Crude oil 
(GJR-
GARCH) 
 
Carbon 
(EGARCH) 
Coal 
(GJR-
GARCH)  
Electricity 
(EGARCH) 
Natural gas 
(EGARCH) 
Crude oil 
(GJR-
GARCH) 
Panel A: conditional mean equation 
α 
0.4878** 
(2.486) 
0.0753* 
(1.860) 
0.0722*** 
(16.594) 
0.0299*** 
(706.041) 
0.2884 
(0.461) 
-0.0057 
(-0.227) 
0.0079 
(0.242) 
0.1080*** 
(14.324) 
-0.0333*** 
(-15.896) 
0.0918 
(0.995) 
ρ 
-0.0877 
(-1.383) 
0.0287*** 
(3.446) 
-0.0098*** 
(-47.423) 
-0.0074*** 
(-58.493) 
-0.0361 
(-0.200) 
-0.0005 
(-0.064) 
-0.0051 
(-0.364) 
-0.0573*** 
(-38.552) 
-0.0069*** 
(-44.818) 
-0.0131 
(-0.555) 
γ0 
0.0206 
(0.040) 
0.2583*** 
(139.026) 
0.0303*** 
(64.712) 
0.0790*** 
(101.711) 
0.0276 
(0.238) 
0.0092 
(0.261) 
0.2419*** 
(9.960) 
-0.0370*** 
(-262.204) 
-0.0477*** 
(-116.127) 
0.0284 
(0.816) 
γ1 
-0.0052 
(-0.436) 
-0.0203*** 
(-40.681) 
-0.0004*** 
(-4.466) 
-0.0005*** 
(-53.254) 
-0.0286 
(-0.957) 
-0.0037 
(-0.961) 
-0.0115*** 
(-4.288) 
0.0164*** 
(93.560) 
0.0032*** 
(40.091) 
-0.0067 
(-1.645) 
γ2 
-0.2528 
(-0.096) 
-0.0032 
(-1.483) 
0.0020*** 
(144.546) 
0.0000 
(0.069) 
0.0196 
(0.847) 
0.0160 
(0.4487) 
0.0079*** 
(2.7875) 
0.0021** 
(2.145) 
0.0005*** 
(186.894) 
-0.0016 
(-0.327) 
 
Panel B: conditional variance equation 
α0 
0.3124 
(0.565) 
0.0676* 
(1.816) 
0.14112*** 
(62.868) 
0.300*** 
(81.749) 
0.1659 
(0.4126) 
0.0510** 
(2.217) 
0.0249*** 
(3.159) 
0.0387*** 
(34.744) 
0.371*** 
(34.378) 
0.0460** 
(2.001) 
α1 
0.3889** 
(2.294) 
0.2202*** 
(8.772) 
0.3083*** 
(11.994) 
0.3886*** 
(33.088) 
0.0219 
(0.651) 
0.2361*** 
(3.050) 
0.1159*** 
(4.525) 
0.1651*** 
(12.969) 
0.1714*** 
(27.437) 
0.0104 
(0.753) 
β 
0.7671*** 
(3.001) 
0.8048*** 
(19.085) 
0.9535*** 
(867.714) 
0.9152*** 
(1968.260) 
0.9175*** 
(12.786) 
0.9756*** 
(88.978) 
0.8772*** 
(47.166) 
0.9789*** 
(5983.324) 
0.9895*** 
(548.652) 
0.9412*** 
(48.778) 
δ 
-0.3614 
(-0.735) 
-0.0705*** 
(-2.959) 
-0.2345*** 
(-15.648) 
-0.3564*** 
(-25.951) 
0.0294 
(0.651) 
-0.2934*** 
(-3.091) 
-0.0001 
(-0.005) 
0.0777*** 
(4.999) 
-0.2656*** 
(-3.658) 
0.0731*** 
(3.386) 
ν 
1.5833** 
(2.179) 
1.1538*** 
(12.484) 
0.7810*** 
(21.784) 
0.6547*** 
(48.946) 
1.7074*** 
(14.578) 
1.301*** 
(12.891) 
1.2507*** 
(18.094) 
0.9131*** 
(21.407) 
0.9740*** 
(29.563) 
1.3744*** 
(17.381) 
Panel C:  likelihood ratio tests 
LR1 - - - - - 0.276 9.737*** 9184.956*** 2144.525*** 28.403*** 
LR2 - - - - - 56.951*** 14.145*** 0.004 34929.384*** 18.436*** 
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Table 4.10 (Continued) 
Parameters 
Bull Market Bear Market 
Carbon 
(EGARCH) 
Coal 
(GJR-
GARCH)  
Electricity 
(EGARCH) 
Natural gas 
(EGARCH) 
Crude oil 
(GJR-
GARCH) 
 
Carbon 
(EGARCH) 
Coal 
(GJR-
GARCH)  
Electricity 
(EGARCH) 
Natural gas 
(EGARCH) 
Crude oil 
(GJR-
GARCH) 
Panel D: diagnostic tests      
E(Zt) -0.036 0.031 0.109 0.064 -0.006 -0.036 -0.007 0.056 0.048 -0.020 
E(Z
2
t) 0.982 1.000 1.047 1.455 0.999 0.996 1.007 1.107 1.115 1.001 
LB(12) 21.745*** 6.613 18.011** 10.606 5.052 10.851 11.914 12.990 27.062*** 8.261 
LB
2
(12) 7.014 3.200 2.177 3.497 17.286 5.080 13.225 3.024 3.180 14.901 
ARCH(12) 7.185 2.868 2.246 3.990 17.859 4.785 13.883 3.056 3.140 14.318 
JOINT 2.480 3.021 2.649    0.691 16.945*** 2.242 2.481 9.131** 4.100 16.009*** 
Notes: The table shows maximum likelihood estimates of the augmented SW feedback trading model III with the convenience yield for emission and energy futures markets, 
across different market regimes. The turning point from bull market to bear market is July, 2008. The bull market is defined as the market before 31 July 2008 and the bear 
market is after July 2008. The conditional mean is specified as: 
2 2 2
0 1 - 12 1( )t t tt t t tR CY R              (Equation 4.23) 
The conditional variance equations are:  
GJR-GARCH: 2 2 2 20 1 11 1 1tt t t tI               or EGARCH: 0 1
2 2
1 1ln t t tG       ; 
1 1
1
1 1
2
| |t tt
t t
G
 

  
 

 
    
The error terms are presumed to follow the Generalised Error Distribution (GED) with a scale parameter of ν. The values of the t-statistics for each parameter (presented in 
parentheses) are robust to autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity by adopting Bollerslev and Woodridge’s (1992) robust standard errors. LR1 is the likelihood ratio test for the 
equality of γ1 in each market regime and LR2 is the test for the equality of γ2 in bull and bear markets. ***, ** and * denote statistically significant at 1 %, 5 % and 10 % 
respectively.  
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Appendix 4A: An overview of related literature on arbitrage opportunities 
and feedback trading 
In addition to the literature summarised in Section 4.2, this chapter conducts a 
comprehensive review of the relevant literature, presented in Table 4A.1. This includes the 
empirical tests for feedback trading in various financial markets using the SW feedback 
trading model (Panel A); theoretical extensions of the original SW model (Panel B); why 
arbitrage is important in futures markets (Panel C); the performances of technical trading 
rules other than feedback trading (e.g. momentum or contrarian strategies) in commodity 
markets (Panel D); and the importance and usefulness of arbitrage opportunities measured by 
the spot-futures basis or convenience yield (Panel E). The literature shows why this chapter 
examines feedback trading in commodity markets and what the linkage is between arbitrage 
opportunities and feedback trading.  
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Table 4A.1: Summary of literature on arbitrage opportunities and feedback trading 
Panel A: Empirical tests of SW feedback trading model in financial markets 
Papers Key or relevant arguments 
Koutmos (1997) 
Provides additional evidence of feedback trading in some 
developed stock markets, including Australia, Belgium, 
Germany, Italy, Japan and UK. Note: Sentana and 
Wadhwani (1992) only study the U.S. market. 
Aguirre and Saidi (1999) 
Studies feedback trading of exchange rates within and 
across three economics areas: EU; ASEAN (southeast 
Asia); and NAFTA (north America). No feedback trading 
is found across economic areas, but provides evidence of 
feedback trading within ASEAN area. 
Koutmos and Saidi (2001) 
Provides empirical evidence of positive feedback trading in 
emerging markets, including HK, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand. 
Watanabe (2002) 
Provides evidence of positive feedback trading in Japan. 
Adjusts the empirical model by allowing asymmetric 
feedback trading parameter, i.e., for positive and negative 
past returns, there are different feedback trading parameters 
or sensitivity of feedback traders’ demand to the last 
period’s return. 
Laopodis (2005) 
Tests feedback trading in exchange rates of 17 industrial 
and emerging currencies with respect to USD or Euro. 
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Antoniou et al. (2005) 
Tests feedback trading in major stock spot indexes before 
and after the introduction of index futures and compares 
the difference. The empirical results support the view that 
the futures markets stabilise the spot markets as feedback 
trading in spot markets disappeared after the introduction 
of futures markets. Finds no evidence of feedback trading 
in futures markets. 
Bohl and Reitz (2006) 
Provides evidence of positive feedback trading in 
Germany’s Neuer market (young company market). 
Chau et al. (2008) 
Investigates the impact of the introduction of Universal 
Stock Futures on the underlying level of feedback trading 
in UK. 
Dean and Faff (2008) 
Provides empirical extension of feedback trading model by 
allowing Markov switching in the conditional mean 
equation, using Australian Equity and bond market data. 
Bohl and Siklos (2008) 
Provides evidence of feedback trading in both emerging 
and mature stock markets. 
Laopodis (2008) 
The paper is similar to Laopodis’ (2005), but adds some 
variance specification tests and robustness tests. 
Schuppli and Bohl (2010) 
Compares the level of feedback trading in China’s A share 
and B share markets. 
Salm and Schuppli (2010) 
Provides empirical tests of positive feedback trading in 32 
emerging and mature index futures markets. 
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Antoniou (2011) 
Provides evidence of feedback trading from major index 
futures markets. 
Panel B:Theoretical extension of SW feedback trading model 
Faff et al. (2005) 
Extends the SW feedback trader model by including a 
cross-market feedback trader. Feedback traders are then 
divided into two groups: “own-market” feedback traders 
who respond to past own markets returns; and “cross-
market” feedback traders who respond to the past returns of 
other related markets. 
Cifarrelli and Paladino (2010) 
Provides evidence of positive feedback trading in oil 
markets. Extends the SW model by using Merton’s (1973) 
ICAPM instead of conventional CAPM.  Thus the “smart 
money” investors’ risk premium does not only depend on 
systematic risk but also other “state variables”. The 
feedback trading model is then transformed from a 
univariate model to a multivariate model. However, this 
does not significantly extend the feedback trading model; 
instead, it extends the rational CAPM model. 
Dean and Faff (2011) 
Introduces a similar extension to that of Cifarrelli and 
Paladino (2010). SW model is extended to a multivariate 
framework, and the two variables used are equity and bond 
returns. 
Chau et al. (2011) 
Extends the SW model by allowing investor sentiment to 
affect feedback traders’ demand function, in both an 
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additive way and a multiplicative way. 
Koutmos (2012) 
Extends the SW feedback trader model by including a 
group of fundamental traders, whose demand function 
depends on the difference between market prices and 
fundamental prices. 
Panel C: Papers about the importance of arbitrage in futures market 
Garbade and Silber (1983) 
“Risk transfer and price discovery are two of the major 
contributions of futures markets to the organization of 
economic activity (Working (1962), Evans (1978, p. 80), 
and Silber (1981)).” Risk transfer is connected to hedging 
and price discovery is related to arbitrage. 
Working (1984) 
Continuous effectiveness of arbitrage between cash and 
futures prices is the driving force behind price discovery. 
MacKinlay and Ramaswamy 
(1988) 
“It is generally agreed that linkage in prices between the 
underlying basket of stocks and the futures is maintained 
by arbitrageurs”. 
Panel D: Papers about momentum/contrarian strategies in commodity markets 
Wang and Yu (2004) 
Studies the short-horizon (1-8 weeks) return predictability 
in 24 U.S futures, including financial, currency and 
commodity markets. The results provide strong evidence of 
futures returns reversals over the 1-week horizon. 
However, further examination of return predictability for 
holding horizons spanning from 2 to 8 weeks shows no 
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evidence of contrarian profits. 
Pirrong (2005) 
Provides evidence of short-run momentum (less than 3-
months) and long-run reversal (more than 1 year) in futures 
markets, including both U.S. and international, and both 
financial and commodity futures. Futures momentum is 
related to, but not subsumed by, equity momentum. 
Shen, Szakmary and Sharma 
(2007). 
Finds momentum profit in 28 commodity futures markets 
in the U.S. from 2-month up to 9-month holding periods. 
The profit is large enough to account for transaction costs 
and the market factor model. Reversal happens after 24-
month horizon, but the profitability of the contrarian 
strategy is not significant. 
Miffre and Rallis (2007) 
The paper studies the profitability of 56 momentum (<=1 
year) and contrarian strategies (> 1 year) in U.S. 
commodity futures markets. It finds 13 profitable 
momentum strategies with an average return of 9.38% p.a., 
but no profitable contrarian strategy. The authors argue 
that, “momentum strategy is related to the backwardation 
and contango theories. The results indicate that the 
momentum strategy is to buy backwardated contracts and 
sell contangoed contracts”. Contango and backwardation 
are related to basis. 
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Marshall et al. (2008) 
Examines the profitability of 7846 technical trading 
strategies in 15 commodities in the U.S. market using 
robust statistics. These rules are divided into five groups: 
filter rules (similar to feedback trading); moving average 
rules; support and resistance rules, channel breakouts; and 
on-balance volume rules. The results indicate there is 
evidence that certain rules generate profits, but the 
statistical significance of these profits disappears once the 
data-snooping bias is accounted for. 
Fuertes, Miffre and Rallis  (2010) 
Firstly, provides evidence of the profitability of using the 
momentum strategy and term structure signal rules in U.S. 
commodity markets, separately. Finds that combining the 
two strategies can generate much higher abnormal returns 
than a single strategy. The results cannot be explained by 
illiquidity, transaction costs or data mining. 
Panel E: Papers about arbitrage proxies, i.e. the basis and convenience yield 
Khoury and Martel (1989) 
Theoretically proves that “the basis is positively correlated 
with the average future change in spot prices and 
negatively correlated with that of futures prices”. 
Khoury and Yourougou (1991) 
Provides empirical evidence for Khoury and Martel’s 
(1989) model. 
Kumar and Seppi (1994) 
Claims that naïve comparison of spot and index futures 
prices (i.e. looking at the basis) could suggest arbitrage 
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opportunities. 
Sofianos (1993) 
Argues that when spot-futures basis is wide enough, 
arbitragers exploit this arbitrage opportunity and it can be 
profitable. 
Miller et al. (1994) 
Claims that arbitrage strategy for index futures is as 
follows: “when the basis widens beyond its theoretical 
level, arbitragers simultaneously sell index futures and buy 
the index portfolio, pulling the difference between the 
futures and index”. 
Chartrath, Christie-David, 
Dhanda and Koch (2002) 
Provides empirical evidence to show that there is a positive 
relationship between basis and futures return volatility. 
Roll, Schwartz and 
Subrahmanyam (2007) 
Produces empirical evidence to show that there is two-way 
Granger causality between the short-term absolute basis 
and liquidity (measured by quoted and effective spread), 
and that liquidity Granger-causes longer-term absolute 
basis. 
Lien and Yang (2008) 
Shows importance of incorporating the dynamics of basis 
into hedging decisions since Working (1953, 1961), but 
only in the mean equation level. Argues that basis also has 
an asymmetric effect on the variance and covariance 
structure, and hence affects the minimum variance hedge 
ratios. Also provides empirical support for the new hedging 
model. 
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Kogan, Livdan and Yaron (2009) 
Provides a theoretical model showing that there is a V-
shaped relationship between oil futures price volatility and 
the slope of the forward curve (like the basis). 
Gorton et al. (2013) 
Provides empirical evidence suggesting that the futures risk 
premium (expected excess return) is related to the basis. 
Mellios and Six (2011) 
Provides a theoretical model showing that the hedging 
demand for futures contracts is uniquely related to the 
estimate of the convenience yield. 
Knetsch (2007) 
Forecasts oil prices through present value model. 
Convenience yield prediction outperforms the approach 
which uses futures prices as direct predictors of future spot 
prices. 
Godbey and Hilliard (2007) 
Claims that convenience yield in hedge ratio determination 
can help to improve the hedging performance of staked 
hedge. 
Bertus Godbey and Hilliard, 
(2009) 
Provides simulations whose empirical results show that 
horizon-sensitive hedging models using stochastic 
convenience yields systematically outperform other 
hedging strategies, especially for longer horizons. 
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Appendix 4B: Summary of Key Results  
In order to observe and compare the empirical results in this chapter comprehensively and 
intuitively, this chapter summarises all the key results from Table 4.4 to Table 4.10 in this 
appendix. Parameter estimates and t-statistics are shown in Table 4B.1. ***, ** and * denote 
that an item is statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. The key parameters 
are γ1, which governs the response of feedback traders to the last period’s returns, and γ2, 
which shows the sensitivity of feedback traders to the arbitrage opportunities in the last 
period, in an additive or a multiplicative ways. 
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Table 4B.1: Summary of feedback trading coefficients estimates in Table 4 to Table 10 
Parameters 
Carbon 
(EGARCH) 
Coal 
(GJR-GARCH) 
Electricity 
(EGARCH) 
Natural gas 
(EGARCH) 
Crude oil 
(GJR-GARCH) 
Model I 
γ1 
-0.0033 
(-0.971) 
-0.0093** 
(-2.020) 
0.0009*** 
(28.966) 
-0.0002 
(-1.336) 
-0.0054* 
(-1.713) 
 
Model II Basis 
γ1 
-0.0032 
(-1.174) 
-0.0078** 
(-2.078) 
0.0005*** 
(9.889) 
-0.0000 
(-0.874) 
-0.0050 
(-0.977) 
γ2 
0.2175 
(0.246) 
0.3558* 
(1.854) 
-0.1558*** 
(-5.110) 
-0.0023*** 
(-149.491) 
0.0365 
(0.075) 
Model II CY 
γ1 
-0.0033 
(-0.900) 
-0.0081** 
(-2.179) 
0.0012*** 
(6.869) 
-0.0004*** 
(-20.640) 
-0.0022 
(-0.3145) 
γ2 
0.0452 
(0.306) 
0.0349* 
(1.952) 
-0.0099*** 
(-237.698) 
-0.0010*** 
(-34.507) 
0.0361 
(0.711) 
 
Model III Basis 
γ1 
-0.0033 
(-0.751) 
-0.0132*** 
(-3.274) 
0.0009*** 
(19.289) 
-0.0001*** 
(-25.101) 
-0.0050 
(-1.279) 
γ2 
0.0034 
(0.010) 
0.0913** 
(2.515) 
0.0595*** 
(26.703) 
0.0005*** 
(72.152) 
0.0262 
(0.569) 
Model III CY 
γ1 
-0.0032 
(-0.856) 
-0.0127*** 
(-3.371) 
0.0008*** 
(5.846) 
-0.0003*** 
(-82.057) 
-0.0054 
(-1.390) 
γ2 
0.0188 
(0.480) 
0.0083*** 
(2.925) 
0.0052*** 
(50.597) 
0.00004*** 
(188.229) 
0.0000 
(0.004) 
 
Model III Basis Bull 
γ1 
-0.0092 
(-1.475) 
-0.0203** 
(-4.224) 
-0.0002** 
(-12.319) 
-0.0009** 
(-187.517) 
-0.0287 
(-0.925) 
γ2 
-0.0522 
(-1.199) 
-0.0316 
(-1.534) 
0.0264** 
(220.960) 
0.0002** 
(363.464) 
0.2788 
(1.259) 
 
Model III Basis Bear 
γ1 
-0.0037 
(-1.809) 
-0.0115*** 
(-2.784) 
0.0162*** 
(35.415) 
0.0031*** 
(9.336) 
-0.0063 
(-1.620) 
γ2 
0.0542 
(0.211) 
0.0852** 
(2.496) 
0.1363*** 
(2.615) 
0.0064*** 
(7.130) 
0.0019 
(0.047) 
 
Model III CY Bull 
γ1 
-0.0052 
(-0.436) 
-0.0203*** 
(-40.681) 
-0.0004*** 
(-4.466) 
-0.0005*** 
(-53.254) 
-0.0286 
(-0.957) 
γ2 
-0.2528 
(-0.096) 
-0.0032 
(-1.483) 
0.0020*** 
(144.546) 
0.0000 
(0.069) 
0.0196 
(0.847) 
 
Model III CY Bear 
γ1 
-0.0037 
(-0.961) 
-0.0115*** 
(-4.288) 
0.0164*** 
(93.560) 
0.0032*** 
(40.091) 
-0.0067 
(-1.645) 
γ2 
0.0160 
(0.4487) 
0.0079*** 
(2.7875) 
0.0021** 
(2.145) 
0.0005*** 
(186.894) 
-0.0016 
(-0.327) 
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Chapter 5 
The impact of allowance submission in the European 
carbon emission markets 
 
 
Abstract 
This chapter studies the impact of the allowance submission deadline (on 30 April every 
year), set by the European Union emission trading scheme (EU ETS), on the relationship 
between spot and futures markets in the European carbon markets. Specifically, utilising 
high-frequency data from the second phase of the EU ETS, this study examines whether the 
mean-reverting process of the carbon spot and futures relationship, price discovery and 
volatility spillovers of the carbon spot and futures markets are different before and after the 
submission deadline. The results suggest that the spot and futures price are cointegrated 
before and after the submission deadline, which shows that the mixed results found for the 
cointegration relationship in previous studies are not due to the allowance submission. 
However, the equilibrium level, adjustment speed and no-arbitrage boundaries of the spot and 
futures relationship shift after the submission deadline, implying that there is a change in the 
mean-reverting process. In addition, the results also show that the allowance submission 
deadline does not have a significant influence on the price discovery process of the European 
carbon markets, in which both the spot and futures markets Granger-cause each other. 
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Furthermore, by using the heterogeneous autoregressive (HAR) realised volatility model, it is 
found that there is a change in volatility spillovers after the submission deadline, particularly 
from the spot market to the futures market. Finally, the above findings are robust to different 
intraday time frequencies. The results suggest that, when modelling the relationship between 
carbon spot and futures prices, the change in the mean-reverting process of the carbon spot 
and futures relationship and volatility spillovers between spot and futures markets before and 
after the submission deadline should be taken into account.   
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5.1. Introduction  
Carbon emission markets, which are designed to reduce emissions of global greenhouse 
gases (GHGs), have experienced rapid ongoing development even during the recent recession 
and have attracted considerable attention from policy makers and investors. Accounting for 
83% of global carbon markets’ value, the European carbon markets under the European 
Union emission trading scheme (EU ETS) is the most influential and successful emission 
trading market in the world (World Bank, 2010). The financial instruments traded in the 
carbon emission markets are known as carbon allowances. According to the EU ETS 
regulations, 30 April of the year succeeding the year when the emissions occur is the last date 
for operating firms to submit their carbon allowances. This date is also known as the 
submission deadline for the European carbon emission markets. After the submission, the 
carbon allowances surrendered to the EU are no long available to trade in the markets. 
Therefore the inventory level of carbon allowances in the markets decreases significantly 
after the submission deadline each year. The inventory level is related to the costs and 
constraints of arbitrage. Firstly, it has been argued that market markers require additional 
compensation for inventory risk (e.g, Ho and Stoll, 1981; Biais, 1993). A high inventory level 
will lower the inventory risk and narrow down the bid-ask spread. Therefore the transaction 
costs of arbitrage activities are lower in a high inventory state. Secondly, it is easier for 
arbitragers to borrow and short-sell financial assets when the inventory level is higher. For 
the above reasons, arbitragers in the European carbon markets are expected to behave 
differently before and after the submission deadline each year, causing a shift in the pattern of 
the mean-reverting process of carbon futures mispricing derived from the cost-of-carry model.   
[Insert Figure 5.1 here] 
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Figure 5.1 displays the time series of carbon futures mispricing, i.e. the logarithmic 
difference between the observed futures prices and the theoretical futures (also known as the 
basis) at the frequency of 15 minute intervals. It can be observed that the patterns of the time 
series before the submission deadline of 30 April differ from those after the deadline, at least 
in 2009 and 2011. In particular, the graph in Figure 5.1, Panel C (year 2011), clearly shows 
that, except for several outliers, the observed futures prices are persistently higher than the 
theoretical futures prices by around 2%-8% before 04/05/2011, which is the first trading day 
after the submission deadline of 30/04/2011. By contrast, the futures mispricing hovers just 
above and below zero after 04/05/2011. This implies that there may be a change in the time 
series characteristics of carbon futures mispricing after the submission deadline and provides 
a strong motivation for examining the impact of allowance submission on the time series 
dynamics of carbon emission markets. Therefore, this chapter aims to investigate the time 
series properties of the carbon spot and futures relationship before and after the submission 
deadline and compare the differences.  
In particular, the first objective of this chapter is to examine the impact of the submission 
deadline on the mean-reverting process of the carbon futures mispricing. Some previous 
papers have studied whether the cost-of-carry relationship holds between the carbon spot and 
futures prices and they have produced mixed results (e.g. Uhrig-Homburg and Wagner, 2009; 
Joyeux and Milunovich, 2010; Chevallier, 2010; Rittler, 2012). However, these papers do not 
take the impact of allowance submission into account. The mixed results for the cost-of-carry 
relationship may be due to the effects of allowance submission. Therefore, it is important to 
compare the mean-reverting characteristics of the spot and futures relationship before and 
after the submission deadline. 
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Secondly, the submission of allowances may also have an influence on the transmission of 
information between spot and futures markets. The EU ETS regulations require firms that fail 
to surrender enough carbon allowances by the deadline to pay a heavy penalty (see Section 
5.2 for details). Therefore, operating firms which have insufficient carbon allowances in-hand 
want to acquire the uncovered allowances in the spot market before the submission deadline 
in order to avoid the penalty. For this reason, trading activities in the spot market are likely to 
be more active before the submission deadline than after. In addition, it is possible that the 
spot market responds to new information more quickly than futures market before the 
submission deadline, due to the active trading in the spot market. This may change the 
underlying data generation process (DGP) of the carbon allowance prices after the 
submission deadline. Rittler (2012) studies the price discovery and volatility spillovers of the 
European carbon markets and finds that the futures market incorporates new information first 
and transmits it to the spot market afterwards. However, the paper ignores the potential 
impact of allowance submission, which may cause distinct information transmission 
processes before and after the submission deadline. This leads to the second purpose of this 
chapter, which is to examine whether the transmission of information between the spot and 
futures markets before the submission deadline is different before and after the submission 
deadline. This involves examining the first and second moments of information transmission, 
i.e. the price discovery process, and volatility spillovers. 
Overall, this chapter represents the first attempt to examine the impact of the allowance 
submission deadline on carbon emission markets. It contributes to the existing literature in a 
number of respects. Firstly, few studies, if any, have studied the mean-reverting properties of 
the carbon spot and futures relationship. Therefore, this constitutes the first attempt to study 
the mean-reverting process of the relationship in the European carbon markets and the effects 
of allowance submission on the process. The results obtained are important for understanding 
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arbitrage activities in the European carbon markets at market microstructure level, and will 
also help to shed light on the mixed results for the cost-of-carry relationship between spot and 
futures prices found in previous studies. Secondly, this chapter is the first to incorporate the 
impact of allowance submission into the examination of the causal relationship between spot 
and futures returns in the European carbon markets. Thirdly, this study also examines 
whether the submission of allowances has an impact on the volatility spillovers between the 
spot and futures markets, for the first time. This study differs from Rittler’s (2012) 
investigation of the volatility spillovers in the European carbon emission markets by 
considering the impact of the allowance submission deadline and by using realised volatility 
instead of conditional volatility, which is preferable, as previous studies have shown that the 
realised measure of volatility is model-free and performs well in out-of-sample forecasting 
(e.g. Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Labys, 2003). Chevallier and Sevi (2011) support the 
merit of using realised volatility in carbon emission markets.  
This study employs tick-by-tick order flow data for spot and futures contracts in the 
leading European carbon exchanges. In order to examine the mean-reverting properties of the 
spot and futures relationship, this chapter adopts a series of cointegration tests, ranging from 
the standard augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test to threshold models and smooth-transition 
models. The smooth-transition model enables not only the speed of adjustment to be 
examined but also the no-arbitrage boundaries. In order to analyse information transmission, 
Granger causality tests are used for price discovery and the heterogeneous autoregressive 
(HAR) model is employed for the realised volatility spillovers. All the above models are 
augmented with dummy variables which account for the effects of allowance submission. 
The results of this chapter show that there is a cointegration relationship between spot and 
futures price before and after the submission deadline, which suggests that the mixed results 
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found for the cointegration relationship in previous studies is not due to the allowance 
submission. More importantly, it is found that the long-run equilibrium level, the speed of 
adjustment, and the upper and lower bands of the no-arbitrage area all change after the 
submission deadline. Therefore, the mean-reverting process of the spot and futures 
relationship is different before and after the deadline. The findings are consistent with the 
hypothesis that arbitrage behaviours alter because of the submission of allowances. The 
above effects are prominent in 2009 and 2011, but not very significant in 2010. This is 
because the financial crisis made industrial production in the EU drop significantly in 2009, 
causing an unexpectedly sharp decrease in carbon emissions in the EU in the same year. 
According to World Bank (2012), carbon emissions in the EU decreased by 11% from 2008 
to 2009, following a 15% reduction in industrial production in the same period. As firms 
emitted less than the excepted amount in 2009, they had sufficient carbon allowances to 
surrender by 30/04/2010 and thus did not need to trade in the carbon market before the 
submission deadline. Therefore the impact of allowance submission in 2010 was not very 
significant.
34
 Industrial productions and carbon emission in the EU recovered to previous 
levels in 2010; therefore the impact of allowance submission in 2011 is significant. Moreover, 
the results of Granger causality tests reveal that the causal relation between spot and futures 
returns in the European carbon markets does not shift significantly after the submission 
deadline each year. Spot and futures returns generally Granger-cause each other, which is in 
line with Rittler’s (2012) claims. However, the values of the F-test statistics indicate that the 
spot market leads the futures markets in the periods before the submission deadline but the 
futures market leads the spot market after the deadline. Nonetheless, in terms of volatility 
spillovers, the results of the bivariate HAR model using realised volatility show that the 
volatility spillovers between spot and futures markets are significantly different before and 
                                                          
34
 For further details of the explanations, please see the last paragraph of Section 5.4.1. 
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after the submission deadline, particularly from the spot market to the futures market. This 
supports the assertion that trading activities in the spot market should be more active before 
the submission deadline than after, and therefore new information may be incorporated into 
the dynamics of volatility in the spot market first during the periods before the deadline. The 
effects of allowance submission on volatility spillovers are also more significant in 2009 and 
2011 than in 2010. The results of the HAR model also suggest that volatility spillovers from 
the futures market to the spot market are only significant in the periods after the submission 
deadline. However, Rittler’s (2012) results show that volatility spillovers are significant from 
the futures market to the spot market but not vice versa. This is because the author ignores the 
impact of allowance submission and uses the conditional measures of volatility instead of 
realised measures. All the above findings are robust to different intraday time frequencies. 
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 introduces the key 
elements of the EU ETS, and the submission deadline in particular. Section 5.3 briefly 
reviews the related literature. Section 5.4 describes how to construct the intraday spot and 
futures price series, and the estimation methodology of futures mispricing, as well as 
presenting the summary statistics of mispricing. Section 5.5 explains the methodology 
employed in this chapter, analyses the empirical results and provides robustness checks. The 
findings are summarised and conclusions presented in Section 5.6. 
 
5.2. The European Union emission trading scheme and the submission 
deadline 
The EU ETS was launched in 2005 to comply with the Kyoto Protocol, which requires 
industrial countries and countries in transition covered by the protocol to reduce their 
collective greenhouse gas emissions by 5.2% of the level reached in 1990 before 2012 
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(UNFCCC, 1997).
 35
 
 
In order to reduce emissions efficiently and economically, the EU ETS 
developed a “cap-and-trade” system. Under this system, central authorities set up a standard 
or “cap” on the total amount of greenhouse gases that a country or region is allowed to emit 
within a year. The authorities then allocate the allowance of emission units, which is the right 
to emit a certain amount of GHGs. Firms’ GHGs emission should not exceed the allocated 
allowance represented by their in-hand allowances; otherwise they must deliver the missing 
carbon allowances in the next year and also pay a heavy penalty. The total amount of 
allowances should not exceed the cap. Consequently, the total amount of emissions can be 
controlled and kept under a target level. If a company needs to emit more than its allocated 
allowance, it can buy carbon allowances from another company which has some emission 
allowances remaining. According to the Coase theorem (Coase, 1937, 1960), under the 
assumption of zero transaction costs, and if the authorities allocate and protect the rights of 
allowance holders very effectively, the “cap-and-trade” system can completely solve the 
externalities problem of market failure. Because the carbon emission markets are futures-
dominated markets and always a sub-market of energy exchanges, carbon allowances are 
commonly viewed as a special type of commodities. 
By adopting the “cap-and-trade” mechanism, the total value of European Union 
allowances (EUAs)
36
 transactions has risen to 118.5 billion U.S. dollars with an 18% growth 
rate, which is considerably faster than the growth rate of the global carbon markets (World 
Bank, 2010). Accounting for 83% of the market value of global carbon emission markets, the 
EU ETS is the most influential and successful emission trading programme in the world. The 
firms covered by the EU ETS comprise approximately 12,000 installations which have a net 
                                                          
35
 There are 41 countries defined as industrialised countries and countries in transition under the Kyoto Protocol. 
See UNFCCC (1997) for details. 
36
 EUA is the carbon allowance traded under EU ETS. 
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generating capacity of more than 20 megawatts (MW) in 28 countries in the EU and 3 non-
EU European countries (Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway). The sectors included are power 
stations, mineral or oil refineries, ferrous metal, glass production, coke ovens, ceramic 
productions, cement manufactures and the aviation industry which joined in 2012. All the 
operators which hold allowances and trade in carbon allowances are registered in the EU ETS 
Transaction Log. The data shows that less than 6% of total accounts were personal holding 
accounts (2,050 out of a total of 34,492 accounts) in November 2012, indicating that the vast 
majority of the participants in the European carbon emission markets are institutional 
investors. This is because individuals cannot claim a carbon allowance from their personal 
emission reduction, disadvantaging them from participating in carbon emission trading 
compared to firms. The participants in the EU ETS include the 12,000 installations covered 
by the scheme, firms investing in the CDM and JI projects, government carbon funds, 
international organisations, arbitragers, speculators and other environmental investors. 
 The EU ETS has three phases, each with different mechanisms. Phase I spans the period 
from January 2005 to the end of 2007, and did not permit banking and borrowing of carbon 
allowances between different phases. The period from January 2008 to December 2012 
constitutes the second phase of the EU ETS; interphase banking and borrowing restrictions 
were relaxed to some extent and more countries, such as Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein 
are covered by the scheme. The aviation industry has also been included in the scheme since 
2012. In Phase III of EU ETS (2013–2020), a series of changes will be made by the European 
Union. For example, a proportion of carbon allowances will be moved from free allocation to 
auctioning; and more restrictions will be imposed on using carbon offsets outside of the EU 
as a substitute for EUAs. This chapter only considers the data from EU ETS Phase II for the 
following reasons. Firstly, the second phase of EU ETS is the most recent commitment period 
and has not been fully investigated. Secondly, the mechanisms of EU ETS Phase I and Phase 
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II had been significantly changed between Phase I and Phase II; therefore, it is not reasonable 
to examine the Phase I and Phase II data together. Thirdly, due to inter-phase banking 
restrictions, the spot prices are close to zero at the end of Phase I, i.e. the second half of 2007 
(Chevellier, 2011a). Therefore, it is not appropriate to use the spot prices at that stage to 
study the relationship between spot and futures markets. 
On 30 April each year, the EU ETS regulations require all firms covered by the scheme to 
surrender a quantity of EUAs or other accepted carbon financial instruments
37
 corresponding 
to the GHG emissions in the previous year. GHG emissions not covered by the surrendered 
carbon allowances incurred a fine of €40 per CO2 ton in Phase I and €100 per CO2 ton in 
Phase II and Phase III. In addition, the uncovered carbon allowance should also be 
surrendered in the next compliance year. In order to avoid the penalty, firms which do not 
have enough carbon allowances to surrender have to purchase the uncovered allowances in 
the spot market before the submission deadline. Thus, firms with spare carbon allowances 
have an incentive to sell these allowances for cash, especially in the current financial crisis 
when the costs of borrowing are high. For the above reasons, trading in the carbon spot 
market is expected to be more active in the period before the submission deadline than after 
the deadline. This implies that the transmission of information may be different before and 
after the submission deadline. The allowances surrendered to the EU are no longer available 
to be traded on the markets. Therefore, the total amount of carbon allowance drops 
dramatically after the submission deadline each year, which can affect trading behaviour in 
the carbon markets, including arbitrage and hedging. To summarise, the submission of 
allowances by 30 April each year could result in changes in the behaviour of arbitrage 
                                                          
37
 These eligible carbon financial instruments include Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) developed from 
Clean Development Mechanisms (CDM) and Emission Reduction Units (ERUs) from Joint Implementation (JI). 
CDM and JI are flexible mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol. CERs and ERUs only account for a very small 
proportion of carbon allowances under EU ETS while the vast majority of allowances are EUAs. 
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activities and the process of information transmission. This chapter will provide empirical 
evidence with regard to whether the shift is significant. 
 
5.3. Related Literature 
Given the novel features and rapid growth of the carbon emission market, an increasing 
number of studies have been conducted in this field. The existing literature includes research 
into pricing carbon spot and derivatives assets (e.g. Benz and Trück, 2009; Daskalakis et al., 
2009); the relationship between carbon allowance prices and macroeconomic variables (e.g. 
Chevellier, 2011a, b); the econometric properties of carbon allowance prices (e.g. Paolella 
and Taschini, 2008); and the market efficiency of carbon emission markets (e.g. Daskalakis 
and Markellos, 2008; Charles et al., 2011).  
An important group of studies on carbon emission markets have examined the 
cointegration relationship between carbon spot and futures prices. Previous studies have 
shown mixed results regarding this relationship. For example, by using daily data from EU 
ETS Phase I, Uhrig-Homburg and Wagner (2009) provide evidence that there is a 
cointegration relationship between observed futures prices and theoretical futures prices 
which is derived from the cost-of-carry model. Charles et al. (2013) confirm the existence of 
cointegration relationship between spot and futures prices in the EU ETS Phase II by using 
daily data. In contrast, Joyeux and Milunovich (2010) show that the cost-of-carry model may 
not hold during the first commitment period of EU ETS at daily level. Chevallier (2010) and 
Chevallier (2012) support Joyeux and Milunovich’s (2010) arguments in EU ETS Phase II, 
by using linear and nonlinear vector error correction (ECM) models with structural breaks. In 
order to explain the mixed results for the cointegration relationship, Rittler (2012) re-
examines this relationship by using high-frequency data in EU ETS Phase II, and find that the 
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cointegration relationship holds at the intraday level. The author argues that the previous 
mixed results regarding the cointegration relationship are caused by the use of low frequency 
daily data, which can induce an identification problem.  
In terms of information transmission in the carbon emission markets, most previous 
studies have focused on the causal relationship between spot and futures returns or the 
leadership of spot/futures markets in the price discovery process. Uhrig-Homburg and 
Wagner (2009) and Chevallier (2010) find the futures market leads the spot market in the 
price discovery process at daily level. The daily data results produced by Rittler (2012) 
support the leadership of the futures markets and suggest a unidirectional causality from 
futures returns to spot returns. However, Rittler’s (2012) results for high frequency analysis 
indicate bidirectional feedback in the spot and futures returns. For the second moment of the 
information transmission process, i.e. volatility spillovers, little research has been conducted 
into carbon emission markets. Only Rittler (2012) has investigated the volatility spillovers in 
the European carbon emission markets using high frequency data and multivariate GARCH 
models, and shown that there are volatility spillovers from the futures market to the spot 
market. However, with the availability of high frequency data, realised volatility is preferred 
over conditional measures of volatility in modelling and forecasting the dynamics of 
volatility. Chevallier and Sevi (2011) examine the statistical properties and forecasting 
performance of realised volatility in carbon emission markets, and show that the model which 
uses realised volatility significantly outperforms GARCH specifications in one step ahead 
forecasting. Therefore, it is better to use realised volatility as a measure for studying volatility 
spillovers in the carbon emission markets. 
 
5.4. The Data  
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5.4.1. Constructing futures and spot price series 
To examine the effects of allowance submission on the European carbon markets, the spot 
and futures price series are constructed based on order flow data from spot and futures 
markets. The spot market tick-by-tick data is provided by BlueNext Exchange while the 
futures markets data is obtained from the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE).
38
 As shown in the 
previous section, this study only analyses the impact of the allowance submission deadline 
based on EU ETS Phase II data, which runs from 2008 to 2011. Because the allowance 
submission deadline for the previous year’s emission falls on 30 April of the following year, 
the first submission deadline in EU ETS Phase II is not 30/04/2008 but 30/04/2009. For this 
reason, the data for the year 2008 is excluded from the analysis. The final sample in this 
chapter runs from 2009 to 2011. For each year, this study uses futures contracts which expire 
in December of that year, which are the most liquid contracts. For example, when studying 
futures mispricing in 2009, the futures contract which expires in December 2009 will be used. 
The trading hours of the ICE and BlueNext exchanges are from 07:00 to 17:00 GMT. 
However, trading is not active in the spot market at the beginning and end of the trading day. 
To avoid these illiquid trading hours, only the transactions which occurred from 09:00 to 
16:00 GMT are used. In order to convert irregular transaction data into equidistant price data 
at frequencies of h-minutes, for each h-minute interval, this study computes the mean of the 
log prices of the immediate preceding and following transactions at that time interval as the 
log price at the h-minute mark. This chapter uses an h=15 minutes interval in the main tests.
39
 
To avoid the intraday effects, the log price of the first trade immediately following 09:00 is 
                                                          
38
 Carbon futures were initially listed on the European Climate Exchange (ECX) from 2005. In 2010, the ICE 
acquired ECX as its emission markets. Therefore, the carbon futures data in this paper is obtained from the ICE. 
39
 As well as the frequency of 15 minutes, this study also examines other intraday frequencies, i.e. 10 minutes 
and 30 minutes. The results are qualitatively similar to those in Section 5.4 and are shown in Appendix 5B. 
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used as the price at the 09:00 time interval each day, and the log price of the last trade 
immediately preceding 16:00 is taken as the price at the 16:00 time interval each day.  
 
5.4.2. Estimating spot-futures mispricing 
Most studies about futures mispricing assume that the theoretical price of a futures 
contract is determined by Brennan’s (1958) cost-of-carry model. In the cost-of-carry model, 
the theoretical futures price is determined by the spot price, risk-free rate, storage costs, 
convenience yield and the time to maturity, which can be expressed as:  
( )( )
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where Ft,T
*
 is the theoretical futures price at time t, which matures at time T. St is the spot 
price at time t, Rft is the annualised risk-free rate, ut is the annualised cost of storage at time t, 
CYt is the annualised convenience yield for the commodity, and T is the expiration date of the 
futures contract. The difference between the observed futures price and the theoretical futures 
price is the futures mispricing. Therefore, the futures mispricing, Zt, at any time point of t is 
computed as: 
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where Ft,T is the observed futures price at time t, which matures at time T. 
A number of studies have examined the cost-of-carry model for the European carbon 
markets. For example, Rittler (2012) employs the cost-of-carry model to calculate the 
theoretical prices of carbon futures, and Joyeux and Milunovich (2010) use the cost-of-carry 
model to investigate the market efficiency of European carbon futures markets. As carbon 
assets in the EU ETS are electronically registered and incur little cost, most of the previous 
studies assume that the cost of storage (ut) for carbon allowances is zero. For the risk-free rate 
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in the model, following Rittler (2012), this study adopts the monthly EURIBOR on a daily 
basis as Rft, which is obtained from DataStream.  
However, previous studies offer different views on whether there is a convenience yield in 
carbon emission markets. In economics, the convenience yield is the benefit from holding a 
spot commodity rather than entering forward or futures contracts, because it is more 
convenient to have some inventory in-hand than to purchase it when needed. Therefore, from 
a valuation standpoint, the convenience yield is similar to the dividend yield, but it is not 
observable. Daskalakis et al. (2009) and Uhrig-Homburg and Wagner (2009) argue that firms 
only need the carbon allowance annually to meet the regulatory requirements, and thus the 
convenience yield in carbon markets should be insignificant. Joyeux and Milunovich (2010) 
and Rittler (2012) also assume that the convenience yield is zero in the cost-of-carry model. 
Conversely, Paolella and Taschini (2006) argue that, because the GHG emissions are 
uncertain during each year, and due to the high transaction costs and illiquidity in carbon 
markets compared to major stock exchanges, there should be significant benefit to be gained 
from holding a spot carbon allowance, and thus the convenience yield in carbon markets is 
not zero. Borak, Härdle, Trück and Weron (2006) and Chevallier (2009) show that carbon 
futures in European markets have a significant convenience yield. Frunza and Guegan (2010) 
and Lin, Chen and Li (2012) also include a non-zero convenience yield term in their cost-of-
carry model. Furthermore, Rittler (2012) shows that the theoretical carbon futures prices with 
zero convenience yield are persistently higher than the observed futures prices, which could 
constitute evidence for the existence of a convenience yield. 
40 
For the above reason, a non-
zero convenience yield is assumed in this study, by employing an option implied 
methodology recently developed by Hochradl and Rammerstorfer (2012) to estimate the 
                                                          
40
 Daskalakis et al. (2009) also find similar results which support the non-zero convenience yield in carbon 
emission markets. 
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convenience yield. The method is based on the original economic idea of a convenience yield, 
where the convenience yield is defined as the benefit of holding spot assets rather than 
futures assets. The convenience yield is estimated as the difference between a put option on a 
spot contract and another put option on a futures contract. Further details about Hochradl and 
Rammerstorfer’s (2012) methodology are provided in Appendix 5A. 
[Insert Table 5.1 here] 
The summary statistics of futures mispricing using 15 min data are presented in Table 5.1. 
The statistics for the full year sample periods are shown in Panel A. All the series in Panel A 
display non-zero skewness and excess kurtosis, and the results of Jarque-Bera tests show that 
they significantly deviate from normal distribution. In Panel B, two samples are provided for 
each year, which run from three months before and after the submission deadline, in order to 
comparatively analyse the effects of allowance submission.
41
 The results of the mean 
statistics show that the average scales of mispricing reduce significantly after the submission 
deadlines for 2009 and 2011, while the means of futures mispricing in 2010 are small and do 
not change much. A similar pattern can also be observed for the standard deviation statistics. 
The skewness of futures mispricing changes from negative to positive after the submission 
deadline for 2009 and 2011; however, in 2010 the skewness does not change much. The 
values for kurtosis also reduce significantly after the submission deadline in 2009 and 2011 
but not in 2010.  
 
5.5. Impact of allowance submission  
5.5.1. Impact of allowance submission on mispricing mean-reverting process 
                                                          
41
 Chen, Chou and Chung (2009) study the effect of decimalization on index futures pricing efficiency, by 
splitting the total sample into two equal-length subsamples before and after the date of decimalization. This 
chapter follows Chen et al.’s (2009) methodology.  
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From the observation of Figure 5.1 and the analysis of Table 5.1, it is found that the last 
date of allowance submission for each year is a potential point of structural change for futures 
mispricing. To further analyse the characteristics of the distribution of the futures mispricing, 
the kernel density for the same sample periods in Table 5.1, Panel B is estimated and 
presented in Figure 5.2. The graphs in Panel A (year 2009) show a clear shift in distribution 
to the left after the submission deadline. The figures in Panel C (year 2011) demonstrate a 
similar pattern to that in Panel A, and the distribution of the sample period before the 
submission deadline strongly deviates to the right, indicating that almost all the observations 
are above zero. However, the kernel density estimations in 2010 hardly change. This is 
because of the low industrial production and carbon emissions in 2009. The above findings 
are consistent with the time series of futures mispricing plotted in Figure 5.1 and the 
summary statistics in Table 5.1. 
[Insert Figure 5.2 here] 
This chapter starts the analysis of the spot and futures relationship from the linear 
cointegration framework. If the cost-of-carry model holds, spot and futures prices should be 
cointegrated with each other and accordingly the futures mispricing (or the basis) will be 
stationary. For this reason, the linear adjustment of futures mispricing, Zt,, is assumed to 
follow the standard Engle and Granger (1987) process. In order to examine the effect of 
allowance submission on the dynamics of the mean-reverting process, this study augments 
the standard ADF test with a dummy variable to account for the period before the submission 
deadline, which is shown as: 
1 1 2 1
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where εt is the white noise error term, ΔZt-i are the lags of the dependent variable included in 
the regression to eliminate the autocorrelation of the dependent variable, Dt is a dummy 
variable set to be 1 during the period before 30 April each year and equal to 0 for the period 
after the submission deadline, δ captures the difference in equilibrium levels of the two 
periods so that α+δ and δ are the equilibrium levels during the period before 30 April and 
after 30 April, respectively; ρ1 and ρ2 are related to the speed of mean-reverting before and 
after the submission deadline, respectively. The null hypothesis of non-cointegration is 
rejected if ρ1 (or ρ2) is statistically significant and lies between -2 and 0.  
[Insert Table 5.2 here] 
The results of the ADF test with dummy variables (Equation 5.3) using 15 min data are 
summarised in Table 5.2. The analysis starts by using a whole sample period running from 
February to July each year (split into two equal-length subsamples before and after the 
submission deadline), and then extends the end of the sample to August and October, 
respectively, to examine whether the effect of allowance submission declines as time passes. 
It is found that the results for the same year but with different lengths of sample periods are 
strongly consistent, showing that the changes in the dynamics of equilibrium reversion are 
permanent. It is observed from Table 5.2 that all the intercept terms are positive and 
significant, suggesting that the equilibrium level is positive in all cases. One of the key 
parameters is the one governing the difference in the mean-reverting level for the two 
subperiods, δ, which is positive and significant for 2009 and 2011, but not for 2010. This 
indicates that the equilibrium level shifts downward after the submission deadline in 2009 
and 2011,
42
 which is consistent with the summary statistics showing that the mean of 
mispricing decreases after the submission deadline. The other key parameters, ρ1 and ρ2, 
                                                          
42
 The intercept terms for the period before and after the submission deadline are α+δ and α, respectively. If δ is 
positive and significant, the equilibrium level after the submission deadline would be lower than that before the 
deadline. 
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which are related to the speed of adjustment, are all significant and lie between -2 and 0, 
providing strong evidence of mean-reversion and cointegration before and after the 
submission deadline. This confirms Rittler’s (2012) results and suggests that the mixed 
results found for the cointegration relationship in previous studies is not because of the 
allowance submission but due to the identification problem caused by using low frequency 
data.  This study further examines whether there is a change in the mean-reverting speed after 
the submission deadline by using a Wald-test of ρ1=ρ2. The results show that the speed of 
adjustment is statistically different for the two sub-periods in 2009, but not in 2010 and 2011. 
To summarise, the overall results of the ADF test with dummy variables confirm the theory 
that allowance submission has an impact on the mean-reverting process of mispricing in 2009 
and 2011, but not in 2010. 
The linear ADF model assumes that the adjustment process is symmetric when the 
variable deviates from its long-run equilibrium. However, the futures mispricing always 
fluctuates within its upper and lower no-arbitrage boundaries due to transaction costs, 
illiquidity, and other market imperfections. When the futures mispricing deviates beyond the 
no-arbitrage boundaries, arbitrage activities can quickly correct the relative pricing 
inefficiency and pull the futures mispricing back within the no-arbitrage boundaries. In 
contrast, if the futures mispricing fluctuates within the no-arbitrage boundaries, arbitragers 
cannot fully eliminate the relative mispricing because of the costs and constraints of arbitrage. 
In this case, arbitrage normally takes place outside the no-arbitrage boundaries when there is 
a large deviation from the equilibrium, while the small mispricing that takes place within the 
no-arbitrage boundaries remains uncorrected. Therefore, various nonlinear mean-reverting 
models are adopted to capture the asymmetries in futures mispricing. Monoyios and Sarno 
(2002) first introduce several threshold and smooth transition models to capture the nonzero 
transaction costs. The first nonlinear model is Tong’s (1978, 1990) threshold autoregressive 
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(TAR) model for the cointegration test, which enforces abrupt changes of dynamic behaviour 
in each regime and assumes that all the arbitragers behave instantaneously in an identical 
style (McMillan and Ülkü, 2009). In the case examined in this thesis, the submission of 
allowances should have a stronger impact on one side of the market, when the theoretical 
futures price induced from the spot price is too high relative to the observed futures price. 
Under this circumstance, arbitragers would short-sell the spot asset. However, it is more 
difficult to short-sell spot carbon allowances after the submission deadline because the total 
amount of carbon allowances in the markets decreases significantly after that date. This thesis 
does not use other non-linear models, such as the Markov regime switching model used in 
Chapter 3, because the unobservable Markov chain in the Markov regime switching model 
lacks an economicbasis, unlike the threshold models, when analysing the cointegration 
between spot and futures prices. For the above reasons, the TAR model is used for the 
cointegration test, which can identify the asymmetric effects in the mispricing series. With an 
augmented dummy variable for the submission deadline, the TAR model with dummy 
variables is shown as: 
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     (5.4) 
where It is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if Zt-1 is greater than or equal to the 
threshold, and 0 otherwise; Dt is a dummy variable set to be 1 during the period before 30 
April and equal to 0 for the period after the submission deadline; ρ1, ρ2, ρ3 and ρ4 are the 
parameters for the speed of mean-reversion. More specifically, ρ1 and ρ2 govern the speed of 
adjustment in the upper regimes, while ρ3 and ρ4 are related the speed of adjustment in the 
lower regimes. Symmetric adjustment holds if -2<ρ1=ρ2<0, or -2<ρ3=ρ4<0 in each subsample, 
and asymmetric adjustment happens when ρ1≠ρ2 or ρ3≠ρ4 and both lie between -2 and 0. 
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Therefore the ADF model described in Equation (5.4) is a special case of Equation (5.3). The 
asymmetric adjustment process shown in Equation (5.4) is consistent with non-zero 
transaction costs and the presence of short-sale constraints. The estimation results of the TAR 
model with dummy variables (Equation 5.4) using 15 min data are presented in Table 5.3. 
[Insert Table 5.3 here] 
Several approaches are adopted in order to determine the value of the threshold. The 
simplest method is to set the threshold at zero. This is an economically meaningful value, and 
therefore the underlying cointegration vector derived from the TAR model attractor would 
correspond to the attractor. However, the value of the threshold should be permitted to differ 
from the attractor (McMillan and Dennis, 2012). For this reason, two alternative methods are 
selected to determine the threshold value. The first approach involves a recursive estimation 
based on Chan’s (1993) procedure. The regression of Equation (5.4) is run over a number of 
possible threshold values and the most appropriate value is selected based on the conditional 
least squares (CLS) methodology. The advantage of this approach is that the estimator of the 
threshold parameter is strongly consistent. Nonetheless, Chan’s (1993) procedure can only 
produce a single threshold value for the whole sample period, which does not allow for the 
variation of the threshold over time. The second method entails using a simple 10-day 
moving average of the futures mispricing Zt as the time-varying threshold values. The results 
reported in Table 5.3 are based on Chan’s (1993) procedure, while the results obtained by 
using the 10-day moving average are qualitatively similar and are presented in Appendix 5C.  
The results in Table 5.3 illustrate several interesting points. Firstly, the results of the 
Wald-tests of ρ1=ρ3 and ρ2=ρ4 are significant in most cases, showing that the speed of 
adjustment is different in the two regimes. This supports the use of the TAR model instead of 
the linear cointegration model. Secondly, similarly to the results in Table 5.2, all the intercept 
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terms are positive and significant, suggesting a positive long-run equilibrium. The coefficient 
of the dummy variable is significant and positive in all the sub-periods in 2009 and 2011, 
showing that the allowance submission can significantly decrease the equilibrium level. 
However, contrary to the results in Table 5.2, the dummy variable in 2010 is negative and 
significant in the subsamples which run from February to July (at 1% level) and February to 
August (at 10% level), but insignificant in the subsample which runs from February to 
October. The results suggest that the submission of allowances can affect the mean-reversion 
equilibrium in 2010 if the asymmetries of futures mispricing are taken into account, but the 
effect diminishes as time passes. The parameters related to the speed of mean-reversion, ρ1, 
ρ2, ρ3 and ρ4, are all negative and significant, showing that the futures mispricing, Zt, is 
stationary in all the subsamples. Because this chapter is mainly concerned with the effects of 
allowance submission, it further examines whether the speed of adjustment is the same before 
and after the deadline, for both the upper and lower regimes, by using two Wald-tests. The 
null hypotheses of ρ1=ρ2 and ρ3=ρ4 are rejected in all the subsamples in 2009, which suggests 
the speed of mean-reversion changes after the submission deadline in both regimes. ρ1=ρ2 
and ρ3=ρ4 are also rejected in the sample running from February to July 2010, but cannot be 
rejected in the other subsample for 2010. This shows that the impact of allowance submission 
on the mean-reverting speed also lessens over time. Only the hypothesis ρ3=ρ4 is rejected for 
all the subsamples in 2011, indicating that the submission of allowances can only affect the 
speed of adjustment in the lower regime. The above results suggest that allowance 
submission can influence the equilibrium level and adjustment speed of futures mispricing in 
all three years. The effects are persistent in 2009 and 2011 but weaker in 2010. 
The TAR model used above imposes an abrupt regime change which requires a number of 
unrealistic assumptions, including that all the agents hold homogeneous expectations, and 
incur the same interest rates and transaction costs (Monoyios and Sarno, 2002). However, 
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asset returns also normally display smooth mean-reverting characteristics. Consequently, 
smooth-transition models have been preferred over threshold models, such as the 
aforementioned TAR model. In order to allow for a smooth change of regimes, this chapter 
employs the quadratic-logistic smooth-transition (QLSTR) model developed by Jansen and 
Teräsvirta (1996), in which the adjustment of a small deviation from the equilibrium is 
different from that of a large deviation, and the shift between regimes is smooth. In addition, 
unlike the single threshold for each side in the TAR model, the QLSTR model allows for 
different threshold points to be set for both sides of the attractor. This makes it possible to 
examine how the allowance submission influences the no-arbitrage boundaries as well as the 
speed of transition between the two regimes. Taking the effects of allowance submission into 
consideration, the QLSTR model with dummy variables is given as follows: 
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    (5.5)  
where Dt is the dummy variable for the submission deadline with the same definition as 
before, γi is the parameter for the speed of transition between the two regimes, c1,i is the lower 
boundary and c2,i  is upper boundary of the inner regime, which determines the locations 
where the adjustment process changes regimes, and α1,i and β1,i govern the speed of 
adjustment in the inner and outer regimes. More precisely, the speed of mean-reversion in the 
outer regime is determined by the sum of α1,i and β1,i, i=1 for the period before 30 April each 
year, and i=2 for the sample period after 30 April. If γi→0, the model becomes a linear ADF 
model, while if γi→∞, the formula becomes 0 if c1,i<Zt<c2,i and is equal to 1 if Zt<c1,i and 
Zt>c2,i. At the point of transition, the model allows different adjustment behaviours for 
positive and negative deviations. Therefore the model contains Balke and Fomby’s (1997) 
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three-regime threshold model. The estimation results of the QLSTR model with dummy 
variables (Equation 5.5) using 15 min data are displayed in Table 5.4. 
[Insert Table 5.4 here] 
The parameters of interest in Equation (5.5) are those that determine the speed of regime 
transition, the speed of mean-reversion and the upper and lower boundaries of the no-
arbitrage space. Five Wald-tests are conducted to examine whether the speed of adjustment in 
the inner and outer regimes, the speed of transition, and the location of the upper and lower 
no-arbitrage boundaries are the same before and after the submission deadline. It can be 
observed from Table 5.4 that the null hypotheses α1,1=α1,2 and β1,1=β1,2 are rejected for all the 
samples in 2009 and 2011, except for the subsample running from February to July in 2011 
for the test of α1,1=α1,2. However, the hypotheses α1,1=α1,2 and β1,1=β1,2 cannot be rejected for 
any of the samples in 2010. The results indicate that allowance submission can affect the 
speed of mean-reversion in the inner and outer regimes in 2009 and 2011, but not in 2010. 
The results of Table 5.4 also show that the parameter related to the speed of regime transition, 
γ, does not change significantly after the submission deadline as the test of γ1=γ2 cannot be 
rejected for all the samples for the three years in question. The most interesting parameters in 
the model are the threshold parameters, c1 and c2. The results shown in Table 5.2 and Table 
5.3 suggest that the long-run equilibrium shifts after the submission deadline for all three 
years; nevertheless, if the upper and lower no-arbitrage boundaries do not change, the 
movement of the equilibrium level does not necessarily induce the change in arbitrage 
behaviour. The results shown in the last two columns in Table 5.4 signify that both the upper 
and lower boundaries of the no-arbitrage space alter after the submission deadline for 2009 
and 2011, as nearly all the tests for c1,1=c1,2 and c2,1=c2,2 are rejected (except the test for 
c1,1=c1,2 in the subsample from February to October 2009 and the subsample from February 
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to July 2011). In 2010, there is a significant change for the lower boundaries in the subsample 
running from February to July only, but the effect lessens very rapidly in the next subsample 
(from February to August). This provides evidence of the effect of the submission deadline 
on the no-arbitrage bands, although the effect in 2010 is not strong and persistent.  
Overall, the results presented in Section 5.4.1 suggest several important findings regarding 
the mean-reverting process of the spot and futures relationship before and after the 
submission deadline, although it is found that the cointegration relationship between spot and 
futures prices holds for all the subperiods, confirming the results obtained by Rittler (2012). 
Firstly, the equilibrium level of mean-reversion shifts after the submission deadline for all 
three years. Secondly, the speed of mean-reversion in each regime is different before and 
after the submission deadline. Thirdly, the no-arbitrage bands have also changed after the 
submission deadline. These findings support the view that the submission of carbon 
allowances can affect arbitrage activities and therefore shift the mean-reverting process of the 
futures mispricing Zt. 
The above effects are more prominent in 2009 and 2011 than in 2010, because the global 
financial crisis deepened in 2009, and the European sovereign debt crisis happened in the 
same year. This caused a 15% reduction in industrial production in the EU from 2008 to 2009 
and an 11% drop in GHG emissions in the same period (World Bank, 2012). It should be 
noted that the emissions in 2009 determine the amount of carbon allowance which should be 
surrendered in 2010. Therefore, the total amount of carbon allowances that should be 
surrendered by 30/04/2010 also decline considerably while the amount of carbon allowances 
allocated to firms are based on a smooth industrial production. In this case, firms would have 
more carbon allowances than those should be submitted, and thus they do not need to 
purchase more carbon allowances from the markets before 30/04/2010. Trading and arbitrage 
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activities before and after the submission deadline in 2010 may not change as much as those 
in 2009, and therefore the impact of allowance submission is not very significant in 2010. 
Economic activities recovered in 2010, causing industrial production and carbon emissions to 
recover to previous levels in 2010.
 
For this reason, trading and arbitrage activities before and 
after the submission deadline in 2011 should be significantly different and the results of this 
study support the above arguments.  
 
5.5.2. Impact of allowance submission on price discovery 
In the previous section, it is shown that the submission of carbon allowances has an impact 
on arbitrage and the mean-reverting process of the spot and futures relationship. However, 
the allowance submission may also affect the transmission of information. Operating firms 
with insufficient carbon allowances in-hand have to purchase the uncovered allowance before 
the submission deadline in order to avoid severe financial punishment. Thus, trading 
activities in the spot market should be more vigorous before the submission deadline than 
after. It is possible that the first market (spot or futures markets) to react to the new 
information would be different before and after the submission deadline. Motivated by the 
aforementioned reasons, this section examines whether the price discovery process changes 
after the submission deadline. The analysis of price discovery is conducted to determine how 
the newly arrived information is incorporated into the price dynamics of several closely 
related markets, such as the spot and futures market for the same asset. The central question 
of price discovery is to identify whether one market reacts to new information more quickly 
than the other market, such that the prices in the two markets would differ temporarily after 
the arrival of new information. Subsequently, the market which responds more slowly to the 
new information would also respond to the prices changes in the first market due to arbitrage 
activities. Therefore, the market which absorbs new information more quickly can lead the 
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other market in terms of price changes. The Granger causality test developed by Granger 
(1969) can be used to test the lead-lag relationship. The Granger causality test is based on a 
vector autoregressive (VAR) model to examine whether the lagged returns in one market are 
jointly significant in the equation of the other market in the VAR system. The null hypothesis 
is that one market does not Granger-cause another, and thus the rejection of the null 
hypothesis would show that the related market Granger-causes the other market. 
[Insert Table 5.5 here] 
In the Granger causality test, sub-sampling analysis is employed instead of using dummy 
variables. The estimation results of the Granger causality tests using 15 min data are 
presented in Table 5.5. The results in Panel A (year 2009) show that spot returns Granger-
cause futures returns while futures returns do not Granger-cause spot returns in the subsample 
before the submission deadline. Thus, the spot market leads the futures market in the price 
discovery process before the deadline. Meanwhile, spots and futures Granger-cause each 
other in the samples that come after the submission deadline in 2009. The above findings are 
consistent with the view that the spot carbon market is more active before the submission 
deadline because operating firms are likely to purchase spot carbon allowances to fulfil their 
obligations. However, the results for 2010 and 2011 do not support the above argument. 
Spots and futures Granger-cause each other in all the samples before and after the submission 
deadlines in 2010 and 2011, showing no evidence of changes in the price discovery process 
caused by the submission of carbon allowances. Consequently, the effect of allowance 
submission on price discovery is not significant and persistent, and the two markets Granger-
cause each other in most cases. The results are in line with Rittler’s (2012) finding that there 
is a bidirectional causality relationship between the results of spot and futures returns before 
and after the submission deadline. However, although there is a bidirectional causality 
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relationship between the results of spot and futures returns before and after the submission 
deadline, it is found that the spot market leads the futures markets in the periods before the 
submission deadline but the futures market leads the spot market after the deadline (indicated 
by the larger F-test statistics). The results are inconsistent with those of Uhrig-Homburg and 
Wagner (2009), Chevallier (2010) and Rittler (2012) who claim that carbon futures contracts 
lead in the price discovery process. However, they overlook the impact of allowance 
submission, which can induce intensive trading before the submission deadline in the spot 
market. 
 
5.5.3. Impact of allowance submission on volatility spillovers 
In addition to analysing the first moment of information transmission in the return level, it 
is of interest to examine whether allowance submission can affect the second moment of 
information transmission, namely volatility spillovers. The volatility of an asset is driven by 
the latent information in the market such that the transmission of information within markets 
can induce a lead-lag relationship in corresponding markets’ volatility dynamics (Andersen, 
1996). Multivariate GARCH models are normally used to study cross-market volatility 
spillovers; however, due to the availability of high-frequency data the realised measure of 
volatility is prevalent in studies on volatility spillovers because of its nonparametric nature 
and excellent performance in out-of-sample forecasting. For example, Bubák, Kočenda, and 
Žikeš (2011) examine volatility spillovers in East European foreign exchange markets by 
using realised volatility. Next, this section will briefly introduce the theory of realised 
volatility and the model for realised volatility spillovers. 
Following Andersen, Bollerslev and Diebold (2007), it is assumed that the logarithmic 
asset price pt follows a continuous-time jump diffusion process, which is shown as: 
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t t t t t tdp dt dW dq              (5.6) 
where µt denotes a finite variation process, Wt denotes a Wiener process, σt represents a 
positive definite stochastic volatility process independent of Wt , κt is the size of jumps in the 
logarithmic prices, and qt is a counting process. The quadratic variation (QVt) for the 
cumulative return process, pt-p0, can be shown as: 
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      The first part of Equation (5.7) relates to the diffusion while the second component 
captures the jumps in the stochastic process. As proved by the seminal work of Andersen, 
Bollerslev, Diebold and Labys (2001), the above quadratic variation can be estimated by the 
summation of the intraday squared returns, which is defined as realised volatility (RV). The 
daily realised volatility is calculated as: 
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where Δ denotes the intraday frequency and rt,Δ=p(t)-p(t-Δ) shows the compounded Δ-period 
return at time t. The advantages of the realised volatility measure are that it is non-parametric 
and model-free. In addition, Andersen et al. (2003) show that modelling using realised 
volatility strongly outstrip a series of GARCH models and stochastic volatility models in 
terms of out-of-sample forecasting. Therefore, in this chapter, the realised volatility approach 
is adopted to examine the volatility spillover in European carbon markets.
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      Long-memory dependency is one of the most important issues to be considered in regard 
to financial market volatility. Some early studies on realised volatility employ complicated 
                                                          
43
 This chapter also tries some Multivariate GARCH models (e.g. Vech-GARCH, CCC-GARCH, DCC-GARCH, 
etc.) for the conditional volatility spillover but failed to get convergence results due to the limited number of 
observations.  
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fractional integrated models (such as ARFIMA) in the empirical estimations, for example 
those by Areal and Taylor (2002), and Andersen et al. (2003), among others.  However, Corsi 
(2009) proposes a simple heterogeneous autoregressive (HAR) model with realised volatility 
(HAR-RV) to capture the main features of long-memory. The HAR model is motivated by 
the heterogeneous ARCH (HARCH) model developed by Müller, Dacorogna, Davé, Olsen, 
Pictet and von Weizsäcker (1997), in which the conditional variance is dependent on a series 
of squared returns over different time horizons. To examine the effects of the submission 
deadline on volatility spillovers in carbon spot and futures markets, this study augments the 
bivariate HAR-RV models by including a dummy variable for the submission deadline, 
which is shown as: 
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where RVFt is the daily realised volatility for futures returns while RVSt is the daily realised 
volatility for spot returns at time t, ( 1| )
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Dt is the dummy variable for the submission deadline with the same definition as described 
earlier. In the above model, ci,k are the parameters governing the volatility spillovers from 
spot markets to futures markets, while the volatility spillovers from futures markets to spot 
markets are determined by the parameters of βi,k. The three volatility components in this 
model, the first lag of realised variance and the average of 5-day and 22-day lagged realised 
variance, reflect daily, weekly and monthly realised volatility. Each component corresponds 
to various response times of different groups of investors to the arrival of new information. 
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An intuitive interpretation of the HAR-RV model is that the model allows the volatility 
patterns over longer intervals to associate with those over shorter intervals (Corsi, 2009). 
Bubák et al. (2011) suggest that the multivariate version of the HAR model can be adopted to 
study the impact of long-run and/or short-run volatility terms in one financial market on 
another. This chapter employs the bivariate framework of the HAR-RV model to study 
volatility spillovers in European carbon markets. In carbon emission markets, Chevallier and 
Sevi (2011) show that the HAR-RV model is more accurate than a number of GARCH 
models in one step ahead volatility forecasting. The HAR-RV model is also adopted by 
Andersen et al. (2007), Chen and Ghysels (2011) and a number of other realised volatility 
studies.  
[Insert Table 5.6 here] 
Table 5.6 displays the results of the bivariate HAR-RV model with dummy variables 
(Equation 5.9 and 5.10). This study employs the longest available sample period each year 
(from February to November), rather than different sub-samples, because of the limited 
number of observations. The key parameters are ci,k for the futures market and βi,k for the spot 
market. For the futures market, it is shown in Table 5.6 that c1,1 and c1,22 are strongly 
significant while c2,1, c2,5, and c2,22 are all insignificant in 2009, indicating that there are 
volatility spillovers from the spot market to the futures market before the submission deadline, 
while the effect disappears after the deadline. This is confirmed by the rejection of the 
likelihood ratio (LR) test for the joint hypotheses c1,1=c2,1, c1,5=c2,5, and c1,22=c2,22, which 
provides evidence of change in the volatility spillover property of the futures market. The 
results for 2010 and 2011 are consistent with those for 2009, where the volatility parameters 
shift from significant to insignificant after the submission deadline and the joint test of 
c1,1=c2,1, c1,5=c2,5, and c1,22=c2,22 is also rejected. As suggested in Section 5.4.2, transactions 
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in the spot market are more active before the submission deadline. Thus, new information 
could be incorporated into the spot market first and thereby induce the change in the volatility 
dynamics of spot returns. Subsequently, the futures market would respond to the new 
information. This results in a causal relationship between the volatility from the spot market 
to the futures market before the submission deadline. The results in Table 5.6 strongly 
support the above analysis, as there is evidence of volatility spillovers from the spot market to 
the futures market before the submission deadline but no spillover effect is found afterwards. 
Furthermore, it is found that the joint LR test of c1,1=c2,1, c1,5=c2,5, and c1,22=c2,22 is rejected 
at the 1% level for 2009 and 2011, while the LR test for 2010 is only rejected at the 10% 
level. The results show that the effects of allowance submission on volatility spillovers are 
more significant in 2009 and 2011 than in 2010, which is consistent with the analysis 
presented in Section 5.4.1. 
In the case of the spot market, only weak evidence of volatility spillovers is found from 
the futures market to the spot market in the subsamples taken after the submission deadline. 
This implies that the futures market incorporates new information first in the periods after the 
submission deadline, in line with the common belief that the futures market plays a key role 
in the information transmission in commodity markets. However, the joint test of β1,F,1= β2,F,1, 
β1,F,5= β2,F,5, and β1,F,22= β2,F,22 cannot be rejected for 2009 and 2010, which shows that the 
submission of allowances has limited impact on volatility spillovers from the futures market 
to the spot market. These results differ from those of Rittler (2012) that find a strong spillover 
effect from the futures market to the spot market but not vice versa due to the omission of the 
allowance submission deadline effect. 
 
5.6. Conclusion 
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The chapter studies the effects of allowance submission on the relationship between the 
spot and the futures markets under EU ETS. In particular, the mean-reverting process of 
carbon futures mispricing, the causal relationship between spot and futures returns, as well as 
the volatility spillovers between the two markets, are different before and after the 
submission deadline, resulting from the decrease in the total amount of spot carbon assets 
available. This research provides evidence with regard to whether the impact is significant. 
Using high-frequency data for the second commitment period of the EU ETS, the results 
firstly show that there is a cointegration relationship between spot and futures prices before 
and after the submission deadline. However, it is found that the long-run equilibrium level, 
the speed of mean-reverting, and the upper and lower boundaries of no-arbitrage space shift, 
due to the submission of carbon allowances. Thus the mean-reverting process of the futures 
mispricing is different before and after the deadline. This confirms the claim that allowance 
submission can change the behaviour of arbitrage activities. Moreover, previous studies, such 
as those by Uhrig-Homburg and Wagner (2009), Joyeux and Milunovich (2010) and 
Chevallier (2010) have produced mixed results regarding the cost-of-carry relationship 
between carbon spot and futures prices. Rittler (2012) suggests that the mixed results are due 
to the use of low frequency daily data, which causes an identification problem in the two 
markets. The results in this chapter indicate that the mixed results found for the cointegration 
relationship in previous studies is driven by the allowance submission, but is due to the 
identification problem caused by using low frequency data. Secondly, the results of the 
Granger causality tests demonstrate inconsistent evidence for the change in the causal 
relationship between spot and futures returns in the European carbon markets after the 
submission deadline each year. Spot and futures returns generally Granger-cause each other. 
The change in the price discovery process due to the allowance submission is insignificant. 
However, by comparing the F-test statistics of the Granger causality tests, it is found that the 
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leading market shifts from the spot market to the futures market after the submission deadline. 
Nonetheless, in terms of volatility spillovers, the results of the bivariate HAR model using 
realised volatility reveal that the change in volatility spillovers between the spot and the 
futures markets is significant after the submission deadline, particularly from the spot market 
to the futures market. This is because trading activities in the spot market should be more 
active before the submission deadline than after, and new information may be incorporated 
into the dynamics of volatility in the spot market first in the sub-periods before the deadline. 
These results conflict with those of Rittler (2012) because his results overlook the impact of 
allowance submission and the author uses conditional measures of volatility instead of 
realised measures. The impact of allowance submission in European carbon markets found in 
this chapter is more prominent in 2009 and 2011 than in 2010, due to the drop in GHG 
emission in 2009 caused by the global financial crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis. 
In conclusion, this chapter finds that the submission of allowances has a significant impact 
on the mean-reverting process of the spot and futures relationship and the transmission of 
information between spot and futures markets under EU ETS. The above findings are robust 
to different intraday time frequencies. The results indicate that, in modelling the relationship 
between carbon spot and futures prices (e.g. for arbitrage purpose), the difference in the 
mean-reverting process of futures mispricing before and after the submission deadline should 
be accounted for. The findings of this thesis are of interest to investors and arbitragers 
operating in the carbon emission market and could aid regulators in improving the EU ETS 
mechanisms used in the next commitment period. 
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Figure 5.1: Time series of carbon futures mispricing using 15 min data 
Panel A.      Year 2009 
 
 
 
 
Panel B.      Year 2010 
 
  
-.15
-.10
-.05
.00
.05
.10
.15
Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov
2009
-.08
-.06
-.04
-.02
.00
.02
.04
.06
Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov
2010
158 
 
Panel C.      Year 2011 
 
Note: The figure shows the time series of carbon futures mispricing from February to November each year, 
using 15 min intervals. The series for 2009, 2010 and 2011 are shown in Panel A, Panel B and Panel C, 
respectively. The carbon futures mispricing, Zt, is computed as the difference between the observed futures 
prices and the theoretical futures prices: 
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Figure 5.2: Kernel density estimation of carbon futures mispricing using 15 min data 
Panel A.      2009 February to April                              2009 May to July 
 
Panel B.        2010 February to April                               2010 May to July 
 
Panel C.        2011 February to April                            2011 May to July 
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Note: The figure shows kernel density estimates of carbon futures mispricing before and after the submission 
deadline each year. The results for 2009, 2010 and 2011 are shown in Panel A, Panel B and Panel C, 
respectively.   
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Table 5.1: Summary statistics of carbon futures mispricing using 15 min data 
Panel A: Full year sample periods 
 2009 2010 2011 
Mean  0.0066 0.0052 0.0143 
Std. Dev. 0.0154 0.0079 0.0174 
Skewness -0.062 0.095 0.649 
Kurtosis 16.188 5.105 5.710 
Jarque-Bera 43924.180*** 1149.384*** 2148.784*** 
Panel B: Before and after submission deadline subsample periods 
 2009 02-04 2009 05-07 2010 02-04 2010 05-07 2011 02-04 2011 05-07 
Mean  0.0124 0.0094 0.0063 0.0083 0.0362 0.0080 
Std. Dev. 0.0223 0.0114 0.0082 0.0088 0.0148 0.0098 
Skewness -0.918 0.847 -0.433 -0.029 -2.114 0.701 
Kurtosis 11.980 6.174 4.383 4.471 28.086 16.276 
Jarque-Bera 6294.107*** 969.689*** 202.835*** 167.672*** 43011.170*** 13352.160*** 
Note: The table provides summary statistics of carbon futures mispricing using 15 min data. Panel A shows the 
full year sample results, i.e. from February to November each year. Panel B displays the summary statistics of 
the sample periods before and after the submission deadline. 2009 02-04 indicates the sample period covering 
February 2009 to April 2009; and by analogy for the rest of the sample periods. ***, ** and * denote 
statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
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Table 5.2: Estimation results of ADF tests with dummy variables using 15 min data 
 α δ ρ1 ρ2 ρ1= ρ2  
Panel A:  Year 2009   
2009 02-07  0.0017*** 
(3.414) 
0.0021*** 
(3.338) 
-0.3019*** 
(-13.234) 
-0.1793*** 
(-5.150) 
11.919*** 
2009 02-08 0.0013*** 
(3.478) 
0.0024*** 
(4.598) 
-0.3023*** 
(-14.326) 
-0.1691*** 
(-5.572) 
17.967*** 
2009 02-10 0.0009*** 
(3.606) 
0.0028*** 
(6.433) 
-0.2977*** 
(-15.815) 
-0.1786*** 
(-7.818) 
23.403*** 
Panel B:  Year 2010   
2010 02-07 0.0013*** 
(6.720) 
-0.0004 
(-1.482) 
-0.1433*** 
(-8.324) 
-0.1511*** 
(-9.288) 
0.128 
2010 02-08 0.0010*** 
(6.946) 
-0.0001 
(0.531) 
-0.1411*** 
(-8.452) 
-0.1468*** 
(-10.323) 
0.079 
2010 02-10  0.0008*** 
(7.297) 
0.0001 
(0.604) 
-0.1411*** 
(-9.075) 
-0.1414*** 
(-11.851) 
0.000 
Panel C:  Year 2011   
2011 02-07 0.0008*** 
(3.419) 
0.0035*** 
(6.200) 
-0.1195*** 
(-8.539) 
-0.1106*** 
(-5.384) 
0.151 
2011 02-08  0.0009*** 
(4.838) 
0.0042*** 
(7.717) 
-0.1411*** 
(-10.558) 
-0.1324*** 
(-7.869) 
0.179 
2011 02-10 0.0008*** 
(5.226) 
0.0043*** 
(8.807) 
-0.1405*** 
(-11.230) 
-0.1260*** 
(-8.146) 
0.640 
Note: The table shows the estimation results of the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests with dummy variables 
using 15 min data. The ADF test with dummy variables is specified as: 
1 1 2 1
1
(1 )
k
t t t t t t i t i t
i
Z D Z D Z D Z       

          
where Dt is a dummy variable set to be 1 during the period before 30 April and 0 otherwise. 2009 02-07 
indicates the sample period covering February 2009 to July 2009; and by analogy for the rest of the sample 
periods. The results for 2009, 2010 and 2011 are shown in Panel A, Panel B and Panel C, respectively. α+ δ and 
α are the intercept terms during the period before 30 April and after 30 April, respectively. The coefficients ρ1 
and ρ2 are related to the first-order lagged mispricing during the period before and after 30 April, respectively. 
The values of the t-statistics for each parameter are presented in parentheses. ρ1= ρ2 is the Wald-test for equality. 
***, ** and * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.   
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Table 5.3: Estimation results of TAR model with dummies using 15 min data (Chan’s (1993) procedure) 
 α δ ρ1 ρ2 ρ3 ρ4 ρ1=ρ2   ρ3=ρ4 
Panel A:  Year 2009     
2009 02-07  0.0016*** 
(3.120) 
0.0023*** 
(3.561) 
-0.3631*** 
(-12.370) 
-0.2357*** 
(-4.882) 
-0.2696*** 
(-10.814) 
-0.1551*** 
(-3.805) 
6.245** 6.983*** 
2009 02-08 0.0012*** 
(3.105) 
0.0026*** 
(4.869) 
-0.3363*** 
(-12.835) 
-0.2127*** 
(-5.308) 
-0.2796*** 
(-11.787) 
-0.1400*** 
(-3.786) 
8.270*** 12.190*** 
2009 02-10 0.0009*** 
(3.628) 
0.0028*** 
(6.357) 
-0.3027*** 
(-13.682) 
-0.1720*** 
(-6.158) 
-0.2918*** 
(-12.322) 
-0.1877*** 
(-6.071) 
17.140*** 8.666*** 
Panel B:  Year 2010     
2010 02-07 0.0011*** 
(4.904) 
-0.0011*** 
(-3.270) 
-0.0617*** 
(-2.593) 
-0.1402*** 
(-7.186) 
-0.3385*** 
(-7.898) 
-0.1955*** 
(-4.085) 
7.149*** 5.080** 
2010 02-08 0.0005*** 
(3.039) 
-0.0005* 
(-1.672) 
-0.0616*** 
(-2.663) 
-0.1040*** 
(-6.090) 
-0.3386*** 
(-8.108) 
-0.3053*** 
(-7.967) 
2.360 0.357 
2010 02-10  0.0004*** 
(3.040) 
-0.0004 
(-1.283) 
-0.0598*** 
(-2.893) 
-0.0967*** 
(-7.019) 
-0.3408*** 
(-8.888) 
-0.3408*** 
(-9.523) 
2.393 0.519 
Panel C:  Year 2011     
2011 02-07 0.0009*** 
(3.637) 
0.0057*** 
(8.682) 
-0.1357*** 
(-9.845) 
-0.1721*** 
(-5.370) 
-0.2035*** 
(-10.752) 
-0.1122*** 
(-5.157) 
1.151 11.099*** 
2011 02-08  0.0009*** 
(4.632) 
0.0064*** 
(10.147) 
-0.1497*** 
(-11.215) 
-0.1804*** 
(-6.063) 
-0.2248*** 
(-12.284) 
-0.1264*** 
(-6.731) 
0.933 15.771*** 
2011 02-10 0.0012*** 
(7.977) 
0.0074*** 
(14.661) 
-0.2080*** 
(-16.867) 
-0.2028*** 
(-10.650) 
-0.5952*** 
(-22.167) 
-0.1872*** 
(-10.620) 
0.057 184.840*** 
Note: The table shows the estimation results of the threshold autoregressive (TAR) model with dummy variables using 15 min data. The model is specified as: 
1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1
1
(1 ) (1 ) (1 )(1 )
k
t t t t t t t t t t t t t t i t i t
i
Z D Z I D Z I D Z I D Z I D Z           

               
where Dt is a dummy variable set to be 1 during the period before 30 April and 0 otherwise. It is also a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if Zt-1 is greater than or equal to 
the threshold, and 0 otherwise. The thresholds are determined by using Chan’s (1993) procedure. 2009 02-07 indicates the sample period covering February 2009 to July 
2009; and by analogy for the rest of the sample periods. The results for 2009, 2010 and 2011 are shown in Panel A, Panel B and Panel C, respectively. α+δ and α are the 
intercept terms during the period before and after 30 April, respectively. The values of the t-statistics for each parameter are presented in parentheses. ρ1= ρ2 and ρ3= ρ4 are the 
Wald-tests for equality. ***, ** and * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.   
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Table 5.4: Estimation results of QLSTR model with dummy variables using 15 min data 
 α0 α1 β0 β1 γ c1 c2 α1,1= α1,2 β1,1= β1,2 γ1= γ2 c1,1=c1,2 c2,1=c2,2 
Panel A:  Year 2009         
2009 02-07 
i=1  
0.0036*** 
(4.769) 
-0.2514*** 
(-6.693) 
-0.0052*** 
(-4.520) 
-0.2096*** 
(-5.137) 
108246.900 
(0.258) 
-0.0014*** 
(-2.587) 
0.0668*** 
(91.915) 
7.938*** 3.753* 0.102 11.853*** 58.389*** 
2009 02-07 
i=2 
0.0008 
(1.430) 
-0.1009** 
(-2.374) 
0.0035 
(1.357) 
-0.3866*** 
(-4.711) 
17284.640 
(0.810) 
-0.0088*** 
(-4.567) 
0.0453*** 
(17.682) 
2009 02-08 
i=1 
0.0036*** 
(5.157) 
-0.2530*** 
(-7.242) 
-0.0053*** 
(-4.870) 
-0.2093*** 
(-5.503) 
108246.900 
(0.277) 
-0.0014*** 
(-2.780) 
0.0668*** 
(96.892) 
10.858*** 4.460** 0.117 14.394*** 69.530*** 
2009 02-08 
i=2 
0.0006 
(1.453) 
-0.0964*** 
(-2.650) 
0.0031 
(1.453) 
-0.3822*** 
(-5.248) 
17284.640 
(0.915) 
-0.0087*** 
(-5.108) 
0.0452*** 
(19.191) 
2009 02-10 
i=1 
0.0036*** 
(5.534) 
-0.2482*** 
(-7.816) 
-0.0052*** 
(-5.252) 
-0.2089*** 
(-5.983) 
108246.900 
(0.298) 
-0.0014*** 
(-2.992) 
0.0668*** 
(107.114) 
15.230*** 6.726*** 0.135 0.300 134.840*** 
2009 02-10 
i=2 
0.0001 
(0.393) 
-0.0856*** 
(-2.822) 
-0.0006 
(-0.621) 
-0.3754*** 
(-6.923) 
17284.51 
(0.917) 
-0.0042 
(-0.948) 
0.0453*** 
(27.943) 
Panel B:  Year 2010         
2010 02-07 
i=1  
-0.0014 
(-0.572) 
-0.0897 
(-0.713) 
0.0121 
(1.626) 
-0.4747* 
(-1.713) 
5421.904 
(1.300) 
-0.0219*** 
(-5.200) 
0.0156*** 
(2.586) 
0.527 1.543 0.002 7.345*** 0.008 
2010 02-07 
i=2 
0.0081 
(0.570) 
-0.4406 
(-0.944) 
-0.0070 
(-0.499) 
0.2177 
(0.450) 
9277.955 
(0.115) 
0.0142 
(1.125) 
0.0499 
(0.127) 
2010 02-08 
i=1 
-0.0014 
(-0.589) 
-0.0912 
(-0.745) 
0.0122* 
(1.697) 
-0.4814* 
(-1.788) 
5419.885 
(1.354) 
-0.0219*** 
(-5.420) 
0.0157*** 
(2.669) 
0.025 0.263 1.402 0.127 0.003 
2010 02-08 
i=2 
0.0198 
(0.084) 
0.4571 
(0.131) 
-0.0330 
(-0.093) 
-1.3828 
(-0.796) 
668.347** 
(2.544) 
0.0221 
(0.179) 
0.0221 
(0.179) 
2010 02-10 
i=1 
-0.0014 
(-0.626) 
-0.0910 
(-0.790) 
0.0121* 
(1.801) 
-0.4796* 
(-1.897) 
5418.831 
(1.436) 
-0.0219*** 
(-5.752) 
0.0157*** 
(2.837) 
0.008 0.005 0.884 0.011 0.000 
2010 02-10 
i=2 
0.2700 
(0.073) 
-4.8778 
(-0.098) 
-0.3143 
(-0.098) 
3.5576 
(0.062) 
4.0154 
(0.001) 
0.0411 
(0.069) 
10.8871 
(0.001) 
Panel C:  Year 2011         
2011 02-07 
i=1  
0.0018 
(1.117) 
-0.0437 
(-1.438) 
0.0100*** 
(3.982) 
-0.8005*** 
(-17.025) 
3263.053 
(1.447) 
0.0136*** 
(10.886) 
0.0917*** 
(10.886) 
2.470 10.993*** 0.087 2.648 19.691*** 
2011 02-07 
i=2 
-0.0095** 
(-2.317) 
0.1324 
(1.226) 
0.0115*** 
(2.805) 
-0.4060*** 
(-3.673) 
111991.900 
(0.305) 
0.0229*** 
(8.662) 
0.0539*** 
(29.435) 
2011 02-08 
i=1 
0.0018 
(1.192) 
-0.0449 
(-1.543) 
0.0106*** 
(4.205) 
-0.8393*** 
(-18.850) 
3260.655 
(1.507) 
0.0917*** 
(11.501) 
0.0131*** 
(2.634) 
5.487** 12.360*** 0.124 3.824* 21.827*** 
2011 02-08 
i=2 
-0.0126*** 
(-3.432) 
0.1943** 
(1.984) 
0.0145*** 
(3.937) 
-0.4592*** 
(-4.588) 
111991.900 
(0.382) 
0.0233*** 
(22.694) 
0.0539*** 
(33.575) 
2011 02-10 
i=1 
0.0019 
(1.368) 
-0.0481* 
(-1.778) 
0.0108*** 
(4.680) 
-0.8721*** 
(-21.245) 
3260.623* 
(1.678) 
0.0131*** 
(2.971) 
0.0918*** 
(12.684) 
6.368** 19.254*** 0.196 4.725** 26.721*** 
2011 02-10 
i=2 
-0.0124*** 
(-3.804) 
0.1836** 
(2.091) 
0.0140*** 
(4.301) 
-0.4463*** 
(-4.996) 
11991.900 
(0.447) 
0.0231*** 
(26.014) 
0.0539*** 
(38.232) 
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Note: The table shows the estimation results of the quadratic-logistic smooth transition (QLSTR) model with dummy variables using 15 min data. The model is specified as: 
   
1 1
0,1 1,1 1 0,1 1,1 1 1 1 1,1 1 2,1 0,2 1,2 1 0,2 1,2 1 2 1 1,2 1 2,2
1
( )(1 exp( ( )( ))) ( )(1 exp( ( )( ))) (1 )
k
t t t t t t t t t t t i t i t
i
Z Z Z Z c Z c D Z Z Z c Z c D Z           
 
        

                      
Dt is the dummy variable set to be 1 during the period before 30 April and 0 otherwise. 2009 02-07 indicates the sample period covering February 2009 to July 2009; and by 
analogy for the rest of the sample periods. The results for 2009, 2010 and 2011 are shown in Panel A, Panel B and Panel C, respectively.  α1,i and β1,i are the parameters used 
to determine the speed of mean-reversion; γi is the speed of regime transition; c1,i is the lower boundary and c2,i  is upper boundary of the inner regime. i=1 for the period 
before 30 April each year, and i=2 for the sample period after 30 April. The values of the t-statistics for each parameter are presented in parentheses. α1,1= α1,2, β1,1= β1,2, γ1= γ2,  
c1,1=c1,2 and c2,1=c2,2 are the Wald-tests for equality. ***, ** and * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.   
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Table 5.5: Estimation results of Granger causality tests using 15 min data 
 Optimal lags Null hypothesis F-statistics P-value 
Panel A:  Year 2009  
2009 02-04  8 Spot≠>Futures 
Futures≠>Spot 
23.845*** 
0.476 
0.000 
0.874 
2009 05-07 7 Spot≠>Futures 
Futures≠>Spot 
3.328*** 
21.854*** 
0.002 
0.000 
2009 05-08 8 Spot≠>Futures 
Futures≠>Spot 
5.540*** 
26.348*** 
0.000 
0.000 
2009 05-10 12 Spot≠>Futures 
Futures≠>Spot 
11.440*** 
30.561*** 
0.000 
0.000 
Panel B:  Year 2010  
2010 02-04 4 Spot≠>Futures 
Futures≠>Spot 
13.201*** 
5.717*** 
0.000 
0.000 
2010 05-07 4 Spot≠>Futures 
Futures≠>Spot 
14.799*** 
14.263*** 
0.000 
0.000 
2010 05-08  18 Spot≠>Futures 
Futures≠>Spot 
24.167*** 
4.290*** 
0.000 
0.000 
2010 05-10 29 Spot≠>Futures 
Futures≠>Spot 
32.190*** 
5.109*** 
0.000 
0.000 
Panel C:  Year 2011  
2011 02-04 2 Spot≠>Futures 
Futures≠>Spot 
9.731*** 
7.340*** 
0.000 
0.001 
2011 05-07  8 Spot≠>Futures 
Futures≠>Spot 
3.487*** 
32.638*** 
0.001 
0.000 
2011 05-08 8 Spot≠>Futures 
Futures≠>Spot 
2.881*** 
47.397*** 
0.003 
0.000 
2011 05-10 8 Spot≠>Futures 
Futures≠>Spot 
3.834*** 
57.652*** 
0.000 
0.000 
Note: The table shows the results of Granger causality tests using 15 min data. 2009 02-04 indicates the sample 
period covering February 2009 to April 2009; and by analogy for the rest of the sample periods. The results for 
2009, 2010 and 2011 are shown in Panel A, Panel B and Panel C, respectively.  The optimal lags are selected 
based on the Schwarz information criterion (SIC). The null hypothesis Spot≠>Futures indicates that spot returns 
do not Granger cause futures returns and Futures≠>Spot shows that futures returns do not Granger cause spot 
returns. ***, ** and * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.   
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Table 5.6: Estimation results of HAR model for volatility spillovers using 15 min data 
 
2009   2010  2011 
RVF RVS  RVF RVS  RVF RVS 
α1 
-0.0305*** 
(-5.877) 
0.0005** 
(2.342) 
 0.0005 
(0.592) 
-0.0002 
(-1.115) 
 0.0386*** 
(7.192) 
0.0010 
(1.251) 
β1,1 
-0.0710 
(-0.870) 
-0.0013 
(-0.372) 
 0.0647 
(0.398) 
0.0270 
(0.774) 
 -0.5961*** 
(-6.859) 
-0.0035 
(-0.275) 
β1,5 
-0.2795 
(-1.419) 
-0.0107 
(-1.234) 
 -0.1457 
(-0.246) 
0.1480 
(1.167) 
 0.3503 
(1.012) 
0.0001 
(0.002) 
β1,22 
-2.8771*** 
(-5.180) 
0.0326 
(1.341) 
 -1.6741 
(-1.028) 
0.0118 
(0.034) 
 2.7737*** 
(4.446) 
0.0602 
(0.661) 
c1,1 
7.5414*** 
(3.024) 
0.0124 
(0.113) 
 3.5519*** 
(2.964) 
-0.3860 
(-1.506) 
 91.7453*** 
(13.679) 
0.6070 
(0.620) 
c1,5 
5.9514 
(1.016) 
0.2123 
(0.828) 
 2.1715 
(0.562) 
0.9343 
(1.130) 
 -63.4115** 
(-2.500) 
-0.7180 
(-0.194) 
c1,22 
81.7784*** 
(6.006) 
-0.4255 
(-0.714) 
 1.5743 
(0.175) 
1.2957 
(0.672) 
 -316.8747*** 
(-6.384) 
-6.5017 
(-0.897) 
α2 
0.0010 
(1.011) 
0.0000 
(0.413) 
 0.0003* 
(1.862) 
0.0000 
(0.073) 
 0.0006 
(0.850) 
0.0002** 
(2.035) 
β2,1 
0.1333 
(0.684) 
0.0095 
(1.114) 
 -0.0087 
(-0.091) 
-0.0011 
(-0.056) 
 0.3995* 
(1.690) 
0.1456*** 
(4.218) 
β2,5 
-0.4089 
(-0.870) 
-0.0085 
(-0.411) 
 0.3245 
(1.539) 
0.0644 
(1.428) 
 0.0969 
(0.222) 
-0.1753*** 
(-2.748) 
β2,22 
0.5380 
(0.905) 
0.0471* 
(1.811) 
 -0.5567 
(-0.996) 
0.2065* 
(1.718) 
 0.1589 
(0.238) 
0.0104 
(0.106) 
c2,1 
-0.9468 
(-0.282) 
0.0921 
(0.627) 
 0.7303* 
(1.704) 
-0.0035 
(-0.038) 
 1.0174 
(1.610) 
0.3759*** 
(4.074) 
c2,5 
6.9261 
(1.127) 
0.4671* 
(1.736) 
 0.9574 
(0.999) 
0.2008 
(0.980) 
 -0.3868 
(-0.254) 
0.4049* 
(1.822) 
c2,22 
-3.976 
(-0.567) 
-0.1609 
(-0.524) 
 1.1522 
(0.701) 
-0.2853 
(-0.810) 
 -1.8174 
(-0.610) 
-0.2367 
(-0.544) 
LR 41.517*** 2.064  7.026* 1.377  269.044*** 17.155*** 
Note: The table shows the estimation results of the heterogeneous autoregressive (HAR) model with dummy 
variables for volatility spillovers using 15 min data. The model is specified as: 
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RVFt is the daily realised volatility for futures returns while RVSt is the daily realised volatility for spot returns 
at time t. ( 1| )
1
1 k
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RVF RVF
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RVS RVS
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  

  . The sample period runs from February 
to November each year (longest available), because of the limited observations available for each year. Dt is the 
dummy variable set to be 1 during the period before 30 April and 0 afterwards. The results for 2009, 2010 and 
2011 are shown in Panel A, Panel B and Panel C, respectively. The values of the t-statistics for each parameter 
are presented in parentheses. LR is the likelihood ratio test for the equality of volatility spillover parameters 
before and after 30 April each year. Specifically, it is the joint test of c1,1= c2,1, c1,5= c2,5, c1,22= c2,22 for futures 
realised volatility spillovers; and the joint test of β1,1= β2,1, β1,5= β2,5, β1,22= β2,22 for spot realised volatility 
spillovers. ***, ** and * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.   
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Appendix 5A: Hochradl and Rammerstorfer’s (2012) Methodology 
Based on the economic implications that the convenience yield represents the advantages 
of holding spot commodities over futures contracts, Heaney (2002) first models the 
convenience yield as the difference between a lookback put option on a spot asset and 
another lookback put option on a futures contract. The advantage of this methodology over 
the traditional approach based on the cost-of-carry model is that it releases the condition of 
no short-sale constraints and other restrictions. Therefore, even if the market is imperfect, 
investors can still use the option implied approach to estimate the convenience yield. 
Hochradl and Rammerstorfer (2012) further develop Heaney’s (2002) approach by using 
Asian options instead of European options. In this case, investors can sell the asset at the 
average price over a period, rather than using Heaney’s (2002) assumption that assets can 
only be sold at the maximum price. For this reason, Hochradl and Rammerstorfer’s (2012) 
methodology is adopted to estimate the convenience yield and calculate the mispricing in 
European carbon markets. 
In Hochradl and Rammerstorfer’s (2012) model, the convenience yield is calculated as the 
difference between an Asian style put option on a spot asset and an Asian style put option on 
a  futures contract
44
: 
, , ,
S F
t T t T t Ty y y                     (5A1) 
Take the Asian style put option on a spot asset as an example. Assume that the investor can 
sell the asset at its average price during the period of [t, T]. Therefore, the amount of money 
the investor can obtain is (geometrically): 
                                                          
44
 Please see Hochradl and Rammerstorfer (2012) for detailed explanation. 
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If the investor misses the chance to sell the asset, the payoff is then the value of a geometric 
average strike Asian style put option: 
max(0, )ST TM S                    (5A3) 
The present value of the option can then be modelled using the standard no-arbitrage 
principle, which can be shown as
45
: 
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where y1 and y2 is shown as (following the same definitions used by Levy (1997)): 
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Next, the same procedure is repeated for the futures contract, and the present value of the 
Asian style put option on futures can also be estimated. The difference between the two 
present values (PVt
S
-PVt
F
) is the option implied convenience yield (CYt):   
                                                          
45
 Please see Levy (1997) for details of the derivation. 
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Appendix 5B: Robustness checks using different time frequencies 
The results in Section 5.5 demonstrate that allowance submission has effects on changing 
the mean-reverting process of the spot and futures relationship and volatility spillovers 
between the spot and futures markets. However, these findings may have arisen because of 
the selection of intraday time frequencies. For this reason, the models in Section 5.5 are re-
estimated by using data at frequencies of h=10 and 30 minute intervals. The results are shown 
in Table 5B.1 to Table 5B.5 in this appendix.  
The results for the robustness checks are generally consistent with those obtained by using 
15 min data. The estimation results using 10 min data are shown in Part A while the results 
using 30 min data are displayed in Part B in each table. In Table 5B.1, the spot and futures 
prices are cointegrated in the periods before and after the submission deadline, for all three 
years and different time frequencies. In addition, the equilibrium level shifts for all three 
years due to the fact that the allowance submission and the speed of mean-reverting are 
different before and after the deadline for 2009 and 2011, for both 10 minute and 30 minute 
intervals. Table 5B.2 provides further evidence that the speed of adjustment also changes in 
the lower regime after the submission deadline in 2010 by using 10 min data. Turning to 
Table 5B.3, the results of the QLSTR model for 10 min data are consistent with previous 
findings that the speed of mean-reverting and no-arbitrage bands alters after the deadline in 
2009 and 2011, and show that the speed of regime transition also changes due to the 
submission of allowances in 2011. For the 30 min data results, it is found that the adjustment 
speed and no-arbitrage boundaries shift after the submission deadline in 2011, but the effect 
of allowance submission on the mean-reverting process is not very significant in 2009 and 
2010. Furthermore, there is evidence that the effect of allowance submission is not significant 
in the price discovery process from the results of the Granger causality tests in Table 5B.4, 
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for both 10 minute and 30 minute intervals. However, the values of the F-test statistics also 
show the switch in the leading market from the spot market to the futures market. Finally, the 
10 min and 30 min data results in Table 5B.5 provide additional evidence for the view that 
volatility spillovers from the spot market to the futures market shift from being significant 
before the submission deadline to insignificant after the deadline. To summarise, all the 
results are consistent with the findings in Section 5.4. 
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Table 5B.1: Estimation results of ADF tests with dummy variables  
Part A: 10 min data results 
 α δ ρ1 ρ2 ρ1= ρ2  
Panel A:  Year 2009   
2009 02-07  0.0014*** 
(3.392) 
0.0020*** 
(3.876) 
-0.2733*** 
(-15.136) 
-0.1493*** 
(-5.148) 
17.442*** 
2009 02-08 0.0011*** 
(3.470) 
0.0023*** 
(5.250) 
-0.2747*** 
(-16.443) 
-0.1411*** 
(-5.583) 
25.965*** 
2009 02-10 0.0007*** 
(3.577) 
0.0027*** 
(7.495) 
-0.2773*** 
(-18.629) 
-0.1464*** 
(-7.752) 
41.276*** 
Panel B:  Year 2010   
2010 02-07 0.0014*** 
(9.863) 
-0.0003* 
(-1.717) 
-0.1667*** 
(-11.651) 
-0.1793*** 
(-13.096) 
0.412 
2010 02-08 0.0011*** 
(10.006) 
-0.0001 
(-0.354) 
-0.1625*** 
(-11.667) 
-0.1699*** 
(-14.292) 
0.188 
2010 02-10  0.0008*** 
(10.320) 
0.0003* 
(1.776) 
-0.1637*** 
(-12.646) 
-0.1578*** 
(-16.125) 
0.153 
Panel C:  Year 2011   
2011 02-07 0.0010*** 
(5.415) 
0.0018*** 
(4.235) 
-0.0758*** 
(-7.208) 
-0.1218*** 
(-8.430) 
7.543*** 
2011 02-08  0.0009*** 
(6.282) 
0.0021*** 
(5.291) 
-0.0836*** 
(-8.280) 
-0.1250*** 
(-9.762) 
7.286*** 
2011 02-10 0.0008*** 
(7.756) 
0.0025*** 
(6.857) 
-0.0921*** 
(-9.872) 
-0.1303*** 
(-12.145) 
8.169*** 
Part B: 30 min data results 
 α δ ρ1 ρ2 ρ1= ρ2  
Panel A:  Year 2009 
2009 02-07  0.0020*** 
(2.773) 
0.0021** 
(2.309) 
-0.3267*** 
(-9.457) 
-0.2161*** 
(-4.130) 
4.502** 
2009 02-08 0.0015*** 
(2.789) 
0.0026*** 
(3.284) 
-0.3248*** 
(-10.180) 
-0.2014*** 
(-4.444) 
7.221*** 
2009 02-10 0.0010*** 
(2.739) 
0.0031*** 
(4.752) 
-0.3195*** 
(-11.250) 
-0.1996*** 
(-5.849) 
11.259*** 
Panel B:  Year 2010 
2010 02-07 0.0006** 
(2.521) 
0.0008* 
(1.907) 
-0.1286*** 
(-6.020) 
-0.1038*** 
(-5.810) 
0.886 
2010 02-08 0.0007*** 
(3.245) 
0.0007* 
(1.746) 
-0.1261*** 
(-5.986) 
-0.1181*** 
(-7.075) 
0.097 
2010 02-10  0.0005*** 
(3.089) 
0.0009*** 
(2.609) 
-0.1251*** 
(-6.402) 
-0.1121*** 
(-8.042) 
0.323 
Panel C:  Year 2011 
2011 02-07 0.0020*** 
(6.339) 
-0.0004 
(-0.573) 
-0.0412** 
(-2.295) 
-0.2529*** 
(-9.192) 
46.539*** 
2011 02-08  0.0020*** 
(7.298) 
-0.0003 
(-0.3713) 
-0.0453** 
(-2.501) 
-0.2703*** 
(-10.471) 
57.202*** 
2011 02-10 0.0018*** 
(8.592) 
0.0000 
(0.060) 
-0.0490*** 
(-2.799) 
-0.2801*** 
(-12.314) 
72.859*** 
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Note: The table shows the estimation results of the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests with dummy variables 
using alternative time frequencies. The results using 10 min data are shown in Part A and the results using 30 
min data are displayed in Part B. The ADF test with dummy variables is specified as: 
1 1 2 1
1
(1 )
k
t t t t t t i t i t
i
Z D Z D Z D Z       

          
where Dt is a dummy variable set to be 1 during the period before 30 April and 0 otherwise. 2009 02-07 
indicates the sample period covering February 2009 to July 2009; and by analogy for the rest of the sample 
periods. The results for 2009, 2010 and 2011 are shown in Panel A, Panel B and Panel C, respectively. α+ δ and 
α are the intercept terms during the period before and after 30 April, respectively. The coefficients ρ1 and ρ2 are 
related to the first-order lagged mispricing during the period before and after 30 April, respectively. The values 
of the t-statistics for each parameter are presented in parentheses. ρ1= ρ2 is the Wald-test for equality. ***, ** 
and * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.   
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Table 5B.2: Estimation results of TAR model with dummies (Chan’s (1993) procedure) 
Part A: 10 min data results 
 α δ ρ1 ρ2 ρ3 ρ4 ρ1=ρ2   ρ3=ρ4 
Panel A:  Year 2009     
2009 02-07  0.0013*** 
(3.107) 
0.0022*** 
(4.086) 
-0.3456*** 
(-14.797) 
-0.2213*** 
(-4.803) 
-0.2335*** 
(-11.760) 
-0.1289*** 
(-3.964) 
6.656*** 9.149*** 
2009 02-08 0.0010*** 
(3.160) 
0.0025*** 
(5.495) 
-0.3413*** 
(-15.880) 
-0.2124*** 
(-5.200) 
-0.2363*** 
(-12.781) 
-0.1199*** 
(-4.218) 
8.963*** 14.352*** 
2009 02-10 0.0007*** 
(3.502) 
0.0027*** 
(7.249) 
-0.2724*** 
(-15.662) 
-0.1654*** 
(-6.996) 
-0.2830*** 
(-14.867) 
-0.1241*** 
(-4.932) 
16.284*** 30.537*** 
Panel B:  Year 2010     
2010 02-07 0.0012*** 
(7.207) 
-0.0004 
(-1.608) 
-0.1383*** 
(-7.681) 
-0.1596*** 
(-10.224) 
-0.2590*** 
(-6.935) 
-0.2934*** 
(-6.519) 
0.873 0.356 
2010 02-08 0.0008*** 
(6.417) 
0.0000 
(0.195) 
-0.1393*** 
(-8.167) 
-0.1371*** 
(-10.440) 
-0.2579*** 
(-7.044) 
-0.3693*** 
(-10.264) 
0.011 4.901** 
2010 02-10  0.0006*** 
(6.464) 
0.0003* 
(1.721) 
-0.1412*** 
(-8.893) 
-0.1272*** 
(-12.010) 
-0.2607*** 
(-7.623) 
-0.3724*** 
(-12.218) 
0.578 6.193** 
Panel C:  Year 2011     
2011 02-07 0.0015*** 
(7.987) 
-0.0001 
(-0.185) 
-0.0420*** 
(-4.046) 
-0.1898*** 
(-11.904) 
-0.9333*** 
(-18.504) 
-0.1508*** 
(-4.817) 
62.777*** 189.330*** 
2011 02-08  0.0014*** 
(8.625) 
0.0002 
(0.468) 
-0.0451*** 
(-4.502) 
-0.1838*** 
(-13.138) 
-0.9815*** 
(-20.429) 
-0.1661*** 
(-6.019) 
67.632*** 233.691*** 
2011 02-10 0.0012*** 
(9.716) 
0.0006 
(1.356) 
-0.0480*** 
(-5.175) 
-0.1791*** 
(-15.344) 
-1.0288*** 
(-23.399) 
-0.1696*** 
(-7.195) 
80.234*** 317.079*** 
Part B: 30 min data results 
 α δ ρ1 ρ2 ρ3 ρ4 ρ1=ρ2   ρ3=ρ4 
Panel A:  Year 2009 
2009 02-07  0.0020*** 
(2.781) 
0.0023** 
(2.294) 
-0.3384*** 
(-8.177) 
-0.2007*** 
(-3.780) 
-0.3168*** 
(-6.535) 
-0.4288*** 
(-3.157) 
5.696** 0.653 
2009 02-08 0.0016*** 
(2.930) 
0.0027*** 
(3.104) 
-0.3387*** 
(-8.827) 
-0.1858*** 
(-4.041) 
-0.3167*** 
(-7.032) 
-0.4024*** 
(-3.695) 
8.852*** 0.588 
2009 02-10 0.0008** 
(2.099) 
0.0035*** 
(4.693) 
-0.3333*** 
(-9.678) 
-0.1594*** 
(-4.294) 
-0.3102*** 
(-7.596) 
-0.3508*** 
(-5.372) 
15.794*** 0.323 
Panel B:  Year 2010 
2010 02-07 0.0007** 
(1.972) 
0.0005 
(0.971) 
-0.1201*** 
(-4.756) 
-0.1109*** 
(-4.304) 
-0.1788** 
(-2.173) 
-0.0881** 
(-1.964) 
0.069 0.947 
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Table 5B.2 (Continued) 
 α δ ρ1 ρ2 ρ3 ρ4 ρ1=ρ2   ρ3=ρ4 
2010 02-08 0.0004* 
(1.801) 
0.0008** 
(1.999) 
-0.1206*** 
(-5.426) 
-0.0973*** 
(-4.987) 
-0.2157** 
(-2.136) 
-0.1945*** 
(-4.827) 
0.668 0.038 
2010 02-10  0.0003* 
(1.723) 
0.0009*** 
(2.709) 
-0.1196*** 
(-5.928) 
-0.0939*** 
(-5.928) 
-0.2140** 
(-2.274) 
-0.1876*** 
(-5.523) 
1.054 0.070 
Panel C:  Year 2011 
2011 02-07 0.0018*** 
(5.015) 
0.0002 
(0.262) 
-0.0509** 
(-2.414) 
-0.2664*** 
(-9.221) 
-0.1117 
(-1.490) 
-0.2134*** 
(-5.292) 
40.304*** 1.514 
2011 02-08  0.0017*** 
(5.787) 
0.0007 
(0.744) 
-0.0606*** 
(-2.797) 
-0.2940*** 
(-10.430) 
-0.1362** 
(-2.018) 
-0.2259*** 
(-6.495) 
47.236*** 1.476 
2011 02-10 0.0016*** 
(7.199) 
0.0010 
(1.113) 
-0.0654*** 
(-3.125) 
-0.3073*** 
(-11.776) 
-0.1453** 
(-2.226) 
-0.2452*** 
(-8.699) 
56.775*** 2.058 
Note: The table shows the estimation results of the threshold autoregressive (TAR) model with dummy variables using alternative time frequencies. The results using 10 min 
data are shown in Part A and the results using 30 min data are displayed in Part B. The model is specified as: 
1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1
1
(1 ) (1 ) (1 )(1 )
k
t t t t t t t t t t t t t t i t i t
i
Z D Z I D Z I D Z I D Z I D Z           

               
where Dt is a dummy variable set to be 1 during the period before 30 April and 0 otherwise. It is also a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if Zt-1 is greater than or equal to 
the threshold, and 0 otherwise. The thresholds are determined by using Chan’s (1993) procedure. 2009 02-07 indicates the sample period covering February 2009 to July 
2009; and by analogy for the rest of the sample periods. The results for 2009, 2010 and 2011 are shown in Panel A, Panel B and Panel C, respectively. α+δ and α are the 
intercept terms during the period before and after 30 April, respectively. The values of the t-statistics for each parameter are presented in parentheses. ρ1= ρ2 and ρ3= ρ4 are the 
Wald-tests for equality. ***, ** and * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.   
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Table 5B.3: Estimation results of QLSTR model with dummy variables  
Part A: 10 min data results 
 α0 α1 β0 β1 γ c1 c2 α1,1= α1,2 β1,1= β1,2 γ1= γ2 c1,1=c1,2 c2,1=c2,2 
Panel A:  Year 2009         
2009 02-07 
i=1  
0.0072** 
(2.475) 
0.4918*** 
(14.776) 
-0.0044 
(-1.490) 
0.3060*** 
(8.979) 
-2092.992 
(-1.070) 
-0.1123*** 
(-4.569) 
0.0629*** 
(23.335) 
0.005 3.713* 0.172 17.340*** 18.710*** 
2009 02-07 
i=2 
0.0116 
(1.008) 
0.4770** 
(2.405) 
-0.0222 
(-1.018) 
0.9001*** 
(2.935) 
-1213.055 
(-1.487) 
0.0040 
(0.302) 
0.0040 
(0.302) 
2009 02-08 
i=1 
0.0072*** 
(2.650) 
0.4894*** 
(15.820) 
-0.0043 
(-1.582) 
0.3063*** 
(9.651) 
-2092.989 
(-1.155) 
-0.1123*** 
(-4.912) 
0.0628*** 
(25.154) 
0.004 4.961** 0.205 21.842*** 27.758*** 
2009 02-08 
i=2 
0.0111 
(1.172) 
0.4784*** 
(2.875) 
-0.0216 
(-1.124) 
0.9241*** 
(3.351) 
-1213.078* 
(-1.726) 
0.0054 
(0.509) 
0.0054 
(0.509) 
2009 02-10 
i=1 
0.0069*** 
(2.804) 
0.4903*** 
(17.535) 
-0.0041 
(-1.631) 
0.3046*** 
(10.517) 
-2093.203 
(-1.270) 
-0.1122*** 
(-5.215) 
0.0629*** 
(27.781) 
0.000 5.907** 0.255 18.829*** 19.315*** 
2009 02-10 
i=2 
0.0103 
(0.878) 
0.4887** 
(2.517) 
-0.0201 
(-0.856) 
0.8388*** 
(3.846) 
-1212.358** 
(-2.105) 
-0.0003 
(-0.024) 
-0.0003 
(-0.024) 
Panel B:  Year 2010         
2010 02-07 
i=1  
0.0011*** 
(3.027) 
-0.1555*** 
(-5.427) 
-0.0034*** 
(-3.096) 
-0.3623*** 
(-5.488) 
13419.620 
(1.367) 
-0.0040* 
(-1.927) 
0.0405*** 
(17.472) 
0.531 2.302 0.562 2.476 0.020 
2010 02-07 
i=2 
0.0060 
(0.826) 
-0.3219 
(-1.419) 
-0.0057 
(-0.683) 
-0.0622 
(-0.333) 
4817.511 
(0.816) 
0.0091 
(1.136) 
0.0437** 
(1.989) 
2010 02-08 
i=1 
0.0011*** 
(3.087) 
-0.1552*** 
(-5.547) 
-0.0034*** 
(-3.158) 
-0.3627*** 
(-5.601) 
13345.360 
(1.406) 
-0.0040** 
(-1.966) 
0.0406*** 
(17.806) 
1.449 0.099 1.332 2.014 2.636 
2010 02-08 
i=2 
0.0097 
(1.227) 
-0.3526** 
(-2.181) 
-0.0132 
(-1.406) 
-0.3068* 
(-1.852) 
2295.332** 
(1.972) 
0.0059 
(0.885) 
0.0558*** 
(6.147) 
2010 02-10 
i=1 
0.0012*** 
(3.314) 
-0.1571*** 
(-5.990) 
-0.0034*** 
(-3.396) 
-0.3649*** 
(-6.024) 
13247.910 
(1.521) 
-0.0040** 
(-2.111) 
0.0405*** 
(19.213) 
2.621 0.245 1.446 4.487** 3.904** 
2010 02-10 
i=2 
0.0085* 
(1.661) 
-0.3547*** 
(-2.969) 
-0.0116* 
(-1.873) 
-0.2965** 
(-2.382) 
2699.710*** 
(2.634) 
0.0057 
(1.364) 
0.0554*** 
(7.685) 
Panel C:  Year 2011         
2011 02-07 
i=1  
0.0008* 
(1.843) 
-0.0225** 
(-2.047) 
0.0363*** 
(15.737) 
-0.5701*** 
(-17.997) 
16797.290** 
(2.100) 
0.0045*** 
(8.273) 
0.0720*** 
(36.136) 
27.328*** 0.000 4.277** 0.047 0.041 
2011 02-07 
i=2 
0.0067 
(1.572) 
-0.1919*** 
(-6.285) 
22.7182 
(-0.016) 
-236.638 
(-0.016) 
317.271** 
(2.123) 
-0.1325 
(-0.211) 
0.1990 
(0.316) 
2011 02-08 
i=1 
0.0009** 
(2.125) 
-0.0251** 
(-2.358) 
0.0382*** 
(17.311) 
-0.5968*** 
(-19.730) 
16797.740** 
(2.246) 
0.0044*** 
(8.909) 
0.0719*** 
(37.260) 
28.449*** 0.000 4.850** 0.047 0.137 
2011 02-08 
i=2 
0.0067* 
(1.801) 
-0.1859*** 
(-6.571) 
-22.6235 
(-0.016) 
-236.6952 
(-0.016) 
321.482** 
(2.379) 
-0.1327 
(-0.211) 
0.1953 
(0.310) 
2011 02-10 
i=1 
0.0009** 
(2.509) 
-0.0275*** 
(-2.783) 
0.0400*** 
(19.776) 
-0.6231*** 
(-22.464) 
16797.770** 
(2.500) 
0.0044*** 
(9.976) 
0.0719*** 
(39.828) 
29.022*** 0.000 6.010** 0.138 0.040 
2011 02-10 
i=2 
0.0067** 
(2.099) 
-0.1805*** 
(-6.761) 
-22.5152 
(-0.016) 
-236.716 
(-0.016) 
321.715*** 
(2.725) 
-0.1336 
(-0.221) 
0.1927 
(0.319) 
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Table 5B.3 (Continued) 
Part B: 30 min data results 
 α0 α1 β0 β1 γ c1 c2 α1,1= α1,2 β1,1= β1,2 γ1= γ2 c1,1=c1,2 c2,1=c2,2 
Panel A:  Year 2009 
2009 02-07 
i=1  
0.0037*** 
(5.350) 
-0.2557*** 
(-6.828) 
-0.0002 
(-0.052) 
-0.2518*** 
(-4.247) 
20438.380 
(0.024) 
-0.1210*** 
(-117.910) 
0.0552** 
(2.167) 
2.650 0.388 0.000 1.817 0.000 
2009 02-07 
i=2 
0.0012 
(1.449) 
-0.1513** 
(-2.504) 
0.0041 
(1.323) 
-0.3328*** 
(-2.862) 
36806.030 
(0.424) 
-0.0073*** 
(-4.361) 
0.0442*** 
(10.803) 
2009 02-08 
i=1 
0.0037*** 
(5.740) 
-0.2548*** 
(-7.341) 
-0.0003 
(-0.061) 
-0.2519*** 
(-4.557) 
20438.500 
(0.025) 
-0.1210*** 
(-121.512) 
0.0552** 
(2.304) 
4.276** 0.392 0.000 1.773 0.000 
2009 02-08 
i=2 
0.0008 
(1.260) 
-0.1368*** 
(-2.601) 
0.0031 
(1.336) 
-0.3252*** 
(-3.132) 
36805.950 
(0.437) 
-0.0062*** 
(-3.797) 
0.0442*** 
(12.360) 
2009 02-10 
i=1 
0.0036*** 
(6.167) 
-0.2484*** 
(-7.947) 
-0.0004 
(-0.101) 
-0.2491*** 
(-4.901) 
20438.540 
(0.028) 
-0.1210*** 
(-125.369) 
0.0553** 
(2.299) 
6.097** 0.011 0.000 1.838 0.000 
2009 02-10 
i=2 
0.0004 
(0.840) 
-0.1335*** 
(-3.244) 
0.0015 
(1.021) 
-0.2587*** 
(-3.419) 
36805.870 
(0.501) 
-0.0072*** 
(-4.888) 
0.0436*** 
(12.457) 
Panel B:  Year 2010  
2010 02-07 
i=1  
0.0012*** 
(3.658) 
-0.1138*** 
(-4.359) 
0.0121 
(0.412) 
-0.3715 
(-0.546) 
9454.080 
(0.731) 
-0.0254*** 
(-3.240) 
0.0357* 
(1.719) 
0.264 0.178 0.000 0.000 0.192 
2010 02-07 
i=2 
0.0006** 
(2.433) 
-0.0969*** 
(-4.442) 
0.0214*** 
(2.828) 
-0.6735*** 
(-3.019) 
1084.086 
(0.000) 
-1.7938 
(-0.000) 
0.0266*** 
(19.071) 
2010 02-08 
i=1 
0.0012** 
(2.456) 
-0.1136*** 
(-3.355) 
0.0094 
(0.430) 
-0.3031 
(-0.607) 
6179.036 
(0.806) 
-0.0251** 
(-2.199) 
0.0352 
(1.488) 
0.000 0.000 0.047 0.000 0.000 
2010 02-08 
i=2 
-0.0874 
(-0.000) 
14.0708 
(0.001) 
0.1754 
(0.000) 
-28.2265 
(-0.001) 
20.043 
(0.001) 
0.0052 
(0.000) 
0.0052 
(0.000) 
2010 02-10 
i=1 
0.0012*** 
(2.604) 
-0.1121*** 
(-3.565) 
0.0093 
(0.449) 
-0.3003 
(-0.636) 
6179.748 
(0.856) 
-0.0251** 
(-2.304) 
0.0352 
(1.581) 
0.000 0.000 0.042 0.000 0.000 
2010 02-10 
i=2 
-0.0875 
(-0.000) 
14.0573 
(0.001) 
0.1753 
(0.000) 
-28.2141 
(-0.001) 
18.813 
(0.001) 
0.0061 
(0.000) 
0.0061 
(0.000) 
Panel C:  Year 2011  
2011 02-07 
i=1  
0.0024 
(1.302) 
-0.0553* 
(-1.730) 
0.0288** 
(2.050) 
-3.1193* 
(-1.699) 
2817.490 
(1.027) 
0.0032 
(0.364) 
0.0998*** 
(4.794) 
23.370*** 0.096 0.572 45.187*** 6.402** 
2011 02-07 
i=2 
0.0021*** 
(6.534) 
-0.2689*** 
(-8.433) 
0.1949*** 
(7.176) 
-3.7063*** 
(-7.522) 
7222.873 
(1.402) 
-0.0758*** 
(-44.265) 
0.0471*** 
(41.935) 
2011 02-08 
i=1 
0.0024 
(1.319) 
-0.0564* 
(-1.744) 
0.0291** 
(2.213) 
-3.135* 
(-1.833) 
2869.210 
(1.041) 
0.0034 
(0.412) 
0.0995*** 
(4.933) 
31.324*** 0.061 0.024 48.187*** 6.403** 
2011 02-08 
i=2 
0.0022*** 
(7.792) 
-0.3027*** 
(-9.673) 
0.1888*** 
(5.621) 
-3.5820** 
(-6.043) 
3357.697** 
(2.089) 
-0.0785*** 
(-30.505) 
0.0481*** 
(20.535) 
2011 02-10 
i=1 
0.0025 
(1.408) 
-0.0593* 
(-1.870) 
0.0304** 
(2.253) 
-3.2779* 
(-1.861) 
2810.234 
(1.120) 
0.0032 
(0.408) 
0.0997*** 
(5.274) 
38.087*** 0.038 0.021 49.774*** 7.438*** 
2011 02-10 
i=2 
0.0021*** 
(9.872) 
-0.3297*** 
(-12.688) 
0.1928*** 
(5.871) 
-3.6364*** 
(-6.281) 
3222.853** 
(2.429) 
-0.0787*** 
(-33.400) 
0.0478*** 
(22.052) 
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Note: The table shows the estimation results of the quadratic-logistic smooth transition (QLSTR) model with dummy variables using alternative time frequencies. The results 
using 10 min data are shown in Part A and the results using 30 min data are displayed in Part B. The model is specified as: 
   
1 1
0,1 1,1 1 0,1 1,1 1 1 1 1,1 1 2,1 0,2 1,2 1 0,2 1,2 1 2 1 1,2 1 2,2
1
( )(1 exp( ( )( ))) ( )(1 exp( ( )( ))) (1 )
k
t t t t t t t t t t t i t i t
i
Z Z Z Z c Z c D Z Z Z c Z c D Z           
 
        

                    
 
Dt is the dummy variable set to be 1 during the period before 30 April and 0 otherwise. 2009 02-07 indicates the sample period covering February 2009 to July 2009; and by 
analogy for the rest of the sample periods. The results for 2009, 2010 and 2011 are shown in Panel A, Panel B and Panel C, respectively. α1,i and β1,i are the parameters for 
determining the speed of mean-reversion; γi is the speed of regime transition; c1,i is the lower boundary and c2,i  is the upper boundary of the inner regime. i=1 for the period 
before 30 April each year, and i=2 for the sample period after 30 April. The values of the t-statistics for each parameter are presented in parentheses. α1,1 =α1,2, β1,1= β1,2, γ1= γ2,  
c1,1=c1,2 and c2,1=c2,2 are the Wald-tests for equality. ***, ** and * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.   
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Table 5B.4: Estimation results of Granger causality tests  
Part A: 10 min data results 
 Optimal lags Null hypothesis F-value P-value 
Panel A:  Year 2009  
2009 02-04  7 Spot≠>Futures 
Futures≠>Spot 
28.584*** 
2.440** 
0.000 
0.017 
2009 05-07 8 Spot≠>Futures 
Futures≠>Spot 
4.674*** 
20.325*** 
0.000 
0.000 
2009 05-08 8 Spot≠>Futures 
Futures≠>Spot 
6.279*** 
27.071*** 
0.000 
0.000 
2009 05-10 14 Spot≠>Futures 
Futures≠>Spot 
11.295*** 
28.180*** 
0.000 
0.000 
Panel B:  Year 2010  
2010 02-04 3 Spot≠>Futures 
Futures≠>Spot 
1.488 
7.561*** 
0.216 
0.000 
2010 05-07 2 Spot≠>Futures 
Futures≠>Spot 
6.352*** 
9.957*** 
0.002 
0.000 
2010 05-08  3 Spot≠>Futures 
Futures≠>Spot 
3.247** 
6.917*** 
0.021 
0.000 
2010 05-10 23 Spot≠>Futures 
Futures≠>Spot 
18.449*** 
9.141*** 
0.000 
0.000 
Panel C:  Year 2011  
2011 02-04 5 Spot≠>Futures 
Futures≠>Spot 
2.728** 
6.620*** 
0.018 
0.000 
2011 05-07  11 Spot≠>Futures 
Futures≠>Spot 
4.631*** 
21.363*** 
0.000 
0.000 
2011 05-08 11 Spot≠>Futures 
Futures≠>Spot 
3.943*** 
31.381*** 
0.000 
0.000 
2011 05-10 11 Spot≠>Futures 
Futures≠>Spot 
4.994*** 
41.074*** 
0.000 
0.000 
Part B: 30 min data results 
 Lags Null hypothesis F-value P-value 
Panel A:  Year 2009  
2009 02-04  2 Spot≠>Futures 
Futures≠>Spot 
99.903*** 
2.312* 
0.000 
0.100 
2009 05-07 3 Spot≠>Futures 
Futures≠>Spot 
8.226*** 
39.590*** 
0.000 
0.000 
2009 05-08 6 Spot≠>Futures 
Futures≠>Spot 
6.600*** 
33.031*** 
0.000 
0.000 
2009 05-10 7 Spot≠>Futures 
Futures≠>Spot 
15.499*** 
40.875*** 
0.000 
0.000 
Panel B:  Year 2010  
2010 02-04 5 Spot≠>Futures 
Futures≠>Spot 
3.977*** 
10.321*** 
0.001 
0.000 
2010 05-07 4 Spot≠>Futures 
Futures≠>Spot 
1.726 
16.112*** 
0.142 
0.000 
2010 05-08  4 Spot≠>Futures 
Futures≠>Spot 
1.160 
21.488*** 
0.169 
0.000 
2010 05-10 5 Spot≠>Futures 
Futures≠>Spot 
4.100*** 
26.187*** 
0.001 
0.000 
Panel C:  Year 2011  
2011 02-04 4 Spot≠>Futures 
Futures≠>Spot 
5.830*** 
14.331*** 
0.000 
0.000 
2011 05-07  4 Spot≠>Futures 
Futures≠>Spot 
7.945*** 
51.726*** 
0.000 
0.000 
2011 05-08 4 Spot≠>Futures 
Futures≠>Spot 
4.216*** 
91.957*** 
0.002 
0.000 
2011 05-10 5 Spot≠>Futures 
Futures≠>Spot 
5.389*** 
100.300*** 
0.000 
0.000 
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Note: The table shows the results of the Granger causality tests using alternative time frequencies. The results 
using 10 min data are shown in Part A and the results using 30 min data are displayed in Part B.  2009 02-04 
indicates the sample period covering February 2009 to April 2009; and by analogy for the rest of the sample 
periods. The results for 2009, 2010 and 2011 are shown in Panel A, Panel B and Panel C, respectively. The 
optimal lags are selected based on the Schwarz information criterion (SIC). The null hypothesis Spot≠>Futures 
indicates that spot returns do not Granger cause futures returns and Futures≠>Spot shows that futures returns do 
not Granger cause spot returns. ***, ** and * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.   
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Table 5B.5: Estimation results of HAR model for volatility spillovers 
Part A: 10 min data results 
 
2009   2010  2011 
RVF RVS  RVF RVS  RVF RVS 
α1 
-0.0645*** 
(-6.952) 
0.0012*** 
(2.939) 
 0.0004 
(0.496) 
-0.0000 
(-0.136) 
 -0.0005 
(-0.122) 
0.0005 
(0.8110) 
β1,1 
-0.3503*** 
(-4.569) 
-0.0033 
(-0.961) 
 -0.1345 
(-0.885) 
0.0282 
(0.996) 
 0.0231 
(0.248) 
-0.0020 
(-0.126) 
β1,5 
-0.8325*** 
(-4.352) 
0.0082 
(0.949) 
 -0.2769 
(-0.503) 
0.0064 
(0.062) 
 0.2113 
(0.638) 
0.0201 
(0.359) 
β1,22 
-1.9422*** 
(-3.815) 
0.0498** 
(2.168) 
 0.2687 
(0.147) 
0.1658 
(0.487) 
 -2.0990 
(-1.244) 
0.0029 
(0.010) 
c1,1 
-0.2261 
(-0.102) 
-0.0441 
(-0.442) 
 7.1448*** 
(4.152) 
0.0605 
(0.189) 
 1.5533 
(0.370) 
0.4683 
(0.660) 
c1,5 
32.0216*** 
(6.646) 
0.4188* 
(1.927) 
 0.4607 
(0.078) 
0.6278 
(0.569) 
 -5.0643 
(-0.666) 
-0.4883 
(-0.380) 
c1,22 
111.4225*** 
(5.222) 
-1.9719** 
(-2.049) 
 -2.6138 
(-0.281) 
-0.5955 
(-0.344) 
 51.920 
(1.329) 
-2.1173 
(-0.321) 
α2 
0.0009 
(0.768) 
0.0000 
(0.394) 
 0.0003* 
(1.928) 
0.0000 
(0.665) 
 0.0014* 
(1.663) 
0.0002* 
(1.716) 
β2,1 
0.1873 
(0.904) 
0.0125 
(1.334) 
 -0.2028** 
(-2.082) 
-0.0276 
(-1.521) 
 0.2006* 
(1.714) 
0.0785*** 
(3.970) 
β2,5 
-0.2756 
(-0.574) 
-0.0006 
(-0.029) 
 0.6444*** 
(3.213) 
0.0282 
(0.756) 
 0.3041 
(1.416) 
-0.0842** 
(-2.320) 
β2,22 
0.6607 
(1.104) 
0.0155 
(0.574) 
 -0.4362 
(-1.037) 
0.1696** 
(2.160) 
 0.0929 
(0.282) 
0.0035 
(0.063) 
c2,1 
0.7103 
(0.204) 
0.0093 
(0.059) 
 1.5248*** 
(2.979) 
0.0956 
(1.001) 
 1.7271*** 
(3.335) 
0.4618*** 
(5.274) 
c2,5 
2.6251 
(0.367) 
0.5191 
(1.608) 
 0.9183 
(0.8572) 
0.4429** 
(2.222) 
 -1.1159 
(-0.855) 
0.2626 
(1.190) 
c2,22 
-2.8213 
(-0.320) 
0.0088 
(0.022) 
 0.2984 
(0.199) 
-0.4853* 
(-1.736) 
 -3.3161 
(-1.149) 
-0.1865 
(-0.382) 
LR 60.460*** 3.619  12.755*** 3.336  2.112 10.212** 
   Part B: 30 min data results   
 
2009   2010  2012 
RVF RVS  RVF RVS  RVF RVS 
α1 
-0.0297*** 
(-8.057) 
0.0004 
(1.539) 
 0.0000 
(0.017) 
0.0001 
(1.434) 
 0.0034*** 
(2.915) 
0.0011 
(1.197) 
β1,1 
-0.2716*** 
(-3.415) 
-0.0002 
(-0.042) 
 -0.0183 
(-0.076) 
-0.0274 
(-1.009) 
 -0.3903 
(-1.547) 
0.0084 
(0.041) 
β1,5 
-0.4551* 
(-1.845) 
-0.0359 
(-2.198) 
 0.5744 
(0.848) 
-0.0024 
(-0.031) 
 -0.2856 
(-0.230) 
0.1406 
(0.139) 
β1,22 
-1.4137*** 
(-4.708) 
0.0646*** 
(3.255) 
 1.5442 
(0.895) 
0.4545** 
(2.348) 
 7.4379* 
(1.955) 
2.0186 
(0.651) 
c1,1 
6.2285*** 
(3.147) 
-0.1448 
(-1.107) 
 -1.0169 
(-0.506) 
0.1176 
(0.521) 
 4.0789*** 
(4.531) 
0.4746 
(0.647) 
c1,5 
14.5439*** 
(3.854) 
0.7639*** 
(3.061) 
 0.6278 
(0.122) 
-1.1147* 
(-1.930) 
 -0.2637 
(-0.055) 
-1.0509 
(-0.270) 
c1,22 
42.6040*** 
(7.924) 
-0.5969* 
(-1.679) 
 -3.0230 
(-0.552) 
-0.8315 
(-1.353) 
 -39.3354** 
(-2.355) 
-10.7468 
(-0.789) 
α2 
0.0008 
(1.140) 
0.0000 
(0.240) 
 0.0001 
(0.879) 
0.0000 
(1.595) 
 0.0004** 
(2.562) 
0.0002* 
(1.960) 
β2,1 
0.1384 
(0.723) 
0.0256** 
(2.020) 
 -0.0202 
(-0.218) 
-0.0039 
(-0.376) 
 0.9816*** 
(10.591) 
0.3434*** 
(4.546) 
β2,5 
-0.2613 
(-0.556) 
-0.0273 
(-0.877) 
 0.2192 
(1.074) 
0.0561** 
(2.449) 
 -0.3826** 
(-2.442) 
-0.3629*** 
(-2.841) 
β2,22 
0.2673 
(0.318) 
0.0730 
(1.315) 
 -0.0116 
(-0.032) 
0.0037 
(0.093) 
 0.2325 
(1.050) 
0.0783 
(0.434) 
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Table 5B.5 (Continued) 
 
2009   2010  2012 
RVF RVS  RVF RVS  RVF RVS 
c2,1 
0.4264 
(0.2177) 
0.0099 
(0.077) 
 1.8959** 
(2.286) 
0.2073** 
(2.229) 
 -0.1995 
(-1.423) 
0.1342 
(1.175) 
c2,5 
3.4966 
(0.858) 
0.5538** 
(2.055) 
 -2.0380 
(-1.423) 
0.2778* 
(1.729) 
 0.5254 
(1.547) 
0.6265*** 
(2.262) 
c2,22 
-2.4646 
(-0.516) 
-0.0372 
(-0.118) 
 2.4034 
(1.220) 
-0.0257 
(-0.116) 
 -1.1109 
(-1.630) 
-0.3906 
(-0.703) 
LR 59.794*** 4.877  3.590 5.557  24.134*** 2.621 
Note: The table shows the estimation results of the heterogeneous autoregressive (HAR) model with dummy 
variables for volatility spillovers using alternative time frequencies. The results using 10 min data are shown in 
Part A and the results using 30 min data are displayed in Part B.  The model is specified as: 
1 1,1 1 1,5 ( 1| 5) 1,22 ( 1| 22) 1,1 1 1,5 ( 1| 5) 1,22 ( 1| 22)
2 2,1 1 2,5 ( 1| 5) 2,22 ( 1| 22) 2,1 1 2,5 ( 1| 5) 2,22 ( 1|
( + )
( +
t t t t t t t t t t t t
t t t t t t t t t t
RVF RVF RVF RVF c RVS c RVS c RVS D
RVF RVF RVF c RVS c RVS c RVS
   
   
         
         
     
      22) )(1 )t tD  
 
1 1,1 1 1,5 ( 1| 5) 1,22 ( 1| 22) 1,1 1 1,5 ( 1| 5) 1,22 ( 1| 22)
2 2,1 1 2,5 ( 1| 5) 2,22 ( 1| 22) 2,1 1 2,5 ( 1| 5) 2,22 ( 1|
( + )
( +
t t t t t t t t t t t t
t t t t t t t t t t
RVS RVF RVF RVF c RVS c RVS c RVS D
RVF RVF RVF c RVS c RVS c RVS
   
   
         
         
     
      22) )(1 )t tD  
 
RVFt is the daily realised volatility for futures returns while RVSt is the daily realised volatility for spot returns 
at time t. ( 1| )
1
1 k
t t k t j
j
RVF RVF
k
  

  ; ( 1| )
1
1 k
t t k t j
j
RVS RVS
k
  

  . The sample period runs from February 
to November each year (longest available), because of the limited observations available each year. Dt is the 
dummy variable set to be 1 during the period before 30 April and 0 afterwards. The results for 2009, 2010 and 
2011 are shown in Panel A, Panel B and Panel C, respectively. The values of the t-statistics for each parameter 
are presented in parentheses. LR is the likelihood ratio test for the equality of the volatility spillover parameters 
before and after 30 April each year. Specifically, it is the joint test of c1,1= c2,1, c1,5= c2,5, c1,22= c2,22 for futures 
realised volatility spillovers; and the joint test of β1,1= β2,1, β1,5= β2,5, β1,22= β2,22 for spot realised volatility 
spillovers. ***, ** and * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.   
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Appendix 5C: Estimation results of the TAR model using moving average 
thresholds 
In Section 5.1, Table 5.3 presents the estimation results of the TAR model by using 
Chan’s (1993) approach to determine the threshold values. Chan’s (1993) procedure can only 
provide a single threshold value for the whole sample period; however, it may be more 
appropriate to allow the threshold to be time-varying in some cases. Therefore, this chapter 
uses an alternative method to decide the threshold values, i.e. a simple 10-day moving 
average of the futures mispricing Zt. The results of the TAR model using moving average 
thresholds for h=10, 15 and 30 minute intervals are displayed in Table 5C.1 to Table 5C. The 
results are qualitatively similar to those generated by using Chan’s (1993) procedure. By 
using 10 min data, it is shown that the speed of adjustment shifts after the submission 
deadline for both the upper and lower regimes in 2009 and 2011, but not in 2010. The results 
for the 15 min data demonstrate similar findings as those for the 10 min data, but the shift of 
adjustment speed in 2011 only occurs in the upper regime. In the case of the results obtained 
by using 30 min data, the mean-revering speed is different before and after the submission 
deadline only in the lower regime for 2009 and 2011. Overall, the results produced by using 
the TAR model using moving average thresholds support the argument that allowance 
submission can affect the mean-reverting speed of the spot and futures relationship.
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Table 5C.1: Estimation results of TAR model with dummies using 10 min data (moving average thresholds) 
 α δ ρ1 ρ2 ρ3 ρ4 ρ1=ρ2   ρ3=ρ4 
Panel A:  Year 2009     
2009 02-07  0.0014*** 
(3.423) 
0.0022*** 
(4.086) 
-0.2892*** 
(-13.358) 
-0.1416*** 
(-4.588) 
-0.2529*** 
(-10.819) 
-0.1833*** 
(-3.684) 
19.595*** 1.743 
2009 02-08 0.0011*** 
(3.440) 
0.0026*** 
(5.464) 
-0.2905*** 
(-14.482) 
-0.1323*** 
(-4.828) 
-0.2542*** 
(-11.712) 
-0.1742*** 
(-3.992) 
27.746*** 2.932* 
2009 02-10 0.0007*** 
(3.459) 
0.0029*** 
(7.500) 
-0.2936*** 
(-16.326) 
-0.1481*** 
(-6.600) 
-0.2567*** 
(-13.105) 
-0.1451*** 
(-4.656) 
32.976*** 10.163*** 
Panel B:  Year 2010     
2010 02-07 0.0015*** 
(9.960) 
-0.0004* 
(-1.820) 
-0.1649*** 
(-10.512) 
-0.1739*** 
(-12.433) 
-0.1723*** 
(-7.360) 
-0.2204*** 
(-8.513) 
0.207 1.997 
2010 02-08 0.0011*** 
(9.779) 
-0.0000 
(-0.2323) 
-0.1610*** 
(-10.528) 
-0.1581*** 
(-12.650) 
-0.1687*** 
(-7.370) 
-0.2265*** 
(-10.295) 
0.024 3.482* 
2010 02-10  0.0080*** 
(9.693) 
0.0003** 
(2.013) 
-0.1620*** 
(-11.397) 
-0.1445*** 
(-13.775) 
-0.1698*** 
(-7.944) 
-0.2098*** 
(-11.228) 
1.038 2.076 
Panel C:  Year 2011     
2011 02-07 0.0011*** 
(5.540) 
0.0023*** 
(4.921) 
-0.0805*** 
(-7.426) 
-0.1422*** 
(-8.529) 
-0.1232*** 
(-8.167) 
-0.1046*** 
(-4.311) 
10.893*** 0.455 
2011 02-08  0.0010*** 
(6.446) 
0.0028*** 
(6.295) 
-0.0897*** 
(-8.648) 
-0.1398*** 
(-9.567) 
-0.1346*** 
(-9.307) 
-0.1084*** 
(-5.179) 
8.825*** 1.136 
2011 02-10 0.0009*** 
(7.942) 
0.0033*** 
(8.213) 
-0.0992*** 
(-10.424) 
-0.1424*** 
(-11.736) 
-0.1464*** 
(-11.017) 
-0.1098*** 
(-6.319) 
8.827*** 2.968* 
Note: The table shows the estimation results of the threshold autoregressive (TAR) model with dummy variables using 10 min data. The model is specified as: 
1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1
1
(1 ) (1 ) (1 )(1 )
k
t t t t t t t t t t t t t t i t i t
i
Z D Z I D Z I D Z I D Z I D Z           

               
where Dt is a dummy variable set to be 1 during the period before 30 April and 0 otherwise. It is also a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if Zt-1 is greater than or equal to 
the threshold, and 0 otherwise. The thresholds are determined by using a 10-day moving average. 2009 02-07 indicates the sample period covering February 2009 to July 
2009; and by analogy for the rest of the sample periods. The results for 2009, 2010 and 2011 are shown in Panel A, Panel B and Panel C, respectively. α+δ and α are the 
intercept terms during the period before and after 30 April, respectively. The values of the t-statistics for each parameter are presented in parentheses. ρ1= ρ2 and ρ3= ρ4 are the 
Wald-tests for equality. ***, ** and * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.   
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Table 5C.2: Estimation results of TAR model with dummies using 15 min data (moving average thresholds) 
 α δ ρ1 ρ2 ρ3 ρ4 ρ1=ρ2   ρ3=ρ4 
Panel A:  Year 2009     
2009 02-07  0.0017*** 
(3.450) 
0.0023*** 
(3.504) 
-0.3191*** 
(-11.559) 
-0.1783*** 
(-4.872) 
-0.2818*** 
(-9.750) 
-0.1929*** 
(-3.086) 
12.679*** 1.791 
2009 02-08 0.0013*** 
(3.497) 
0.0027*** 
(4.743) 
-0.3194*** 
(-12.490) 
-0.1671*** 
(-5.134) 
-0.2820*** 
(-10.504) 
-0.1842*** 
(-3.374) 
18.209*** 2.782* 
2009 02-10 0.0008*** 
(3.316) 
0.0031*** 
(6.475) 
-0.3140*** 
(-13.682) 
-0.1728*** 
(-6.409) 
-0.2776*** 
(-11.417) 
-0.1950*** 
(-5.105) 
21.478*** 3.666* 
Panel B:  Year 2010     
2010 02-07 0.0012*** 
(6.557) 
-0.0005* 
(-1.950) 
-0.1139*** 
(-5.748) 
-0.1376*** 
(-8.121) 
-0.2113*** 
(-7.391) 
-0.2190*** 
(-7.113) 
0.958 0.035 
2010 02-08 0.0009*** 
(6.1324) 
-0.0002 
(-0.808) 
-0.1120*** 
(-5.825) 
-0.1217*** 
(-7.949) 
-0.2098*** 
(-7.535) 
-0.2394*** 
(-9.144) 
0.180 0.625 
2010 02-10  0.0006*** 
(5.928) 
0.0001 
(0.446) 
-0.1120*** 
(-6.253) 
-0.1152*** 
(-8.767) 
-0.2099*** 
(-8.047) 
-0.2288*** 
(-10.157) 
0.023 0.317 
Panel C:  Year 2011     
2011 02-07 0.0012*** 
(4.257) 
0.0046*** 
(7.472) 
-0.1314*** 
(-9.376) 
-0.1463*** 
(-6.583) 
-0.2135*** 
(-11.116) 
-0.1163*** 
(-3.404) 
0.356 6.546** 
2011 02-08  0.0011*** 
(5.211) 
0.0053*** 
(9.175) 
-0.1468*** 
(-10.854) 
-0.1531*** 
(-7.938) 
-0.2367*** 
(-12.785) 
-0.1220*** 
(-4.133) 
0.079 11.550*** 
2011 02-10 0.0010*** 
(6.580) 
0.0060*** 
(11.534) 
-0.1609*** 
(-12.919) 
-0.1601*** 
(-10.022) 
-0.2577*** 
(-15.148) 
-0.1268*** 
(-5.211) 
0.002 20.668 
Note: The table shows the estimation results of the threshold autoregressive (TAR) model with dummy variables using 15 min data. The model is specified as: 
1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1
1
(1 ) (1 ) (1 )(1 )
k
t t t t t t t t t t t t t t i t i t
i
Z D Z I D Z I D Z I D Z I D Z           

               
where Dt is a dummy variable set to be 1 during the period before 30 April and 0 otherwise. It is also a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if Zt-1 is greater than or equal to 
the threshold, and 0 otherwise. The thresholds are determined by using a 10-day moving average. 2009 02-07 indicates the sample period covering February 2009 to July 
2009; and by analogy for the rest of the sample periods. The results for 2009, 2010 and 2011 are shown in Panel A, Panel B and Panel C, respectively. α+δ and α are the 
intercept terms during the period before and after 30 April, respectively. The values of the t-statistics for each parameter are presented in parentheses. ρ1= ρ2 and ρ3= ρ4 are the 
Wald-tests for equality. ***, ** and * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.   
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Table 5C.3: Estimation results of TAR model with dummies using 30 min data (moving average thresholds) 
 α δ ρ1 ρ2 ρ3 ρ4 ρ1=ρ2   ρ3=ρ4 
Panel A:  Year 2009     
2009 02-07  0.0020*** 
(2.777) 
0.0024** 
(2.470) 
-0.3460*** 
(-8.539) 
-0.2211*** 
(-4.036) 
-0.3037*** 
(-7.009) 
-0.2017** 
(-2.168) 
4.762** 1.070 
2009 02-08 0.0016*** 
(2.814) 
0.0028*** 
(3.424) 
-0.3440*** 
(-9.175) 
-0.2070*** 
(-4.268) 
-0.3020*** 
(-7.509) 
-0.1874** 
(-2.327) 
7.087*** 1.752 
2009 02-10 0.0010** 
(2.560) 
0.0033*** 
(4.829) 
-0.3373*** 
(-10.046) 
-0.1954*** 
(-4.875) 
-0.2955*** 
(-8.128) 
-0.2124*** 
(-3.788) 
10.578*** 1.724 
Panel B:  Year 2010     
2010 02-07 0.0008*** 
(2.708) 
0.0006 
(1.358) 
-0.1315*** 
(-5.890) 
-0.1198*** 
(-5.215) 
-0.1115** 
(-2.449) 
-0.0704** 
(-1.995) 
0.145 0.517 
2010 02-08 0.0006** 
(2.470) 
0.0008* 
(1.924) 
-0.1289*** 
(-5.855) 
-0.1087*** 
(-5.295) 
-0.1098** 
(-2.434) 
-0.1398*** 
(-4.398) 
0.486 0.302 
2010 02-10  0.0004** 
(2.306) 
0.0009*** 
(2.703) 
-0.1277*** 
(-6.257) 
-0.1053*** 
(-5.970) 
-0.1090*** 
(-2.594) 
-0.1265*** 
(-4.795) 
0.749 0.127 
Panel C:  Year 2011     
2011 02-07 0.0011*** 
(5.540) 
0.0023*** 
(4.921) 
-0.0805*** 
(-7.426) 
-0.1422*** 
(-8.529) 
-0.1232*** 
(-8.167) 
-0.1046*** 
(-4.311) 
10.893*** 0.455 
2011 02-08  0.0010*** 
(6.446) 
0.0028*** 
(6.2952) 
-0.0897*** 
(-8.648) 
-0.1398*** 
(-9.567) 
-0.1346*** 
(-9.307) 
-0.1084*** 
(-5.179) 
8.825*** 1.136 
2011 02-10 0.0009*** 
(7.942) 
0.0033*** 
(8.213) 
-0.0992*** 
(-10.424) 
-0.1424*** 
(-11.736) 
-0.1464*** 
(-11.017) 
-0.1098*** 
(-6.319) 
8.827*** 2.968 
Note: The table shows the estimation results of the threshold autoregressive (TAR) model with dummy variables using 30 min data. The model is specified as: 
1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1
1
(1 ) (1 ) (1 )(1 )
k
t t t t t t t t t t t t t t i t i t
i
Z D Z I D Z I D Z I D Z I D Z           

               
where Dt is a dummy variable set to be 1 during the period before 30 April and 0 otherwise. It is also a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if Zt-1 is greater than or equal to 
the threshold, and 0 otherwise. The thresholds are determined by using a 10-day moving average. 2009 02-07 indicates the sample period covering February 2009 to July 
2009; and by analogy for the rest of the sample periods. The results for 2009, 2010 and 2011 are shown in Panel A, Panel B and Panel C, respectively. α+δ and α are the 
intercept terms during the period before and after 30 April, respectively. The values of the t-statistics for each parameter are presented in parentheses. ρ1= ρ2 and ρ3= ρ4 are the 
Wald-tests for equality. ***, ** and * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.   
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion 
 
 
6.1. Summary of the findings and the implications 
Using the data from the second commitment period of the EU ETS, this thesis 
investigates the time series properties and trading behaviour in the European carbon emission 
markets. Specifically, this research examines the performance of Markov regime switching 
and alternative hedging strategies, the effects of arbitrage opportunities on feedback trading, 
and the impact of the allowance submission deadline on the relationship between carbon spot 
and futures markets. In this section, the author summarises the main findings of this thesis 
and discusses the implications of the findings. 
The first empirical chapter, Chapter 3, models the relationship between carbon spot and 
futures markets by incorporating regime switching, disequilibrium adjustment into the return 
process with state dependent and clustering in the volatility process, and compares the 
performance of regime switching hedging strategies with alternative approaches. 
Specifically, the author proposes a Markov regime switching model (MRS) with a long run 
relationship (LR) and DCC-GARCH errors, to connect the idea of long run disequilibrium 
adjustment measured by a lagged basis with that of uncertainty estimated by DCC-GARCH, 
across high/low variance states (referred to as the MRS-LR-DCC model). The empirical 
results show that the class of Markov regime switching hedging strategies significantly 
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outperform constant OLS, VECM and GARCH hedging approaches for all the hedging 
performance measures considered, including minimising hedged portfolio variance, 
maximising hedgers’ utility, and reducing the VaR exposure of the hedged portfolio, for both 
in-sample and out-of-sample analysis. Within the class of Markov regime switching hedging 
strategies, the MRS-LR-DCC model achieves the highest variance reduction, and the 
improvements offered by the MRS-LR-DCC approach over other hedging strategies are 
statistically significant at conventional levels, as indicated by the results of White’s (2000) 
reality check. In addition, the results suggest that the MRS-LR model constantly outstrips the 
MRS model for all measures and for both in-sample and out-of-sample analysis. This implies 
that incorporating the long run relationship measured by a lagged basis into the hedging 
model can provide incremental value for hedging. Besides the symmetric hedging 
performance measures mentioned above, this chapter also considers the downside risk 
measures and differences in hedging performance between long and short hedging positions. 
The results of the downside risk analysis show that the constant and GARCH hedging 
approaches still underperform the class of Markov regime switching strategies and the MRS-
LR-DCC model performs best in most cases, for both long and short hedging positions, 
which is generally in line with the results achieved by using symmetric measures. This 
suggests that no matter what position market participants hold, they can benefit from using 
regime switching hedging strategies. Overall, the results of this chapter demonstrate the 
importance of using state dependent hedge ratios to hedge the financial risk in carbon 
emission markets. Risk managers using Markov regime switching approaches to hedge their 
exposure to carbon emission allowances can achieve greater variance reduction and better 
hedging performance. 
In Chapter 4, this thesis develops and estimates several feedback trading models in which 
the feedback investors’ demand function not only depends on the last period’s asset returns, 
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but also on the potential arbitrage opportunities within the spot and futures markets. It is an 
extension of Sentana and Wadhwani’s (1992) feedback trading model by considering the 
impact of arbitrage opportunities on the demand of feedback traders, in both an additive way 
and a multiplicative way. The results firstly show that there is no evidence of feedback 
trading in European carbon emission markets, where institutional investors dominate due to 
the EU ETS regulations, implying that institutional investors are not necessarily all feedback 
traders. The finding is inconsistent with the common belief that institutional investors 
significantly contribute to feedback trading activities. However, significant feedback trading 
is found in a few other energy markets.  In addition, the results of the augmented feedback 
trading models suggest that arbitrage opportunities can affect demand from feedback traders 
in several energy markets, in both an additive and a multiplicative way. This supports the 
view that arbitrage opportunities have an influence on feedback trading. Furthermore, this 
thesis finds that the response of feedback traders to the last period’s return or arbitrage 
opportunities varies significantly across bull and bear market conditions. This indicates that 
the impact of arbitrage opportunities on feedback trading is also dependent on bull/bear 
market regimes. Finally, all the findings above are robust to different measures of arbitrage 
opportunities, including the spot-futures basis and the convenience yield. To summarise, the 
findings of this chapter support the argument that feedback traders in some markets also 
consider the potential arbitrage opportunities when making investment decisions. The 
findings are important in understanding investors’ trading behaviour and trading strategies in 
the carbon emission and energy markets and also contribute to the debate about whether 
institutional investors are feedback traders or not. 
Chapter 5 studies the impact of the allowance submission deadline under the EU ETS on 
the time series characteristics of the relationship between carbon spot and futures markets by 
using high frequency data. In particular, this chapter examines whether the mean-reverting 
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process of the relationship between carbon spot and futures prices, and the price discovery 
and volatility spillover process in the carbon spot and futures markets are different before and 
after the submission deadline each year. The results show that spot and futures prices are 
cointegrated with each other for the periods before and after the submission deadline, which 
suggests that the previous mixed results regarding the cointegration relationship between 
carbon spot and futures prices are not caused by the allowance submission deadline. However, 
the chapter finds that there is a shift in the equilibrium level, adjustment speed and the no-
arbitrage bands after the submission deadline, which implies that the mean-reverting process 
changes after the allowance submission deadline. Moreover, the results indicate that the 
impact of allowance submission on the price discovery process in carbon emission markets is 
not significant, as there is a bidirectional causal relationship between carbon spot and futures 
returns for the periods before and after the submission deadline. Furthermore, the chapter 
finds that the volatility spillover process changes due to the submission of carbon allowances, 
especially from the spot market to the futures markets. Finally, the findings in the chapter are 
robust to different intraday time frequencies. The effects described above are more significant 
in 2009 and 2011 than in 2010. The weak impact of the submission deadline on the spot and 
futures relationship in 2010 is due to the fact that industrial production and GHG emission in 
the EU slow down significantly in 2009 because of the global financial crisis and the 
European sovereign debt crisis. The findings of the chapter indicate that, when modelling the 
relationship between carbon spot and futures markets (e.g. for arbitrage purposes), the 
difference in the mean-reverting process and volatility spillover before and after the 
submission deadline should be taken into account. 
Overall, the thesis finds that carbon emission markets yield different time series 
characteristics and trading behaviours from other financial markets. The findings of this 
thesis are of interest to risk managers, environmental investors and arbitragers participating in 
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the carbon emission market and could help policy makers to improve the mechanisms of the 
EU ETS in the next commitment period.     
 
6.2. Limitations and further research  
Last but not least, a few limitations of the thesis need to be addressed. Firstly, this thesis 
uses the second commitment period data of the EU ETS from 2008 to 2012. Although 
European carbon emission markets were created in 2005, this research does not combine the 
Phase I and Phase II data of the EU ETS together because of the different mechanisms used 
in each commitment period. In order to obtain enough observations to estimate the Markov 
regime switching models, Chapter 3 uses the spot and futures price data on a daily basis. 
However, most studies on the performance of regime switching hedging strategies use 
weekly data and a sample period of longer than 15 years (e.g. Alizadeh and Nomikos, 2004; 
Lee and Yoder, 2007a, b; Alizadeh et al., 2008; Lee, 2010). This shows that most research 
assumes that risk managers rebalance their portfolios on a weekly basis while this thesis 
assumes that they rebalance their portfolios every day, which is unrealistic in practise. This 
frequent rebalancing would incur significant transaction and monitoring costs, which would 
have negative effects on the actual performance of the Markov regime switching hedging 
strategies.  
Another limitation of the thesis is the proxy used for arbitrage opportunities. In Chapter 4, 
this research adopts two measures for arbitrage opportunities: the lagged values of the spot-
futures basis; and the convenience yield. Both measures show the degree that spot and futures 
prices deviate from each other and thus can act as signals for the presence of arbitrage 
opportunities. However, strictly speaking, arbitrage activities are triggered when the profit 
generated by arbitrage is greater than the round trip transaction costs. There are no arbitrage 
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activities when the deviation is within no-arbitrage bands. Therefore, when the basis and 
convenience yield move within certain thresholds determined by the transaction costs, they 
are not perfect measures for arbitrage opportunities as these small deviations cannot trigger 
arbitrage activities. With advances in understanding the characteristics of arbitrage activities, 
there is no doubt that a better proxy can be found to measure the arbitrage opportunities.  
The third limitation of the thesis is related to the thin trading problem in carbon emission 
markets suggested by Montagnoli and De Vries (2010). The trading volume of carbon 
emission markets has increased dramatically in the EU ETS Phase II; however, when 
observing the tick-by-tick data, in some cases, there are only one or two transactions within a 
10-minute interval, especially in the spot market. The thin trading problem will induce price 
jumps and temporary large mispricing of futures contracts which cannot immediately be 
corrected through arbitrage activities, and which makes it difficult to convert irregular 
transaction data into equidistant price data. In order to address this problem, Chapter 5 only 
considers the transactions that took place between 09:00 to 16:00 GMT, and constructs the 
price data at 10-minute, 15-minute and 30-minute intervals, but not 5-minute intervals. 
Nonetheless, it also can be observed from Figure 5.1 that there are several large values in the 
time series of the carbon futures mispricing with 15-minute time intervals. With the 
development of the carbon emission markets, the author believes that the thickness of carbon 
emission markets will not be a problem for empirical research in the next commitment period. 
Apart from these limitations, this thesis raises several questions for future research. 
Firstly, this thesis shows the impact of the allowance submission deadline on the mean-
reverting process of carbon futures mispricing and the volatility spillover between the spot 
and futures markets. However, the impact of the submission deadline on hedging has not 
been examined. The pricing efficiency of futures contracts and the basis risk are important in 
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determining the performance of futures hedging (Figlewski, 1984). Therefore, the hedging 
performance in carbon emission markets may be affected by the allowance submission 
deadline. The first suggestion for future research is to examine whether the impact is 
significant or not. 
Secondly, this thesis analyses hedging, feedback trading and arbitrage activities in carbon 
emission markets. Nevertheless, the profitability of technical trading rules in carbon emission 
markets, including momentum and contrarian strategies, has not been investigated. Sullivan 
et al. (1999) evaluate the performance of 7,846 technical trading rules in the U.S. stock 
market and address the data snooping issue. Qi and Wu (2006) and Marshall et al. (2008) 
conduct similar research in foreign exchange and commodity markets, respectively. Given 
the high volatility and low level of market efficiency in carbon emission markets, technical 
trading rules are expected to generate significant abnormal returns. In addition, the allowance 
submission deadline may also have an influence on the performance of technical trading 
strategies. For the reasons described above, the second direction for future research would 
involve studying the profitability of quantitative timing trading strategies and the impact of 
the allowance submission deadline on the performance of these strategies. 
Thirdly, the thesis focuses on the European carbon emissions markets and only considers 
a single type of carbon financial instrument, i.e. the EUA. Further research could therefore 
examine the characteristics of carbon emission markets in other parts of the world, and could 
include other types of carbon financial instruments, for example the Certified Emission 
Reduction (CER) from the CDM programmes and the Emission Reduction Unit (ERU) from 
the JI projects.  
Finally, the third commitment period (2013-2020) of the EU ETS has already been 
launched in 2013.  A number of important regulatory changes have been made from Phase II 
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to Phase III. For example, a larger proportion of carbon allowances are now distributed 
through auction than through free allocation; more restrictions are imposed on using carbon 
emission allowances outside of the EU as a substitute for EUAs, etc. With increasing data 
availability, another suggestion for future research would be to investigate the new features of 
carbon emission markets in EU ETS Phase III. 
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